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A B S T R A C T
The Internet of Things (IoT) promises to be an enhanced platform for support-ing a heterogeneous range of context-aware applications in the fields of traffic
monitoring, healthcare, and home automation, to name a few. The essence of the
IoT is in the inter-networking of distributed information sources and the analysis of
their data to understand the interactions between the physical objects, their users,
and their environment. Complex Event Processing (CEP) is a cogent paradigm to
infer higher-level information from atomic event streams (e.g., sensor data in the
IoT). Using functional computing modules called operators (e.g., filters, aggregates,
sequencers), CEP provides for an efficient and low-latency processing environment.
Privacy and mobility support for context processing is gaining immense impor-
tance in the age of the IoT. However, new mobile communication paradigms—like
Device-to-Device (D2D) communication—that are inherent to the IoT, must be en-
hanced to support a privacy-aware and reliable execution of CEP operators on mo-
bile devices. It is crucial to preserve the differing privacy constraints of mobile users,
while allowing for flexible and collaborative processing. Distributed mobile environ-
ments are also susceptible to adversary attacks, given the lack of sufficient control
over the processing environment. Lastly, ensuring reliable and accurate CEP becomes
a serious challenge due to the resource-constrained and dynamic nature of the IoT.
In this thesis, we design and implement a privacy-aware and reliable CEP system
that supports distributed processing of context data, by flexibly adapting to the dy-
namic conditions of a D2D environment. To this end, the main contributions, which
form the key components of the proposed system, are three-fold:
(i) We develop a method to analyze the communication characteristics of the users
and derive the type and strength of their relationships. By doing so, we utilize
the behavioral aspects of user relationships to automatically derive differing
privacy constraints of the individual users.
(ii) We employ the derived privacy constraints as trust relations between users to
execute CEP operators on mobile devices in a privacy-aware manner. In turn,
we develop a trust management model called TrustCEP that incorporates a
robust trust recommendation scheme to prevent adversary attacks and allow
for trust evolution.
(iii) Finally, to account for reliability, we propose FlexCEP, a fine-grained flexible
approach for CEP operator migration, such that the CEP system adapts to the
dynamic nature of the environment. By extracting intermediate operator state
and by leveraging device mobility and instantaneous characteristics, FlexCEP
provides a flexible CEP execution model under varying network conditions.
Overall, with the help of thorough evaluations of the above three contributions,
we show how the proposed distributed CEP system can satisfy the requirements
established above for a privacy-aware and reliable IoT environment.
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K U R Z FA S S U N G
Das Internet der Dinge (engl. Internet of Things [IoT]) wird künftig eine verbessertePlattform für heterogene kontextbewusste Anwendungen unter anderem in
den Bereichen von Verkehrsbeobachtung, Gesundheitsfürsorge und Heimautoma-
tion bieten. Das Hauptprinzip des IoT ist die Vernetzung von verteilten Informa-
tionsquellen (z.B. Sensoren in der Umgebung) und die Analyse ihrer Daten, um Ein-
blicke in die Zusammenhänge zwischen den physischen Entitäten, deren Nutzern,
und deren Umgebung zu gewinnen. Komplexe Ereignisverarbeitung (engl. Complex
Event Processing [CEP]) bietet eine stichhaltige Lösung, höherwertige Informationen
aus den atomaren Ereignisströmen (bspw. Sensordaten im IoT) abzuleiten. Durch
funktionale Rechenmodule, sogenannte Operatoren (z.B. Filter, Aggregator, Sequen-
zer), verschafft CEP eine effiziente Verarbeitungsumgebung mit niedriger Latenz.
Die Sicherstellung der Privatsphäre und die Unterstützung der Mobilität von Nutz-
ern ist im Zeitalter des IoT von enormer Bedeutung. Doch neue mobile Kommunika-
tionsparadigmen im IoT, wie Gerät-zu-Gerät (engl. Device-to-Device [D2D]) Kommu-
nikation, müssen erweitert werden, um eine privatsphärenbewusste und zuverläs-
sige Ausführung von CEP auf mobilen Geräten zu unterstützen. Für mobile Nutzer
müssen dabei vielfältige und unterschiedliche Bedingungen an die Privatsphäre
sichergestellt werden. Gleichzeitig muss das CEP-System ein hohes Maß an Flexibil-
ität sowie Kollaboration zwischen den Nutzern unterstützen, um relevante Informa-
tionen für die Nutzer erkennen zu können. Verteilte Umgebungen können außerdem
aufgrund der fehlenden Kontrolle über die einzelnen Systemkomponenten Angrif-
fen ausgesetzt sein. Schließlich stellt die Aufrechterhaltung eines zuverlässigen und
akkuraten CEP-Systems aufgrund der Ressourceneinschränkungen sowie Dynamik
des IoT eine erhebliche Herausforderung dar.
In dieser Dissertation wird ein privatsphärenbewusstes und zuverlässiges CEP-
System entwickelt, implementiert und evaluiert. Das CEP-System unterstützt eine
verteilte Verarbeitung von Kontextdaten im IoT, indem es sich flexibel den dynam-
ischen Rahmenbedingungen einer D2D-Umgebung anpasst. Die Hauptbeiträge dieser
Arbeit, die auch die drei Hauptkomponenten des entwickelten Systems bilden, lauten
wie folgt:
(i) Als erster Beitrag wird eine Methode zur Analyse der Kommunikation zwis-
chen Nutzern entwickelt, um daraus die Art und Stärke der Beziehungen
abzuleiten. Somit werden die verhaltensbezogenen Eigenschaften von Nutzer-
beziehungen in Anspruch genommen, um automatisch die unterschiedlichen
Privatsphärebedingungen der einzelnen Nutzer abzuleiten;
(ii) Im zweiten Beitrag werden die abgeleiteten Privatsphärebedingungen zum Er-
mitteln des Vertrauens zwischen Nutzern angewendet, um somit die CEP-
Operatoren unter Sicherstellung der Privatsphäre auf mobilen Geräten umset-
zen zu können. Dazu wird ein Modell zur Verwaltung des Nutzervertrauens
v
namens TrustCEP konzipiert. Das Modell ermöglicht bei Angriffen anderer
Nutzer robuste Empfehlungen hinsichtlich des aktuellen Nutzervertrauens, um
dabei auch wechselndes Benutzerverhalten und Änderungen der Vertrauens-
beziehungen über die Zeit zu berücksichtigen;
(iii) Im dritten Beitrag wird zur Unterstützung der Zuverlässigkeit ein feingranu-
larer und flexibler Ansatz namens FlexCEP für die Migration von Operatoren
entwickelt. Dieser erlaubt dem CEP-System, sich der Dynamik im Netzwerk
anpassen zu können. FlexCEP bietet eine flexible Ausführung von CEP bei
wechselnden Netzwerkbedingungen, indem einerseits der Zwischenzustand
der Operatoren und andererseits die aktuellen Mobilitäts- und Leistungswerte
der Geräte berücksichtigt werden.
Insgesamt wird durch umfassende Evaluationen gezeigt, dass das entwickelte
verteilte CEP-System die oben beschriebenen Anforderungen für eine privatsphären-
bewusste und zuverlässige IoT-Umgebung erfüllt.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Recent years have seen a dramatic paradigm shift towards networked sensor-fitted devices (e.g., smartphones), and subsequently, the rise of context- and
situation-aware applications. Such applications interact with users and their environ-
ment to provide specific services based on the prevailing user context. Examples can
be found in the fields of environmental monitoring—observing noise and air pollu-
tion levels in the environment and marking the areas that users should avoid [57]—
and traffic management—observing traffic movement and congestion levels to opti-
mize traffic flow on highways [77]—as well as healthcare monitoring [103, 135] and
home automation [138], to name a few.
A promising emerging concept that lays an improved platform for heterogeneous
context-aware applications is the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT entails the inter-
networking of mobile devices like smartphones, vehicles, and environmental sensors
present in everyday infrastructure like buildings and electronics [31, 76, 203, 237].
Thus, the IoT offers the potential for an increased availability of information about
the environment, leading to the notion of smart cities and smart infrastructure [203,
237].
A key concept in the IoT is Device-to-Device (D2D) communication, which is also
set to be part of the Fifth Generation (5G) standard for the future cellular network
architecture and future wireless systems, especially for improving network cover-
age [87, 211]. Given the resource-constrained nature of the devices involved in the
IoT, D2D communication ensures better efficiency, especially with respect to com-
munication costs and energy consumption in a mobile environment. Owing to direct
communication among the devices and reduced dependency on a central entity, D2D
communication allows for improved availability and accessibility of the sensing and
processing devices [31, 140]. In this thesis, we mainly focus on local D2D environ-
ments, where devices process and exchange information collaboratively, without the
necessity of a central entity.
Context processing and recognition is the most basic requirement for any context-
aware application. One of the most promising paradigms for context processing is
Complex Event Processing (CEP) or just event processing. CEP enables an efficient in-
ference of higher-level data by discovering inherent patterns in event streams (e.g.,
sensor data) [36, 53, 54, 69]. Basically, CEP facilitates the interpretation of incoming
event streams using computing modules, often called operators, and produces higher-
level information with high accuracy and low latency [53, 157].
A major aspect of context processing in the IoT is data privacy, primarily in view
of the possibility of the inference and processing of sensitive information about a
user’s location, co-location, activity, or mood [129, 184, 193]. Thus, ensuring the pri-
vacy of events in CEP systems poses a serious challenge, especially given the dis-
1
2 introduction
tributed nature of the IoT, where sensitive information can be processed on several
(possibly malicious) devices [59, 61]. In addition to privacy, ensuring reliability dur-
ing distributed event processing also poses a significant challenge in the IoT. Given
the resource-constrained and dynamic nature of a D2D environment, any distributed
processing system must adapt itself to the varying conditions of the environment.
In this thesis, we propose a distributed CEP system that facilitates the preserva-
tion of privacy as well as increases reliability in dynamic D2D environments in the
IoT. In the following, we motivate our approach by highlighting some important con-
cepts behind CEP as well as the main challenges towards the above-mentioned goal.
We then draw the main research questions and corresponding contributions of this
thesis.
1.1 motivation
The first event processing systems in related literature focused primarily on the fil-
tering and extraction of relevant events from incoming notifications. This formed
the basis for the well-known, message-oriented interaction paradigm called publish/-
subscribe [40, 70, 165], where users can obtain information of interest by subscribing
to particular topics or classes of events. CEP extends traditional publish/subscribe
systems by allowing users to perform certain operations on simple events (e.g., tem-
perature data) to obtain complex events (e.g., fire) [36, 53, 54].
Typically in CEP, multiple dependent operators, such as filters, aggregates, and se-
quencers, are used to produce complex events. The operators can be placed freely on
processing elements, while the execution order and the corresponding input/output
relationship of event streams are dictated by directed, acyclic graphs called operator
graphs. These operator graphs connect producers (i.e., sources of information) to con-
sumers (i.e., stakeholders of higher-level information) through event streams [54, 157].
By means of appropriate collaboration among available devices exchanging informa-
tion, distributed CEP provides for an efficient and low-latency processing platform.
The main objective of any distributed CEP system is the adequate placement of
the CEP operators on the available devices. A wide spectrum of methods have been
proposed in related literature for the appropriate placement of CEP operators to
satisfy different processing requirements [38, 54, 121, 157, 201]. CEP placement algo-
rithms address an extensive range of issues, e.g., improving bandwidth and memory
usage [23], minimizing processing and communication delays [54, 157, 159], and im-
proving energy efficiency [201, 231]. Nevertheless, the execution of placement algo-
rithms in a highly dynamic environment like D2D-based networks in the IoT imposes
major difficulties with respect to the privacy and dynamic nature of both, the users
and the devices involved. In the following, we detail these challenges to highlight
the main requirements of the privacy-aware and reliable CEP system proposed in
this thesis.
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1.1.1 Main Challenges
Respecting the differing privacy concerns of users. Distributed processing in the
IoT involves interaction and collaboration among users with possibly different pri-
vacy constraints. The privacy constraints depend strongly on the type of information
shared as well as the intended recipient(s) [114, 153, 170]. For example, in a typi-
cal context recognition system, users may be willing to share their location readings
with anyone by classifying them as non-private information. On the other hand, they
may only share their microphone readings with close friends/colleagues, classifying
them as extremely sensitive information. These constraints may vary from user to
user, depending also on the time of the day and nature of the situation at hand. It is
important to consider these privacy constraints while deploying CEP on available de-
vices, such that user privacy constraints are protected while still facilitating flexible
collaboration among devices.
Preventing adversary attacks. Distributed systems are generally susceptible to differ-
ent kinds of adversary attacks. A fundamental issue in distributed processing is the
difficulty to comprehensively track the path of events after they have been dissemi-
nated, and to control the activity of the other devices involved [195]. This becomes
increasingly challenging in a D2D-based network, where the devices are mobile and
interconnected intermittently. Adversaries may collaborate with other adversaries to
obtain more sensitive information from a combination of received event streams. Pre-
venting adversary attacks, hence, becomes a crucial factor for the proper functioning
of one such system.
Adapting to a dynamic user environment. The placement and execution of CEP op-
erator graphs varies with dynamic changes in the available sensor data as well as the
available processing devices. The main problem with distributed CEP in D2D-based
networks is possible network discontinuity due to device movement or failure [60,
110, 122, 159], which in turn leads to the loss of events and/or falsified output events.
Accounting for device mobility is an important requirement in the IoT. The perfor-
mance of devices like user smartphones can fluctuate due to the restricted amount
of resources like battery life and memory space. Hence, it becomes pivotal to adapt
the execution of CEP operator graphs in a flexible manner to the dynamic changes
in the environment.
1.1.2 Key Research Gaps
There exists a large collection of approaches towards distributed CEP in related litera-
ture, covering a wide spectrum of system requirements. Most existing approaches fo-
cus on fixed networks and on performance metrics, such as latency, bandwidth, and
network load [23, 54, 121, 167], by placing the CEP operators on appropriate devices.
Other CEP-related approaches in the field of wireless and mobile networks concen-
trate on achieving either low latency event processing [157, 159] or energy-efficiency
among resource-constrained devices [201, 231]. But these approaches neglect privacy
altogether. Current CEP systems that do consider privacy as a constraint concen-
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trate on access policy mechanisms to facilitate the processing of sensitive events in a
distributed environment [91, 187]. However, these systems have been construed for
static networks and scenarios with low dynamic behavior.
The flow of events from one device to another must take place in adherence to
the privacy constraints of the users involved, which thereby has a direct correspon-
dence with the placement of CEP operators. The privacy-aware placement of CEP
operators becomes a crucial issue, especially when a priori knowledge of the sensing
and processing devices is unavailable. Many related approaches in other distributed
environments—e.g., Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs),
or Delay-Tolerant Networks (DTN)—propose to tackle this issue by capitalizing on the
trust between the devices to facilitate privacy-aware data processing [47, 124, 174,
206, 208, 216, 229]. However, these approaches either consider a trusted third party
to allow for privacy-aware transactions, suffer from high computational delays, or
do not devise appropriate methods to deal with the evolution of trust over time.
The constantly changing user landscape enforces additional restrictions on the
operation of a distributed CEP system. Even after operator placement, appropriate
measures must be taken to adapt system functionality to the dynamic changes. The
migration of operators to less failure-prone devices can support a reliable execution
of CEP operator graphs in these environments. While existing work on reliability in
CEP systems has proposed cogent solutions for static and fixed networks [22, 65, 93,
116, 159, 188], there is a clear lack of approaches for the dynamic mobile environment,
where resource constraints and device mobility are the norm.
1.2 research questions and main contributions
The main goal of our work is to design, realize, and evaluate a privacy-aware and
reliable CEP system that allows for the distributed processing of context data, by
flexibly adapting to the dynamic conditions of a D2D environment. Consequently,
based on this goal and the analysis of the key research gaps, we address the follow-
ing three research questions. For each of the research questions, we provide a brief
description of the corresponding contributions in this thesis.
RQ1.1: How can we automatically estimate user relationships in order to identify user
privacy constraints?
One of the primary factors that affects users’ privacy constraints—especially with
respect to the amount of information they would like to disclose or share—is their re-
lationship with other users and the corresponding trust level [51, 114, 153]. In order
to identify these privacy constraints, we investigate how we can estimate the type
(social circle) and closeness (tie strength) of user relationships based on their interac-
tions. In particular, we propose a method to analyze users’ communication behavior
on synchronous and asynchronous channels with the help of our smartphone-based
application called FamApp for field studies, expanding our previous work [58]. In
doing so, we determine the factors—e.g., intensity, frequency, locative dependence,
and temporal dependence—that have the most influence on estimating user relation-
ships.
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RQ1.2: What are the implications of user privacy constraints on CEP operator placement
and execution?
We leverage the concept of trust in supply chain management such that the trust
level between two users (also termed dyadic trust [181]) dictates the amount of infor-
mation shared between them [64]. We use the concept of behavioral trust [5, 190, 212]
to capture the direct trust between the users, based on the analysis of their commu-
nication behavior, as per our contribution to RQ1.1. In doing so, we capitalize on
the social networking characteristics of the user environment to establish a privacy-
aware setting for event processing. We propose a trust-based approach called Trust-
CEP for distributed CEP [59], wherein we (i) propose a trust management model
based on user communication behavior, (ii) incorporate a robust trust recommen-
dation scheme to overcome adversary attacks and support trust evolution, and (iii)
develop an algorithm to apply local trust for privacy-aware operator placement and
execution of CEP operator graphs.
RQ1.3: How can we ensure flexible execution of CEP operators in dynamic D2D environ-
ments?
To overcome the challenges of reliability and efficient execution of CEP operator
graphs in dynamic D2D environments, we propose FlexCEP, a flexible approach
for fine-grained mobility-aware operator migration from one device to another in
D2D-based networks in the IoT. To this end, building on previous work [60], we (i)
demonstrate how operator state can be extracted from a standard CEP environment,
and (ii) leverage device mobility and other instantaneous characteristics (e.g., cur-
rent energy levels) to migrate partially extracted operator state in a resource-efficient
manner. In turn, FlexCEP offers an increased flexibility in failure-prone environ-
ments, by trading between communication overhead and recovery time, depending
on the application needs.
With these contributions, we satisfy the requirements for a privacy-aware and re-
liable CEP system in dynamic D2D environments. While our focus lies in the local
D2D environment with direct interaction between devices, the above approaches can
also be applied in other distributed environments on a global scale using concepts
like fog computing [34, 35, 94, 157] and cloudlets [185, 215] that allow for hybrid
solutions.
Furthermore, with respect to privacy, we mainly propose a trust-based approach
that adhere to user privacy constraints in order to facilitate distributed processing.
However, we assume that appropriate security mechanisms underlie our implemen-
tation, based on existing advancements in encryption and authentication [68, 97, 155,
162].
Finally, we assume the availability of an appropriate CEP query language and
rule-set for different IoT applications. In turn, we assume that the generated CEP
operator graphs can be executed in a distributed environment with many devices, as
has been shown by many related efforts so far [54, 157, 201]. Thus, we do not focus
on the generation of rule models and their semantics. Interested readers may refer to
related work by Chakravarthy and Mishra [44], and by Cugola and Margara [52, 54].
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1.3 thesis structure
In the following, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the fundamentals in distributed
processing systems, focusing on operator placement and migration in a distributed
CEP system, as well as the concepts of human relationships and trust in distributed
computing. We classify the state of the art in these categories and detail the key re-
search gaps, which are the focus of our work. Based on this discussion, we present
the design of the proposed system as well as key design considerations in Chapter 3.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present and describe the three main contributions of this thesis.
Chapter 4 focuses on the estimation of the type and strength of human relationships
based on past communication behavior using our smartphone application, FamApp.
This forms the basis for the trust-based approach TrustCEP for distributed CEP,
which is detailed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 delves into FlexCEP, which accounts for re-
liable CEP through flexible operator migration in dynamic D2D environments. Each
of these chapters also entails an exhaustive evaluation of the respective approaches.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a summary and outlook towards possi-
ble future work.
2
B A C K G R O U N D A N D S TAT E O F T H E A RT
Our work focuses on the efficient placement and execution of CEP operatorsin a distributed environment, where we comply with the privacy constraints
of the users involved, and take the dynamic characteristics of the environment into
consideration. In the following, we present relevant information on the fundamentals
behind our system as well as the state of the art on existing mechanisms towards
privacy-aware distributed CEP in dynamic user environments.
Going by the three research questions introduced in Section 1.2, we divide this
chapter into three main sections to address the different aspects on event process-
ing (Section 2.1), trusted computing (Section 2.2), and human relationship analysis
(Section 2.3). In turn, we focus on the following questions with respect to the state
of the art: (i) How do existing mechanisms towards operator placement and migra-
tion in distributed event processing systems address privacy and reliability? (Sec-
tions 2.1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.1.3); (ii) How is the concept of (user) trust used to facilitate
privacy-awareness in (distributed) computing? (Section 2.2.1); and (iii) What are the
existing approaches to infer the relationship between two users and what are their
main revelations? (Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). Each of these sections is concluded by a
short discussion of the identified research gaps, which form the basis for our work
in the following chapters.
2.1 event processing systems
In recent years, there has been a steady rise in the number of applications that con-
tinuously process data originating from distributed sources and on the fly to pro-
duce necessary higher-level information about the data. Examples of such applica-
tions include, among others, environmental sensing applications that monitor the
raw atomic data produced by sensors in the environment and produce higher-level
situational information for context-aware services (as in the scenarios described in
Section 3.1), financial stock markets that provide real-time analytics on the stock
prices, and intrusion detection/security monitoring that help in detecting abnormal
system behavior and thus identify potential attacks [28, 36, 45, 46, 53, 136].
In general, such applications are considered part of the so-called Information Flow
Processing (IFP) systems [53]. In particular, CEP systems or just event processing sys-
tems are a class of systems that observe data flow in the form of a continuous stream
of events. The focus here lies in the discovery of inherent patterns in multiple incom-
ing events, and the production of requisite higher-level (complex) events to interested
parties. In the following, we provide a short overview of event processing systems,
compare them against other event-based systems like publish/subscribe and data
stream management systems, and analyze their application in D2D-based environ-
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ments. Subsequently, we proceed to analyze the state of the art in distributed event
processing systems, especially targeting approaches for the placement and execution
of processing operations on available devices.
Introduction to Event Processing Systems
Before we proceed to understand the functionality of event processing systems, let
us first define what an event is, adopted from the definition stated by Etzion and
Niblett [69] as well as Chandy et al. [45].
Event. An event is an occurrence of any meaningful change that has hap-
pened or surmised to have happened within a particular system or do-
main.
In general, both the occurrence as well as a notification of the occurrence are
termed events in related literature. The above definition limits the unlimited num-
ber of occurrences within a given system to those that are meaningful, depending on
the application [36]. In general, an event can be two types: simple and complex.
A simple event can be a change event—where the value of a certain observed param-
eter differs from that in the previous observation, e.g., the position of an object—or
a status event—where we observe the value of a certain parameter at a later point
in time, e.g., readings of a temperature sensor. In the case of the latter, even same
parameter values at different time instants can be considered a meaningful change
depending on the application at hand, e.g., the internal temperature readings of a
CPU.
A complex event is obtained by either a composition or a derivation based on mul-
tiple simple and/or other complex events. They are produced through operations
of event algebra, e.g., aggregation, sequencing, or by using semantic knowledge on
the occurrence of multiple simple/complex events. The aggregate sum of tempera-
ture readings of a CPU over a time period of 10 minutes is an example of a complex
event based on composition. On the other hand, the inference that the CPU fan is not
working properly, based on observations of increasing temperature readings over the
same time period, is an example of a complex event based on derivation. In general,
complex events are generated based on Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rules, which
are applied on the incoming simple/complex events [36, 53].
A CEP system consists of three main components—a set of event producers, a set
of event consumers, and an event processing engine. Figure 1 shows a component-
based overview of a (distributed) CEP system. Event producers are the information
sources in a CEP system, such that they monitor the environment pertinent to the
application at hand (e.g., network traffic for intrusion detection) and produce the
events based on their observations. Event consumers are the stakeholders of a CEP
system, i.e., the ones interested in obtaining higher-level events produced based on
the discovered patterns in (atomic) events generated by event producers.
The event processing engine forms the central component of a CEP system and is
responsible for the transfer of the relevant events after appropriate transformation
to the interested consumers, based on ECA rules specified by the application at
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Figure 1: Main Components of a (Distributed) CEP System
(adopted from Cugola and Margara [53])
hand. The ECA rules are generally specified in the form of so-called operators that
are the functional modules of a CEP system. Each operator accepts event streams as
input, processes them based on the specified logic to detect higher-level events, and
produces an output event stream that forms the input for subsequent operators. The
event flow in the event processing engine is defined by connecting one operator to
the next in the form of a graph called the operator graph.
The architecture of the CEP engine can vary in accordance with the application
design. The event processing engine can be executed on a central entity (centralized)
or on a distributed set of processing devices, commonly called brokers [39, 40, 70]
or event processing agents [69]. In our work, we primarily focus on distributed CEP
systems that are composed of multiple event processing devices in the CEP engine
between producers and consumers. Each of these systems vary in their mechanisms
for routing and forwarding events between the processing devices [41, 69], and how
the processing functions, i.e., the operators, are distributed among the different de-
vices [9, 167].
Parallels to Other Event-Based Systems
CEP systems have a lot in common with other event-based systems that are also
based on the IFP principle. Two of the prominent examples are publish/subscribe sys-
tems [70] and Data Stream Management Systems (DSMS) [15] or Stream Processing Sys-
tems (SPS) [14], which are also based on the principle of message-oriented interaction.
All three systems focus on the scalable handling of incoming data streams and events
from heterogeneous sources, in accordance with a (large) number of processing rules
to produce higher-level information, as queried by interested stakeholders.
DSMSs are based on the concepts behind active database systems, which comprise
a persistent storage unit that maintains all relevant data. Similar to CEP systems,
a DSMS applies ECA-based application rule logic in the form of queries on stored
data in either a one-time or a continuous basis to produce the required higher-level
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information, which is again stored in the database for further processing [15]. These
queries generally entail simple filtering operations or join operations over two or
more incoming data streams. However, unlike CEP systems, DSMSs do not focus on
the discovery of hidden patterns in the incoming data streams through appropriate
sequencing and ordering [53].
On the other hand, the publish/subscribe paradigm provides a generic protocol
design for the realization of event-based systems with the help of a Message-Oriented
Middleware (MOM). Similar to CEP systems, publish/subscribe systems consist of
event publishers, event subscribers, and an event notification service [70]. In publish/sub-
scribe systems, the publishers and subscribers are decoupled in space and time, such
that they do not need to know each other and need not be online at the same time [40,
70, 165]. Subscribers express their interests in the form of subscriptions with respect
to the events generated by the publishers. The event notification service—which can
be a set of brokers, just as in the case of CEP systems—primarily filters the incoming
published events on the basis of the existing subscriptions, and sends the relevant
events to the respective subscribers. Similar to CEP systems, there can be complex
event filters necessary to satisfy the prevalent subscriptions based on the content of
the published events [166]. In this respect, CEP systems can be perceived as an ex-
tension to publish/subscribe systems with additional complex operations to detect
further hidden patterns in the (raw) events produced by the information sources [53].
CEP over D2D
Moving towards 5G cellular networks (and beyond), one of the paramount technolo-
gies expected to have a strong impact on the scalability, latency, and bandwidth
utilization in cellular networks is Device-to-Device (D2D) communication. Cellular
networks with this functionality can allow two devices in close proximity to com-
municate directly with each other and process information cooperatively, in a self-
organizing manner, without the involvement (or with minimal involvement) of cellu-
lar base stations [31, 140, 211] (see Figure 2). D2D communication can play a pivotal
role in the context of modern communication advancements, such as fog comput-
ing [34, 35, 94, 157, 214] and cloudlets [185, 215], as well as MANETs [3] and Vehic-
ular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) [90]. Its application use cases extend from typical
network off-loading in big malls or stadiums to areas of natural disaster without
possibly any cellular connection.
In the IoT, D2D communication forms the basis for collaboration among differ-
ent Internet-compatible devices in the environment, facilitating the deployment of
CEP systems on top to allow for the detection of higher-level situational and con-
textual information. Devices communicate with each other using short-range net-
works based on underlying communication protocols like WiFi, Bluetooth, Zigbee,
and RFID, thus forming multiple-hop networks [31, 140]. In turn, CEP over D2D
allows for in-network processing of atomic events from the producers, without the
involvement of centralized processing entities, especially in view of the resource-
constrained and mobility-driven nature of devices in the IoT. Initial research work
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on the use of CEP in wireless sensor networks proves its viability as a processing
middleware in such resource-constrained environments [122, 183].
Recall from Chapter 1 that one of the central design considerations for any dis-
tributed CEP system is the placement of CEP operators on appropriate devices. This
becomes increasingly important in D2D-based networks in the IoT, where the devices
have varying mobility patterns and resource availability, such that merely placing the
operators does not guarantee a reliable processing environment. Above all, given the
sensitive nature of the data exchanged in an IoT scenario, it behooves the distributed
CEP system to comply with the (possibly varying) privacy constraints of the users
involved. In view of these considerations, we now analyze the state of the art in
distributed CEP systems to understand how they account for the above-mentioned
challenges.
2.1.1 Operator Placement in Distributed Event Processing Systems
Most approaches towards distributed event processing focus on optimizing oper-
ator execution by placing the operators on the appropriate devices, such that the
application-specified criteria, e.g., latency considerations, are satisfied. The most no-
ticeable criteria for operator placement in existing event/stream processing systems
are latency, bandwidth considerations and network load [38, 121].
Rizou et al. [176] propose a placement algorithm that accounts for the reduction of
end-to-end latency in large-scale stream processing environments, while also keep-
ing the network load at a minimum. They give a higher preference to nodes with
more residual resources for the placement of operators, if they lead to the reduction
of the overall processing delay. Similarly, Pietzuch et al. [167] devise a Stream-Based
Overlay Network (SBON) to determine a decentralized strategy for operator place-
ment. By maintaining a distributed cost space metric, SBON determines the place-
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ment strategy that induces the least network usage, while maintaining a low latency
and improved bandwidth utilization. Hong et al. [95] and Ottenwälder et al. [157]
propose approaches to provide for low-latency processing of CEP queries in Mobile
Situation Awareness (MSA) applications. They propose algorithms to cover moving
range queries and spatio-temporal event processing that uses a prediction-based con-
tinuous query handling.
Towards network load balancing, Cugola and Margara [54] propose different de-
ployment strategies for distributed CEP, based on their own CEP query language
called Tesla. Their approach allows for reduction of processing load across a multi-
ple processor architecture, while maintaining the correct operation of the distributed
CEP system. Jayasekara et al. [108] propose a load-balancer based CEP system called
Wihidum that allows for the distribution of CEP operators among the available
nodes, by breaking the CEP query into multiple sub-queries. They propose multiple
algorithms including pipelining and partitioning towards scalability of distributed
CEP systems. Mayer et al. [134] propose an improved windowing approach for par-
allel CEP, such that they minimize the processing load as well as the communication
overhead when placing the operators.
Energy-efficiency also plays an important role in operator placement, especially in
resource-constrained D2D-based networks like Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and
MANETs. Focusing on running a CEP system on a WSN, Li et al. [122] attempt to
reduce the energy consumption on the individual nodes by splitting the complex
queries into server-side and node-side queries, such that only real-time events are
processed directly on the nodes. By doing so, they claim to improve the real-time
performance of their system. Yang et al. [231] propose a collaborative query pro-
cessing framework to utilize the processing power of the individual devices, and
minimizing the amount of communication with a centralized server. They show that
their approach allows for a reduction of 60% of the overall energy consumption
overhead in the system. Starks et al. [201] aim to minimize energy consumption in
resource-constrained devices by limiting the data transmission costs and achieving
near-optimal operator placement, compared to a centralized approach.
2.1.2 Reliability in (Distributed) Event Processing Systems
All of the above approaches deal with the initial placement of CEP operators, but
do not address the problem of operator graph maintenance upon changes in the
system or the network. Operator migration is a key requirement in systems where
the network undergoes dynamic changes, e.g., due to node1 failure or mobility, such
that the operator graph can be restored and system reliability can be maintained.
Most approaches towards reliability and fault-tolerance in event processing systems
can be put into two main categories—(active) replication mechanisms [22, 84, 86, 157,
188, 217] and rollback-recovery mechanisms [42, 65, 85, 100, 101, 116]. Replication
mechanisms maintain one or more backup nodes at all times and improve system
reliability by masking node failures. Rollback-recovery mechanisms, on the other
1 In the context of reliability, we switch between the terms node and device interchangeably.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the Two Traditional Reliability Approaches—Active Replication and
Rollback Recovery/Upstream Backup
hand, use a scheme of persistent event storage on the nodes at different checkpoints
such that these can be used for restoring the system upon failure. Figure 3 illustrates
these two traditional approaches.
Active Replication
With respect to fault-tolerance systems, Schneider introduced active replication mech-
anisms to combat Byzantine and fail-stop failure models [188]. Guerraoui and Schiper [86]
furthered this concept towards software-based replication, where they emphasize
on the necessity for group communication and consensus algorithms to facilitate
software-based replication on off-the-shelf hardware. In general, such systems intro-
duce a horizontal degree of redundancy in the operator graph execution by replicat-
ing the operators on multiple nodes (see Figure 3a). In turn, they minimize the delay
penalty (loss of events) and recovery time during migration, since the redundant
paths can be chosen upon failure of the main path of the operator graph. However,
this introduces a high amount of communication overhead and processor utilization,
since all event streams must be replicated on the backup nodes.
Balazinska et al. [22] propose an approach called dpc (Delay, Process, and Correct)
to handle failures on the part of processing nodes and network failures in the Bore-
alis stream processing system [1]. Using dpc, the authors attempt to minimize the
inconsistencies across all replicas, by allowing for an appropriate trade-off between
data availability and consistency. Heinze et al. [92] propose an algorithm to opti-
mally adapt a stream processing system through appropriate scaling in and scaling
out, depending on the dynamic nature of the workload. They evaluate the princi-
ple of auto-scaling a stream processing system by evaluating different strategies to
determine the appropriate threshold for adaptation.
Towards active replication in CEP systems, Völz et al. [217] propose an algorithm
that tolerates n possible failures by introducing n redundant replicas for each oper-
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ator. Ottenwälder et al. [159] focus on Mobile CEP (MCEP) in the context of MSA ap-
plications, and propose a probabilistic migration approach. Their main focus lies in
reducing latency and improving bandwidth utilization in mobile scenarios through
appropriate migration of CEP operators between edge computing nodes.
Other approaches focus on managing the run-time functionality of operators or in
selective replication to minimize communication costs. Mutschler and Philippsen [145]
propose a framework for runtime migration towards reallocation in distributed event-
based systems. They propose a cooperative handover mechanism to identify the host
devices that receive the replicated event stream from predecessor devices. Grüneberger
et al. [84] propose a conceptual idea towards a selective replication approach in CEP
systems, where they replicate only selected fine-grained parts of an operator. In turn,
they claim to improve system availability with minimal resource usage. Ottenwälder
et al. [158] propose reCEP, an approach to reuse partially overlapping operators in
mobile CEP systems. In turn, they attempt to minimize the computational overhead
and resource consumption.
Rollback Recovery/Upstream Backup
Rollback recovery or upstream backup is an approach for restoring previous check-
points or logs during the execution of any processing system, as summarized in the
survey by Elnozahy et al. [65]. This concept has also been proposed in the context of
network middleboxes by Sherry et al. [191]. They propose improved algorithms to
manage the state of middleboxes (e.g., activity logs and port mappings) upon poten-
tial network failures, by reducing the amount of logged information per middlebox.
In the context of event processing, rollback recovery is mainly done by storing
past events on the dedicated buffers on the devices and retrieving these events upon
failure, therefore introducing a degree of vertical dependency in the operator graph
execution (see Figure 3b). Generally, this is used in large centralized event (or stream)
processing systems, where the storage of events can be controlled in a flexible and
controlled manner. This concept was first introduced by Hwang et al. [100] where
they use upstream nodes as backups for their downstream neighbors by logging
event tuples in their output buffer. Similarly, Gu et al. [85] focus on improving check-
pointing by reducing the communication overhead during run-time through the us-
age of cumulative acknowledgments.
Certain other approaches focus on the state of operators in the processing chain
to optimize system recovery. Castro Fernandez et al. [42] introduce a scale-out and
fault-tolerance mechanism for stream processing in cloud computing. They propose
the externalization of internal operator state to optimize the usage of Virtual Machines
(VMs) based on varying system load, and do so by exploiting the processing, buffer,
and routing states of each operator. Koldehofe et al. [116] approach the same issue in
event processing systems by developing an adaptive acknowledgment-based mech-
anism to maintain non-reproduceable operator state in the form of savepoints. They
incorporate the operator state in their approach to identify the points in time where
the amount of state information is minimal.
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Building on their previous approach, Hwang et al. [101] propose a self-configuring,
cooperative approach for delta-checkpointing with stateful operators like AGGREGATE
and JOIN in distributed stream processing systems. They show that their approach
performs better than approaches that employ active replication or complete check-
pointing in terms of recovery time and run-time overhead. Wang and Peh [219] de-
velop MobiStreams, that deploys a distributed SPS on smartphones. They tackle
the problem of multiple failures and network instability by employing improved
checkpointing techniques—a token-based approach that allows for each operator
to coordinate its checkpointing and thus reduce the amount of stored data; and a
broadcast-based approach that uses UDP-based data transmission to reduce unnec-
essary network overhead.
Hybrid Approaches
Some authors have proposed hybrid approaches by combining different fault-tolerance
mechanisms, primarily in the context of cloud-based stream processing systems. Za-
haria et al. [236] propose a stream processing model called discretized streams to over-
come both system faults as well as slow-processing nodes or stragglers. Heinze et
al. [93] propose an adaptive approach for active replication by scaling the system in
and out, elastically. By using recovery time estimates for each operator, they deter-
mine the required number of operators for replication. Su and Zhou [204] propose
fault-tolerance mechanisms for massively parallel stream processing systems. They
use active replication for only certain operators depending on the availability of re-
sources, and propose a modified passive replication approach for the others. By gen-
erating tentative outputs for the operators without active replication, they attempt to
find the optimal balance between active and passive replication schemes.
2.1.3 Privacy in Event-Based Systems
The issue of privacy gains paramount importance in the field of the IoT, considering
that the data generated by the different sensors can be extremely sensitive. Sensor
data can reveal private information about users, such as their location or activity,
which in turn can be used by malicious users to extract higher-level information
about the users, such as their apartment occupancy hours or their stress levels [184,
193].
Combating privacy becomes increasingly difficult in event-based systems, given
the fact that the data generated by producers can be delivered to any consumers
based on the processing rule logic of the event processing/notification service. This
sense of space decoupling, which is especially inherent to publish/subscribe systems,
leads to many complications when dealing with user privacy. Are the consumers
trustworthy? Is the processing/broker system trustworthy? How can the higher-level
events be observed without violating the privacy constraints of the producers?
In this section, we analyze the different methods used in related literature on event-
based systems—and primarily, CEP systems, DSMSs/SPSs, and publish/subscribe
systems—to combat privacy and security attacks, in general. We focus on a selected
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set of approaches that deal with the confidentiality of information exchanged and the
protection of user privacy in distributed event-based systems. For a complete survey
on confidentiality and security in publish/subscribe systems, we refer the interested
reader to the work by Esposito and Ciampi [68], and Onica et al. [155].
Encryption-Based Mechanisms
Overall, Public-Key Infrastructures (PKIs) are commonly used on a wide scale for se-
curity purposes in any distributed system, where a trust certificate authority facil-
itates encrypted communication with the help of public and private keys [6]. This
also forms the basis for the popular encryption technique, Transport Layer Security
(TLS), that is used for privacy-preserving event dissemination in a few event-based
systems [18, 194, 197]. However, these approaches assume the processing nodes in
between to be trusted.
Many encryption-based mechanisms in distributed event-based systems focus on
the confidentiality of the data transmitted across the broker/processing network,
such that the processing agents/brokers cannot read into the contents of the data
exchanged in the system. In most approaches, honest-but-curious processing devices
are considered, such that they follow system protocol in an honest manner, but are
also curious to learn as much as possible during protocol execution.
Shikfa et al. [192] analyze the different confidentiality requirements in Content-
Based Publish/Subscribe (CBPS) systems, and present a secure routing algorithm to
disseminate events efficiently. They propose encrypted routing tables based on mul-
tiple layer commutative encryption, and secure look-up operations to allow brokers
to perform their forwarding operations on encrypted data. Barazzutti et al. [26] in-
troduce a pre-filtering mechanism in publish/subscribe systems, which builds on
privacy-preserving encrypted matching schemes. In doing so, they propose a com-
putationally less intensive approach that leverages the existing relationships between
the subscriptions to minimize the encryption overhead and yet support data confi-
dentiality. Tariq et al. [210] propose authentication and confidentiality in broker-less
CBPS with the help of identity-based encryption. Using pairing-based cryptography
mechanisms and fine-grained key management, they enable subscription confiden-
tiality and efficient routing of encrypted events.
De Oliveira et al. [152] propose an approach for privacy-preserving event corre-
lation using symmetric homomorphic encryption techniques. They particularly fo-
cus on resolving greater-than and range queries in the context of stream processing
events, such that the processing devices can perform query resolution but do not
infer stream contents. Nabeel et al. [147] propose a novel cryptographic approach—
based on the Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem [162]—to protect both data confi-
dentiality and to safeguard subscriber privacy in CBPS systems. They mainly focus
on performing the operations MATCH and COVER over the brokers, without revealing
the contents of the subscriptions and notifications to them.
In their follow-up work, Nabeel et al. [146] extend their previous work by a novel
approach for group key management in context-based publish/subscribe systems.
This allows for fine-grained encryption-based access control, so that the context-
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based privacy constraints of the publishers and subscribers can be supported. Instead
of Trusted Third Party (TTP) servers performing subscription encryption like in their
previous work, here, the authors employ so-called context managers that provide the
required security parameters to the publishers and subscribers—based on their cur-
rent context—to encrypt their notifications/subscriptions. Based on the group key
management system, the context managers control the information level exchanged
among the subscribers.
Access Control Mechanisms
Access control mechanisms are normally used as an added security mechanism on
top of encryption schemes, like the ones described above. In general, any encryption
scheme involves the exchange of keys to decrypt the encrypted data and retrieve the
original message. Access control mechanisms account for user authentication and
authorization, so that the keys can be exchanged according to the amount of data
a user is allowed to read [68, 155]. User authentication entails the verification of a
user’s identity, whereas authorization accounts for the rights given to a user to access
certain data or to use a certain functionality in a system. Access control mechanisms
have been proposed in the field of cloud computing [235], online social networks [48],
where the general notion is to allow access to user data based on the governing users’
policies.
Belokosztolszki et al. [32] propose a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) mechanism
for publish/subscribe systems, which allows users to manage their data by grouping
the other users into different roles based on how trusted they are. They use the
event-based middleware called Hermes [165] to create a secure framework called
Oasis, which implements policies for: broker-client interaction, type management
(i.e., which roles are allowed to access event types), as well as advertisement and
subscription rights. In this system, unlike the above approaches with homomorphic
encryption schemes, only certain brokers are assumed to be untrustworthy, so that
certain trustworthy brokers can manage the role-based certificate allocation.
Another popular access control mechanism is Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC),
where the authorization to read and modify data is assigned to users based on certain
data attributes as well as attributes of the users themselves [98, 99]. This allows for
a more fine-grained and flexible mechanism for access control, such that additional
factors like environmental conditions or user context can be taken into considera-
tion while allocating authorization rights. Fiege et al. [73] introduce the concepts of
ABAC in the publish/subscribe system Rebeca [163], where they manage the scope of
publisher notifications with the help of attribute certificates. In this approach, a dis-
tributed infrastructure manages the attribute-based keys using an overlay network
and is assumed to be trusted by all users.
In the field of event and stream processing systems, Lindner and Meier [126] pro-
pose a secure stream processing framework that employs access control to manage
the data flow. They implement their approach on top of the Borealis engine, de-
veloped by Abadi et al. [1], which focuses on query processing and optimization in
centralized DSMSs. Their access control mechanism accounts for the authorization of
18 background and state of the art
users to determine who may receive sensitive data streams. To this end, they employ
a simple tuple-based stream suppression method that allows for privacy-preserving
processing of data streams.
Information Flow Control
Another approach towards security in distributed processing systems is a data-centric
approach called Information Flow Control (IFC), that implements mandatory access con-
trol. Basically, IFC deals with the tracking of data (streams) in a system, such that
the propagation of data is controlled through appropriate security labels that are
applicable throughout the entire system, without allowing the users to modify them
(unless they have the rights to do so) [19, 139, 194, 195]. IFC focuses on data isolation,
data flow tracking, and data flow enforcement between any two users in a given sys-
tem. In other words, while normal discretionary access control mechanisms—like the
ones discussed above—consider user-specific policies, systems using IFC consider a
system-wide administrative control [19].
The initial work towards IFC in publish/subscribe systems was developed by
Singh et al. towards policy-based information sharing [197] and IFC in healthcare en-
vironments [196]. Building on these initial approaches, they developed an approach
called interaction control (IC) for publish/subscribe systems based on legal obliga-
tions in a given application environment [194]. Their approach incorporates granular
security constraints that allow for inter-domain event dissemination in a privacy-
preserving manner, without allowing non-domain brokers to obtain any sensitive
data from within a certain domain.
Migliavacca et al. [139] propose a lightweight IFC framework for event processing
systems in the form of DEFCon. They enforce information security by introducing
security labels or tags to the event messages (or parts of the event messages)—a con-
fidentiality tag dictates where an event (or event part) can flow to; an integrity tag
accounts for where an event can flow from. Using these security tags and additional
privileges that can be assigned to certain users, the DEFCon approach accounts for
low processing latency and yet improved security than traditional approaches. How-
ever, the main drawback of this approach is that it is based on centralized systems
where a single administration has control over the individual system components.
The security labels are controlled and assigned in isolated domains that are defined
at the OS-level within these systems, and cannot be modified otherwise.
Enck et al. [67] address the issue of information disclosure within current smart-
phones among third-party applications, and propose a system called TaintDroid
that provides an efficient and dynamic service for tracking sensitive data on smart-
phones. TaintDroid labels the sensitive data from private sources—e.g., contextual
information—and tracks their propagation through program variables, files, and
inter-process messages through the taint they leave behind. Thus, TaintDroid al-
lows users to obtain real-time information about the data that the different mobile
applications use at any point in time. In turn, their approach allows for applications
to share information under the privacy constraints established in the system. Their
2.1 event processing systems 19
evaluation results show an increase of 32% with respect to the processing overhead
on a CPU-bound micro-benchmark.
Obfuscation Mechanisms
Some other related work focuses on the obfuscation of certain data events when
executing CEP operators in a distributed manner on different devices, such that the
sensitive input events cannot be inferred by observing the obtained output events.
This goes hand in hand with the above mechanisms where the obfuscation of the
disseminated data events can be done in accordance with the access control policies
and information flow control.
The existing approaches towards Privacy-Preserving CEP (PP-CEP) predominantly
lay focus on static operator graphs and/or scenarios with a low degree of dynamics.
He et al. [91] present a concept for PP-CEP by analyzing the implications of event pat-
tern reporting on user privacy. By grouping the generated event patterns into public
and private patterns—those that should and should not be reported, respectively—
they propose a mathematical foundation for PP-CEP such that private patterns can
be suppressed intelligently without compromising on the utility of the CEP system.
They primarily concentrate on facilitating privacy-preserving event reporting in the
case of Sequence and Window operators, such that the adversaries may not be able
to infer the private events based on the externally observable events.
Schilling et al. [187] approach this issue by considering user access policies that
are used to obfuscate private event patterns over a chain of dependent operators in a
distributed CEP system. They mainly focus on developing a scalable method to mea-
sure the obfuscation imposed by access policies, especially when there are multiply-
connected correlation paths. Their work is based on the analysis of AGGREGATE opera-
tors, such that the input sensitive events can be sufficiently obfuscated by the output
observable events.
2.1.4 Discussion
Recall that, in our approach, we focus on preserving the privacy of the disseminated
events in a distributed mobile CEP system, where the participating users and their
devices—i.e., their resource availability and the privacy constraints of the users—can
vary dynamically with time.
In terms of reliability, none of the above approaches deal with dynamic D2D envi-
ronments where the nodes are mobile and resource-constrained. In our initial work
on CEP over D2D [60], we explored the possibility of migrating CEP operators in
D2D-based networks by analyzing the main challenges. However, the proposed ap-
proach in that work does not account for mobility-awareness and appropriate buffer
management. In our approach, we propose a flexible fine-grained operator migra-
tion approach that employs the above-described fault-tolerance and reliability mech-
anisms in accordance with the network conditions. In doing so, we leverage the
advantages of active replication and rollback recovery to reduce recovery time as
well as run-time communication overhead in distributed CEP systems.
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In terms of privacy, most of the above approaches are not feasible in dynamic
scenarios, since these scenarios do not provide a priori knowledge of the producers,
consumers, and intermediate processing devices in the environment. The usage of
homomorphic encryption—while promising for privacy-preserving operations in a
distributed environment—has not yet been proven to be applicable for wide-scale
deployment, especially in the IoT [97, 195]. To account for these dynamic conditions,
we propose an approach that incorporates the inherent trust among the participating
users, such that collaborative processing can be facilitated without violating user
privacy constraints. This allows the other approaches towards access control and
obfuscation mechanisms to be used in parallel with ours, where we identify the
trustworthiness of the collaborating devices to establish the user access policies.
2.2 trust in computing
A major component of human relationships and any social network is trust. The
most common form of trust in research is interpersonal trust, where trust is seen as a
medium to evaluate the strength of a social tie between a trustor and a trustee [133]. In
general, trust between two people—dyadic trust—depends on their interactions over
time, and in turn, also influences the behavior of both people in a relationship [113,
181].
In the field of computer science, trust is normally differentiated into system trust
and user trust. System trust mainly describes the trust or expectations placed on a
computer system or device, such that it fulfills the purpose it is intended for [190,
232]. In our work, we account for the aspect of system trust by proposing reliability
mechanisms, as mentioned above in Section 2.1.4.
Our primary focus lies in the evaluation and management of user trust. User trust
finds its roots in the fields of psychology and sociology. One of the most widespread
definitions of user trust, as defined by Gambetta [75] and transcribed by Quercia et
al. [168], reads, “[trust] is a particular level of the subjective probability with which
an agent will perform a particular action, both before [we] can monitor such an action
and in a context in which it affects [our] own action.” Basically, user trust describes
the level of confidence a person places in another person for a particular action,
without them having the ability to control the execution of the action itself [168,
190].
In general, trust2 evolves with experience within a relationship. A positive experi-
ence strengthens the trust in a relationship, whereas a negative experience depletes
the same. Trust in human relationships satisfies a set of properties, which must be
dealt with when incorporating trust in computing systems.
Subjectiveness. People exhibit distinct behaviors and perceive things around them
differently to one another. This leads to the fact that one may have different thresh-
olds for their trust levels towards others. Wang and Redmiles [221] define this inher-
ent tendency to perceive the trustworthiness of other people as the baseline trust of
2 In the following, unless otherwise mentioned, we simply use the term trust to refer to user trust.
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an individual. Trust is, therefore, predominantly influenced by one’s predispositions
towards others and the services offered by them.
Propagation of trust. Trust between people is based on its propagative nature [190].
The trust placed by person A in person B also depends on the trust placed by person
C in person B, as well as the trust placed by person A in person C. While trust is not
transitive [190], in that there does not have to exist any trust between A and B, there
can exist a propagation of trust due to the social network between A, B, and C.
Context-dependence. A person’s location and surroundings can have a significant
effect on their trust towards others. People generally trust their co-workers only
within the confines of their work environment, whereas they may not trust their
family members when it comes to confidential work-related matters. This also plays
an important role in establishing trust based on propagation.
Dynamism. Trust improves with increase in successful operations between two
people, and decays over time and with negative experiences. Given that user behavior
is generally very dynamic in nature, with varying interaction patterns, the evolution
of trust is an important aspect for any trust-based approach.
Asymmetric. In principle, trust between people is not necessarily symmetric, i.e.,
the trust placed by person A in person B need not be the same as that placed in
person A by person B. The asymmetric nature of trust between two people can reduce
with time and positive experiences, leading to same trust levels in both directions.
Similarly, any trust aberrations by person A will eventually lead to a decreased trust
by person B in A.
A general model for trust management comprises the evaluation of the direct trust
between two people, as well as its evolution. The direct trust between two people
is their trust based on the direct interactions between them. Trust evaluation is the
process of calculating this trust based on certain measurable trust metrics that quan-
tify the quality of the services offered by one to another. To better understand these
concepts, let us consider the following terminology based on the above definition for
trust. Users A and B (the trustors) have distinct levels of trust towards user C (the
trustee) with respect to a particular set of actions X in context Y.
Trust evaluation is the process of calculating trust on C based on certain trust
metrics. These metrics are measurable parameters based on X and Y that quantify
the quality of the services offered by C to A and B. For example, a file sharing
application may have trust metrics defining the quality of the file received, based
on the file size and its content. A wrong file size or empty contents offered by C
will lead to a negative trust level from A or B. This assessment of trust based on
own experiences in termed direct trust. On the other hand, A may evaluate its trust
towards C based on B’s recommendation. This is termed as recommendation trust.
These two trust parameters allow for the calculation of the overall trust of A towards
C. It is necessary to account for the same set of actions X and the context Y while
evaluating the trust. Since user trust is asymmetric, the above procedure has to be
performed independently for each user in the environment.
The robustness of one such trust-based approach requires an efficient mechanism
to update trust values at regular intervals, accounting for trust evolution [168, 190].
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Trust evolution accounts for the dynamism that characterizes user trust. Varying
experiences as well as recommendations from others need to be considered while
evaluating the trust level over time. This allows the trust framework to adapt itself
to the existing changes in user behavior as well as interaction patterns. Trust rec-
ommendations allow for the adaptation of existing trust values, so that the trust
values converge towards the optimal solution. However, one major problem here is
the possibility of falsified and inaccurate recommendations. Malicious users can use
this approach to modify the system performance to suit their needs. It is necessary
to identify false recommendations and take appropriate measures to deal with such
situations.
2.2.1 Trust-Based Models for Distributed Systems
Given the above introduction to the notion of trust in computing systems, we now
present the state of the art of trust-based models in distributed systems. We particu-
larly focus on existing mechanisms for the evaluation of trust in different distributed
systems, including P2P and D2D systems, to analyze how they tackle the above-
mentioned challenges. Furthermore, we also present how these trust-based systems
overcome the presence of adversaries.
Trust Evaluation
The first and most important step in any trust-based system is the determination
of the trust between communication parties, i.e., trust evaluation. Any trust manage-
ment model attempts to establish the trust existing between a trustor and a trustee by
analyzing certain metrics in an appropriate manner, depending on the application
settings and the methods of interaction that can be evaluated. The application set-
tings vary from pervasive computing environments and social networks to P2P and
ad-hoc networks. Most trust management models also avoid the usage of a central-
ized management service, given the fact that one such service can be compromised
as a single point of failure/attack.
Mui et al. [144] propose a computational model for trust and reputation based on
a Bayesian formalization that accounts for context-dependent and subjective trust. In
turn, they propose a model that allows for a probabilistic inference of trust and rep-
utation, such that it can be implemented in a real-world multi-agent3 environment.
Liu and Xiu [127] also focus on multi-agent networks and propose a trust negoti-
ation framework that allows client systems to establish the trust relationship with
the system. This allows the system and clients to verify each other’s credentials in
an automated manner with the help of security capsules. The authors claim that their
concepts can be applied to any distributed system and Internet applications.
Quercia et al. [168] build on the work by Mui et al. and put forth a computational
trust framework for pervasive computing, incorporating the trust properties of sub-
3 In the context of trusted computing, the term agents is used to denote the stakeholding devices in the
system.
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jectiveness as well as time- and context-dependence. They propose a generic n-level
discrete trust model, which is lightweight and allows for the incorporation of both
direct and recommendation based trust metrics. Through extensive evaluations, they
show that their trust model can be used to perform packet delivery in a network
with possibly malicious peers.
Ries [175] proposes a decentralized computational trust model, allowing agents
to interact with other partners based on their trustworthiness. He incorporates two
representation schemes in his trust model—(i) a human trust interface (HTI) that
accounts for the probability of trustworthy behavior of an agent in any future trans-
action and the context-based certainty of the said probability; and (ii) a Bayesian
approach using probability density functions, similar to previous work by Mui et
al. and Quercia et al. In doing so, he mathematically proves that a mapping between
both the representation schemes is possible.
Moving to other applications, Jamali and Ester [106] propose a scheme for trust-
based recommendation in recommender systems. Using a random-walk method,
they propose an improved scheme called TrustWalker that recommends items to
users not only based on the ratings of the items, but also based on the similarity
among the different items. In turn, this allows new users in the network, who are not
within an established trust network, to obtain appropriate items. Nepal at al. [149] fo-
cus on trust models in social networks by establishing trust communities based on a
concept called social trust. Their social trust model STrust considers the social capital
of a relationship, in that it accounts for the interactions, comments, and discussions
between the users, to establish the trust.
Adali et al. [5] introduce the concept of behavioral trust in the field of social net-
works, which is a form of dyadic trust that is based on the communication char-
acteristics between the two parties. They propose that the communication behavior
between people—e.g., nature of phone conversations, e-mail correspondence, social
network comments—can be used to quantify the trust between them. Subsequently,
they propose models for conversational and propagation trust, and validate them
on Twitter4 datasets. Similarly, Trapp et al. [212] propose a sociologically-inspired
model for trust in MANETs, which uses the social relationship between the mobile
users to establish trust. They argue that reliable trust measurement based on network
data requires a densely populated MANET. Instead, they propose the usage of the
tie strength between users to establish trust, discussing the possibilities of assessing
trust based on local smartphone interaction data.
Trust in P2P Systems
P2P systems are a branch of distributed systems that are, by and large, devoid of
any hierarchy or centralized organization [202]. They are based on self-organizing
overlay networks, where peers may act as both clients and servers, to form so-called
servents. In doing so, peers provide access to their resources, such as documents,
movies, etc., and support the sharing of these resources with the other peers in the
4 https://twitter.com
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system. To this end, P2P systems are characterized by specialized routing algorithms,
storage mechanisms, and scalability, among others, so that a cooperative framework
of peers can be established and maintained [112, 118, 202].
One of the most important requirements of any P2P system is an appropriate
mechanism for the evaluation of trust and reputation among the peers, so as to fa-
cilitate a secure and trustworthy communication system. Given the lack of a central-
ized organization, malicious peers can attempt to provide falsified data to incoming
requests, impersonate other peers, perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, etc. Con-
sidering that peers in a P2P system engage themselves in bilateral communication,
it is possible to develop models to evaluate computational trust and peer reputation
through appropriate feedback mechanisms, which in turn allows benign peers to
defend themselves against adversaries.
One of the first approaches to deal with trust and reputation in P2P systems was
introduced by Aberer and Despotovic [2]. Building on general reputation-based mod-
els, they develop a scalable trust model that works without the need for a central
organization and calculates reputation of peers based on their previous interactions
with other peers. Peers can make and store their complaints about the services of-
fered by other peers in an overlay network called the P-Grid. The P-Grid can then be
accessed to estimate the trustworthiness of other peers. To improve scalability, repli-
cas of complaints are stored on multiple peers, also allowing for robustness against
failures in the system.
Kamvar et al. [111] present an algorithm called EigenTrust to manage the rep-
utation of peers in a P2P network and thus, reduce the transfer and exchange of
inauthentic files in the network. EigenTrust allows all peers to engage in calculating
a global trust value of the other peers in a distributed and node-symmetric manner.
To do so, with respect to a certain peer X, the local trust value of each peer towards
X are combined with the trust values placed by the other peers towards X, using a
weighted aggregation mechanism. The left principal eigenvector of the resulting ma-
trix provides the global trust value of peer X. A peer uses these global trust values
to decide whom to contact for any file in the P2P system.
Xiong and Liu [229] propose a reputation-based trust algorithm for P2P-based
e-commerce systems called PeerTrust, where they likewise develop a transaction-
based feedback system to estimate the reputation and trustworthiness of the peers
in the system. For their algorithm, they include peer feedback, number of trans-
actions, feedback credibility as the main trust parameters. Furthermore, they also
include context-based parameters based on the transaction and the community at
hand. Building on this model, Srivatsa et al. [200] develop TrustGuard, which intro-
duces a generic framework for calculating a dependable trust model under dynamic
changes in peer behavior. Their model accommodates for behavior fluctuations on
the part of other peers, such that positive interactions lead to gradual trust increase,
while negative interactions lead to harder punishments.
In his PhD thesis, Liebau presents a token-based accounting scheme to facilitate
a trust-based communication and collaboration environment [124]. Tokens are used
by peers as objects for permission and receipts, such that a token spent is equivalent
2.2 trust in computing 25
to a transaction in the system. Using an appropriate structure for the tokens as well
as token aggregation mechanisms, the thesis shows how the trustworthiness of peers
can be determined and used by other peers to ensure trusted computing.
Vidyalakshmi et al. [216] present a decentralized trust model to facilitate transfer of
data in a (mobile) P2P network based on the trustworthiness of other peers as well as
the given situational context. They introduce an access control mechanism using their
trust model that controls access to files based on their category (music files, family
photos, etc.) and context (location, time, light, etc.). Similar to the previous efforts
described above, trust between peers is calculated based on historical transactions
with regard to file transfers in a given context. In addition, recommendation-based
trust is incorporated to improve trust values in case of lack of direct interactions.
Socially-Aware D2D Networks
The aspect of trust also plays a very important role in D2D-based networks, where de-
vices discover and interact with each other without any (or with minimum) involve-
ment of a centralized entity. To this end, a class of networks have been developed
that incorporate the social structure among users in establishing a trusted environ-
ment for device-level interactions. Such networks are called social-aware (sometimes,
socially-aware) D2D networks, where social behaviors of the users are leveraged to
assist D2D communication in a privacy-aware manner [123].
Ometov et al. [154] implement a proof-of-concept for incorporating social trust
associations over proximity-aware D2D communications. In doing so, they account
for the dynamic variations in the networks and focus on the establishment of secure
groups among the changing D2D network participants. They assume that a central
entity (base station) handles the discovery of devices and also assumes the role of
a trusted certificate authority in the system. Performance evaluation results of their
prototypical implementation show that the computational latency lies in the range
of 60-120 ms, depending on the dynamic nature of the environment.
Wu et al. [228] focus on optimizing the usage of different content sharing modes in
D2D environments, switching between base-station-to-device (B2D), D2D, and multi-
device-to-device (MD2D) modes. To this end, they introduce a social-aware rate at
which the devices should communicate in order to ensure high physical link quality
and effective cooperation among the devices.
Militano et al. [141] deal with the coalescence of Narrowband IoT (NB-IoT) and D2D
communication, moving towards 5G cellular systems. They present trust models to
determine the reputation and reliability of devices in D2D-based content uploading
networks, thus enabling social awareness among the devices. Similar to the work by
Ometov et al., the eNodeB (a base station in LTE-Advanced cellular networks) stores
the information about device reliability, reputation, and trust in the system. Each
devices refers to this information to decide on the social reliability and recommen-
dation reliability of the remaining devices.
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Mitigating Adversary Attacks in Trust-Based Systems
Security mechanisms are developed in order to protect systems against adversary
attacks. This becomes even more important in trust-based systems, given the intan-
gible and probabilistic nature of trust between humans. Furthermore, as observed in
the above approaches, the value of trust assigned by one user towards another can
be significantly dependent on the recommended values by other users in the system.
Thus, it is important to appropriately incorporate incoming recommendations.
Most approaches in trust-related literature deal with adversary attacks in the form
of either collusion attacks (e.g., bad-mouthing, ballot-stuffing) or on-off and behav-
ioral attacks. Adversaries that practice these kinds of attacks are normally catego-
rized as honest-but-curious or selfish nodes, such that they attempt to reap as much
benefit from the network without deviating from the specified protocol or degrad-
ing their own performance. Contrarily, Byzantine adversaries attempt to disrupt the
performance of a network/system without any concerns over their own resource
consumption [13, 115]. Trust-related literature generally deal with the former (selfish
adversaries), leaving appropriate authentication and integrity mechanisms to take
care of Byzantine adversaries.
In their system TrustGuard, Srivatsa et al. [200] deal with colluding and on-off
adversaries, by considering a feedback-based evaluation of trust and adjusting for
behavioral fluctuations on the part of the users in the network. They propose a
personalized similarity measure that accounts for trust variance among the users,
by taking the previous interactions among all users in the network into considera-
tion. Sun et al. [206] consider trust as a measure of uncertainty in ad-hoc networks
and attempt to facilitate efficient packet routing in ad-hoc networks with colluding
adversaries. Building on recommendation trust, they propose a method to identify
colluding adversaries based on their reports of packet loss on a specified processing
path.
Denko et al. [56] propose a probabilistic trust management scheme in ubiqui-
tous systems to combat against collusion and on-off attacks. In their scheme, each
user compares incoming recommendation trust values against their own direct trust
measurements—based on the beta distribution of previous satisfying and unsatisfy-
ing interactions. If the values vary considerably, the corresponding recommendations
are considered to be falsified and the corresponding users are marked as adversaries,
accordingly. Das and Islam [55] propose a feedback-based dynamic trust computa-
tion framework called SecuredTrust that overcomes oscillating adversary behavior
in multi-agent systems. Similar to the approach by Srivatsa et al., they calculate trust
based on historical interactions, accounting for fluctuations and decay, in addition
to novel factors like satisfaction and deviation reliability. Considering the number of
trust-related parameters to be assessed, their overall trust model results in increased
computational delays, making it unfeasible in resource-constrained environments
like D2D networks.
Chae et al. [43] focus exclusively on the management of trust in wireless networks
where adversaries exercise on-off attacks. They propose a novel trust management
model and redemption scheme based on predictability that distinguishes between
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random unforeseen errors and purposeful malicious behaviors. By evaluating the
influence of sliding windows to estimate predictability trust, the authors show how
a user can find a trade-off between on-off security and performance.
2.2.2 Discussion
Unlike P2P systems, ad-hoc networks do not provide sufficient means to track all
the messages exchanged in the network. This makes it significantly more difficult
to evaluate the trustworthiness of any device, or its user. This aspect leads to the
recommendation-based approach in establishing trust models in ad-hoc and D2D-
based networks. While the existing efforts towards social-aware D2D networks rely
on a centralized base station or cellular tower to take over the calculation of trust
level of the participating devices [141, 154, 228], most approaches for trust manage-
ment in ad-hoc networks either consider different schemes to evaluate trust recom-
mendations among the involved devices [174, 206, 213] or propose game-theoretic
designs [25, 169].
Considering the social aspect behind the IoT and D2D communication, we follow
the path set by existing work on behavioral trust [5, 212] to evaluate the direct trust
among the users. Much like other work on trust management in ad-hoc networks,
we consider trust recommendation to improve existing trust values and allow for
trust evolution. However, existing work on trust management does not consider the
cold start problem, where there exists minimal or no previous interaction between
the users involved.
Overall, there is a lack of trust-based approaches for distributed CEP in exist-
ing literature. Distributed CEP requires an increased amount of cooperation and
trust among the processing devices to execute the operator graphs in a collabora-
tive manner. Furthermore, considering the resource-constrained and mobile nature
of a D2D environment, the underlying CEP system must support low-latency and
battery-efficient data processing. This necessitates a light-weight computation model
for trust that facilitates privacy-aware distributed CEP without adversely affecting
the performance of the system, otherwise.
2.3 human relationships
Building on the aspect of behavioral trust, we now turn our attention to one of
the most influential factors behind it: the relationship between two people. In gen-
eral, user trust evolves within a relationship with experience. A positive experience
strengthens the trust in a relationship, whereas a negative experience depletes the
same [172]. In particular, the type and strength of a relationship correlates positively
with the amount of trust between people.
In the following, we first briefly discuss the importance of understanding human
relationships, focusing on different aspects of human behavior. We then present some
of the general traits of human relationships, and establish the correlation between
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trust and the type and strength of relationships, before moving on to the state of the
art in estimating human relationships.
Importance of Understanding Relationships
Given the advent of mobile ubiquitous computing, and with that the constant always
online nature of its users, the problems with privacy violation have risen steadily over
the past few years. User privacy constraints become increasingly important when
dealing with the exchange of sensitive user context (e.g., location, activity, mood) or
personal information posted on Online Social Networks (OSNs) like Facebook5 and
Google+6. Understanding human relationships and the interaction patterns within
these relationships allows for the improvement and facilitation of many services for
the users to combat these problems.
The characteristics of a relationship can have a strong correlation with the sharing
pattern within the relationship itself [51, 78, 114, 153, 170]. For example, close friends
tend to share more information among themselves than work colleagues. However,
users fail to apply their privacy options on their smartphones or OSNs, appropri-
ately [83, 142, 170, 225], leading to unnecessary privacy leaks and further unforeseen
consequences, such as job dismissals and health insurance cancellations [71, 220].
Understanding human relationships allows for developing appropriate mechanisms
and systems that adhere to the prevailing privacy constraints and allow the users to
manage their privacy in a better manner [170]. To put in perspective, context-aware
systems require the knowledge of the underlying connections (in the form of rela-
tionships) to provide the appropriate services to the users [7, 30, 114].
Another feature of the ubiquitous nature of current mobile computing are services
that provide push-based notifications, so that the (mostly relevant) information is di-
rectly sent to the users, as and when any event occurs. Inopportune notifications can,
however, lead to undesired interruptions, which in turn can cause unnecessary stress,
mood changes, and irritability [21, 119, 131, 148], and a continual persistence of these
effects can also cause a burnout [186]. Therefore, research on interruption and noti-
fication management has also increased significantly over the past 10 years [20, 137,
164, 182]. Considering that messaging applications constitute a large portion of the
applications employing push-based notifications [50, 182], understanding and pre-
dicting human relationships as well as their interaction patterns allows for optimiz-
ing the time and context in which notifications (of a chosen set of contacts) should be
delivered to the users. For example, in a meeting, a user may be interested in receiv-
ing notifications from his boss or certain co-workers, however notifications sent by
friends or distant relatives can be deferred until after the meeting is over. By waiting
for the opportune moment when a particular user is ready to receive notifications
(or a particular set of notifications), one can reduce the above adverse effects [131].
5 https://www.facebook.com
6 https://plus.google.com/
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General Traits of Relationships
One of the most important concepts in understanding human relationships is social
identity theory. According to state-of-the-art research in the fields of sociology and
social psychology [4, 209], social identity theory or just identity theory dictates that a
person’s sense of who they are and what their role is, depends on the group with
which they interact. Basically, groups give a sense of social identity to an individ-
ual [209], and also tend to influence an individual’s behavior [107].
People tend to have many social identities in general, depending on the social
context they are in [151]. For example, a school teacher can be the father to his
son at home, while being a teacher to his students at school. Here, the roles father
and teacher describe the different facets or circles assumed by the school teacher in
the different social contexts—i.e., at home and at work. The roles of two people in
a relationship can vary depending on the social context, as well. For example, the
school teacher can be a father to his son at home, but a teacher to his own son
at school. Similarly, a work colleague who is also a friend outside working hours
satisfies two different roles depending on the context. These identities thrive upon
the relationship with other people and are influenced positively/negatively based
on their interactions [72, 160].
Typically, the most relevant social circles (or life facets) studied in related literature
are those of family, work, and social (friend, hobby colleague) nature [72, 142, 151,
160]. Each of these social circles expose a different behavior on the part of an indi-
vidual, depending on the personality traits of the individual, and therefore, involve
different interaction patterns. For example, people normally interact with work col-
leagues during the day, with friends in the evenings, and with family members on
the weekends. Similarly, the usage of the different communication channels used by
the people varies from circle to circle, e.g., some exhibiting a higher usage of calls,
while others preferring message-based interactions.
Within each of these social circles, the strength of the relationship can vary from
strong to weak. For example, a person can have close family members and distant
relatives. Mark Granovetter [81] introduced the concept of tie strength to capture this
sense of closeness within a relationship. Basically, strong ties correspond to highly-
trusted relationships, e.g., between close friends and family, and is generally indica-
tive of a stronger overlapping of the social circles. In general, people in strong ties
also share more information with each other, owing to the higher trust placed on the
counterpart in the relationship. Weak ties, on the other hand, generally corresponds
to mere acquaintances and do not involve the sharing of much personal informa-
tion, as far as possible. In effect, a human relationship is a two-dimensional social
construct, where the social circle and the tie strength comprise the two axes, such
that each point in the imaginary coordinate system corresponds to a particular tie
strength within a given social circle.
Granovetter defines the tie strength between two people on the basis of four main
dimensions—the amount of time spent with each other, the emotional intensity, the
intimacy, and the reciprocity within the relationship [82]. These dimensions can also
be extended to the study of social circles. Subsequent research on tie strength and
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social cirlces in the field of sociology and human-computer interaction have led to
an increased number of dimensions, including locative and temporal dependencies,
relationship maintenance, number of mutual friends, socioeconomic status, political
affiliation, race, and gender [125, 222]. Marsden and Campbell [132] ascertain that
these dimensions cannot be measured directly, and instead suggest certain indicators
or proxies for these dimensions, which allow one to measure the tie strength between
two people.
Several related efforts have since proposed multiple proxies for each of these di-
mensions, depending on the interaction mode—online social networks, smartphone-
based communication, crowdsensing, etc.—considered in their work. In the follow-
ing, we discuss the state of the art in estimating the tie strength and social circle of
a given relationship between two people. We particularly focus on the interaction
modes and the indicators considered in each of these approaches, thus allowing us
to discern the key research gaps.
2.3.1 Predicting Tie Strength
One of the preliminary attempts in predicting the tie strength of a human relation-
ship was made by Marsden and Campbell [132]. After proving that the direct mea-
surement of tie strength is difficult, they devise a model to predict the tie strength
based on certain indicators like the communication intensity and frequency, among
others. Through a user study and extensive empirical evaluation, they show that
closeness or emotional intensity in a relationship is the best indicator of tie strength,
but they leave fine-graded measures for closeness for future work. Furthermore, they
show that contact frequency and duration are false indicators of tie strength, leading
to overestimation. Furthermore, they state that relationship with family members are
generally stronger than relationship with neighbors and co-workers.
Gilbert and Karahalios [78] built a model based on data obtained from Facebook
to determine if a friend on Facebook is a weak or a strong tie, obtaining an accuracy
of over 85%. 35 participants took part in a user study, and were asked to answer
questionnaires with five questions pertaining to the relationship with their Facebook
friends. Subsequently, the authors also extracted 74 numerical Facebook variables,
such as days since last communication, educational differences, number of mutual
friends, inbox positive emotion words, etc., as well as the data accessible from a
user’s Facebook profile to operationalize the tie strength in a machine learning sys-
tem based on the obtained data from the questionnaires.
Spiliotopoulos et al. [199] applied a similar approach on estimating user tie strength
based on Facebook data. They implemented the tie strength calculation functionality
into Facebook, thus allowing for real-time results that can be used by the application,
instantly. Their resulting model had an accuracy of around 66% in distinguishing
strong and weak ties, and around 86% in distinguishing very strong and weak ties.
In their preliminary work, Wiese et al. [226] attempted to predict the tie strength
between two users based on their smartphone communication history with respect
to calls and SMS, achieving an accuracy of around 91%. By doing so, they could
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reconfirm the assumption that frequent and intense communication does indeed
indicate strong ties. In their follow-up paper [227], they further analyzed their results
to establish that “a lack of communication does not necessarily indicate a weak tie”.
Further revelations indicate that the users nowadays prefer to communicate over
other channels like instant messaging services. Also, a person may not communicate
much with his/her family members over their smartphone, but may still have a close
relationship with them.
Rojas et al. [178, 179] analyzed the influence of the usage of emoticons and emojis
on the closeness within a relationship. In doing so, their work is the first attempt
in analyzing the sentiments in chat-based communication. Based on their evaluation
on the instant messenger Skype, they show that emoticons are a positive indicator of
human sentiments and can be used to estimate the strength of a given chat relation-
ship.
2.3.2 Predicting the Social Circle/Life Facet
Towards the prediction of the types of human relationships in terms of social circles
or life facets, Avrahami and Hudson analyzed the influence of instant messaging (IM)
communication data [12]. They undertook an analysis of PC-based IM conversations
between users, and evaluated the influence of IM characteristics such as messaging
rate, count, and duration on the relationship type. They achieve an accuracy of 79%
in distinguishing between work and social relationships, without delving into the
contents of the messages.
Eagle et al. [63] collected location and proximity information from mobile phones
and analyzed their influence in determining if the relationship was a friendship or
not. Using the Reality Mining dataset [62]—which includes Bluetooth-based proxim-
ity information and call log statistics—and self-reported data for the ground truth,
the authors showed, among others, that friends tend to colocate more often than
other relationship types. They found other correlations with co-workers based on
the time of the day and location of the users.
Min et al. [142] analyze call and SMS logs on user smartphones and find the
valency of their correlation with the life facet to which the contacts belong: family,
work, or social. Going by a similar approach as proposed by Gilbert and Karahalios,
the authors use supervised machine learning methods to build relationship models
based on communication features from calls and SMSs as well as profile features
from a user’s contact list. Using user-based manual contact labeling as the ground
truth, they achieve an accuracy of 87% for their models. Similarily, Reinhardt et
al. [171] achieve an accuracy of 86% using communication data from call, SMS, MMS,
and e-mail logs on user smartphones.
Yu et al. [234] approached this issue by assessing interpersonal relationships based
on cellphone network data and in particular, by analyzing the spatio-temporal pat-
terns based on the location and co-location information of the users. In doing so, they
obtain a maximum accuracy of 73% using support vector machines as their underly-
ing machine learning model. Bao et al. [24] present a framework called CommSense
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to categorize contacts on user smartphones into the relationship types: important
contacts, significant other, family, and friends. Using historical communication fea-
tures from calls, SMS, along with GPS and WiFi readings in a multi-stage classifi-
cation algorithm, they achieve an average accuracy of 80% for the above-mentioned
categories. In terms of performance, CommSense induces an average memory load
of 2.36 MB and an average CPU usage of around 7%.
Backstrom and Kleinberg [17] undertook a slightly different approach to under-
standing relationships. They analyzed relationship status information on Facebook
and thereby, attempted to predict if a given social tie is a romantic partnership or not.
They also introduce a new evaluation metric called dispersion to signify the amount
of disconnectedness of mutual friends in a romantic relationship. Consequently, they
achieved a performance accuracy of around 79% in distinguishing single and mar-
ried users.
2.3.3 Discussion
Given that our research in this thesis focuses on D2D environments where users
communicate using mobile devices like smartphones, we restrict our analysis of hu-
man relationships based on the data available on user smartphones. While phone
call interactions have been proven to be a strong factor in determining the type and
strength of a relationship, the usage of SMS has reduced drastically over the past
few years [227]. In recent years, there has been a rise in mobile instant messaging
services, such as WhatsApp7 and Facebook Messenger8, where users conduct quick
exchange of messages and transfer of media content over the Internet. Therefore, we
focus on understanding and analyzing the influence of instant messaging services
on the estimation of human relationships.
Similar to the state-of-the-art approaches in related literature, we employ machine
learning algorithms to extract the key characteristics from a user’s communication
behavior. Moving towards the concept of behavioral trust, we primarily focus on
establishing the key features of the IM communication channel (alongside phone
calls) in estimating the relationship, which in turn has a direct correlation with the
trust within the relationship.
7 https://www.whatsapp.com/
8 https://www.messenger.com/
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S Y S T E M D E S I G N
The analysis of related work in the fundamental topics behind this thesis—CEP,trust in distributed processing, and human relationships—and the identifica-
tion of the main research gaps in Chapter 2 allow us to draw the key requirements
of the envisioned system. Based on these conclusions, we now describe the event
processing and networking models that govern the functionality of the envisioned
system. Finally, we present a component-based overview of the envisioned system,
highlighting the areas where our main contributions apply.
3.1 motivating scenarios
To begin with, we present a set of motivating scenarios that expose the main aspects
and challenges that play a key role in this thesis. Consider two smart cities, SmartC-
ityA and SmartCityB, that are equipped with modern sensors to allow for real-time
IoT processing and data analytics, supporting a context-aware environment. Walt
lives in SmartCityA and drives every weekday to SmartCityB, where he works at a big
IT firm. Consider the following sub-scenarios and corresponding example queries:
Scenario A: Meeting. At work, Walt wants his smartphone to adapt its profile to
incoming notifications based on the situation at hand (e.g., go silent for unimportant
calls during meetings). He uses a context-aware application to resolve the query if
he is in a meeting or not, based on his location, the sound levels in the room, and
the accelerometer readings of the surrounding people [128]. The query is resolved
collaboratively on the available smartphones, but is therefore subject to the privacy
constraints of the users involved (including Walt himself) as well as the resource
constraints of the processing devices.
Scenario B: Traveling to/from Work. Walt uses the highway to reach his destina-
tion in the shortest time possible. On the highway, he uses an application for speed
and lane assistance to help him avoid unforeseeable situations. Based on the loca-
tion, speed, and direction of the vehicles around with respect to his car, he obtains
information on the optimal driving speed and also, if necessary, lane changing in-
structions to best suit his route. Here, the query needs to be processed correctly
despite the high mobility of the devices involved.
Scenario C: Fitness Route. To stay fit, Walt likes to jog in the city by considering
different running profiles based on the gradient distribution along the route. He
prefers routes where the air and noise pollution levels are as low as possible, yet
taking a different route each time. His context-aware fitness application selects a
suitable route by taking the noise and CO2 levels due to traffic and surrounding
crowds into account and estimating the best route for the jog. The query is resolved
in a distributed manner using location, CO2, and microphone readings from vehicles
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and people along the route. Here, the resource constraints and random movement of
the devices, as well as the privacy constraints of the users involved pose considerable
challenges to resolving the query appropriately.
Scenario A accounts for low-mobility with nearly static devices, whereas Scenario
B accounts for high mobility with devices moving at over 50 km/h. Scenario C targets
situations with medium mobility, covering pedestrian movement (2 − 5 km/h) and
slow-moving city traffic (10 − 50 km/h). With respect to privacy, each of the above
scenarios involves the processing of possibly sensitive information—e.g., location
and microphone readings—mainly due to their collaborative and distributed nature
of processing queries. Such distributed processing allows for lower latency, reduced
load on centralized servers, and better protection of one’s privacy constraints. We
use these three sub-scenarios to motivate our system design as well as the evaluation
setup.
3.2 design considerations
We now delve into the design considerations for the envisioned system, focusing on
the concepts and assumptions that play a key role. We present a formal mathematical
description of the CEP model considered in our work, including descriptions of
sample operator graphs based on the scenarios presented above. Then, we present
the networking model used in our envisioned system, including a brief look into the
adversary model considered.
3.2.1 CEP Model
As mentioned in Section 2.1, a CEP system comprises a set of producers P—the
sources of atomic events like sensor streams—and a set of consumers C—the sinks
that are interested in the higher-level events generated by the system, like the type of
meeting in Scenario A introduced above. The incoming atomic events are analyzed
by a set of correlation operators Ω, which extract higher-level information by inter-
preting inherent patterns in the atomic events. One can model the functionality of a
(distributed) CEP system with the help of an operator graph, G(Ω ∪ P ∪C,E), which
dictates the order of execution of the operators by directing the event streams E from
the producers to the consumers. In turn, we can define E ⊆ (P ∪Ω)× (Ω∪C).
To better understand the working of operator graphs, we now describe how the
concepts of CEP can be applied in the above scenarios. We consider Scenarios A and
B, so as to account for the two extremes of mobility-based scenarios.
• Consider Figure 4, which illustrates the main operators used to satisfy the meet-
ing query as part of Scenario A. Walt’s phone c1 ∈ C is interested in knowing
whether the current situation is a meeting, and if so, the type of the meeting
(e.g., calm business meeting, loud informal meeting). To recognize this, the
context-aware application incorporates different sound levels—obtained from
smartphone microphone sensors—in the meeting room, as well as the location
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Figure 4: Sample CEP Operator Graph for Scenario A—Meeting
𝝎𝑭 
𝝎𝑳 
𝝎𝑺 
  𝒑𝟏   𝒑𝟐   𝒑𝟑 
  𝒄𝟏 
Producers 
Operator 
Graph 
Consumers 
𝝎𝑺 
(a) Sample Operator Graph
𝝎𝑭 𝝎𝑳 
𝝎𝑺 
𝝎𝑺 
Avg. 
Speed 
Speed 
events 
Obstacle 
events 
  𝒑𝟏 
  𝒑𝟑   𝒑𝟐 
  𝒄𝟏 
(b) Highway Scenario
Figure 5: Sample CEP Operator Graph for Scenario B—Highway
and accelerometer readings of the participants [33, 128]. For a given meeting
query, operator ωM filters the microphone readings with respect to the re-
quired time frame and determines the average sound level in the given room
(in decibels, dB). Operator ωL determines the current logical location based on
GPS or Wi-Fi fingerprinting [96] and filters the readings that lie outside this
range. Operator ωA then combines the output events of ωM and ωL, and de-
rives the higher-level context (e.g., sitting, standing) from the movement of the
users based on their accelerometer readings. Finally, operator ωF calculates the
type of the meeting based on the output events of ωA, and sends the results to
Walt’s phone c1 (and other consumers, if any).
• Let us now consider Figure 5, which illustrates the execution of a sample oper-
ator graph to detect speed and lane changes as part of Scenario B. Here, Walt’s
vehicle c1 ∈ C is interested in knowing about the average speed of the vehicles
in the next 700− 1000m as well as the presence of any obstacles on the route
that may compel a lane change. To obtain these higher-level events, the atomic
data available from the vehicles (or the corresponding smartphones), such as
location, speed, and steering position, are processed using different operators.
The vehicular information is transmitted from one vehicle to another using
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Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication1, allowing for a reliable transmission
range of 250m [79]. For each road segment, operator ωS calculates the average
speed of the segment ahead over the last 30 seconds, using the information
obtained from the corresponding vehicles. Further, operator ωL predicts the
possibility of an obstacle by analyzing incoming data on (average) speed and
steering wheel movement. A sequence of speed change and steering wheel
movement by multiple vehicles can relate to the presence of an obstacle on a
given lane. The above operators can be placed on multiple devices to account
for reliability in the estimated data. Finally, operator ωF determines the recom-
mended speed and driving lane for consumer c1 (Walt’s vehicle) based on the
average speed and obstacle presence events obtained from the vehicles ahead.
Each event e can be described as a tuple of attribute-value pairs in the form, e =
(〈att1, val1〉, 〈att2, val2〉, . . . , 〈attn, valn〉), where event e consists of n attributes-value
pairs. The contents of an event are dependent on the application at hand; typically,
events contain the attributes: event type, event value, timestamp, and a source ID.
Between any two devices in the system, we consider an event stream (o,d) ∈ E as
part of the operator graph, such that the events flow from the origin device o to the
destination device d. In this context, we call o as the the predecessor or the upstream
device, and d as the successor or the downstream device. Consequently, we term the
event stream emerging from o as its outgoing event stream, and the event stream going
into d as its incoming event stream. The attribute values of each event are kept up to
date in order to facilitate further processing and in-order delivery of events.
At any given device, the incoming event stream is analyzed by an operator ω ∈ Ω,
which is part of the operator graphG. For a given operatorω, we define the incoming
event stream as Iω ∈ E. The operator graph and the involved operators are defined
in accordance with the application at hand and the prevailing queries. Accordingly,
each operator ω applies the internal correlation function fω on Iω to produce a set
of output (complex events) ce ∈ E that are inserted into the outgoing event stream
Oω ∈ E in temporal order. We can therefore define the internal logic of an operator
ω as fω : Iω → Oω.
3.2.2 System Model
In the following, we detail the characteristics of our envisioned system and state
the main assumptions behind it. We base our design on the state of the art in D2D
communication and in the IoT, such that users can collaboratively process contex-
tual information based on their needs. Considering that we deal with privacy in
distributed systems, we also present our model for adversaries in the system.
1 While we exclusively focus on direct communication between vehicles (or devices, in general) to avoid
overloading the cellular network, one can consider placing operators on centralized instances to ensure
event flow continuity when the traffic density is considerably low.
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3.2.2.1 Networking Aspects
In our system, we consider the availability of users’ smartphones as well as other
sensor-fitted devices (e.g., environmental sensors to detect temperature) that pro-
vide information about the environment. Recall that our main focus lies in the IoT
and the area of smart cities, where the detection and usage of user contextual infor-
mation is paramount for the proper functioning of user-centric services. As shown
by Wang and Peh [219], local processing directly on users’ smartphones can reduce
the cellular load as well as processing latency. Thus, we primarily consider users’
smartphones as the devices responsible for processing the available sensor informa-
tion using D2D communication. However, the proposed concepts can be extended to
other distributed networked systems of autonomous computing entities using any
other network architecture, as mentioned in Chapter 1.
Just as seen in the motivating scenarios, we focus on collaborative settings with
distributed sources of information and distributed stakeholders for the resulting
higher-level information. We consider a system model that builds on a D2D-based
network spanning a set of users’ smartphones. We assume that the CEP operator
graphs can be executed in a distributed manner on the available devices, such that
the system scales with increases in the number of producers, processing devices, and
consumers. We particularly consider the mobility aspect inherent to the IoT and D2D
communication, where the devices can move at varying speeds in and out of a given
environment. Thus, the devices can have varying degrees of participation, joining
and leaving the network in a random manner—called, device churn [202].
Given that we primarily consider users’ smartphones and other environmental
sensors in our system model, we deal with an ad-hoc network of devices that have a
restricted set of resources (e.g., battery power, memory space) and limited visibility.
Thus, we achieve scalability of the system by restricting the processing environment
to the pertinent devices in the local environment. We assume that the devices keep
track of the other sensing and processing devices available in the vicinity, as well as
the context queries that neighboring devices are interested to process. In doing so,
each user can estimate their own context depending on their application at hand, and
hence obtain appropriate services, accordingly. For each context query, we consider
a leader device that is chosen based on a consensus beforehand amongst all pertinent
devices—e.g., based on the available battery level, network connectivity, or mobility
pattern. The leader initiates the deployment of the corresponding operator graph,
based on the context query at hand. During the placement of CEP operators on
available devices, we account for the privacy constraints of the leader as well as
the participating devices (neighboring collaborators) to achieve privacy-aware event
dissemination in the distributed CEP system.
To account for reliability, we primarily focus on the migration of the CEP oper-
ators and the involved events upon changes in the system—because of device dis-
appearance (e.g., due to mobility) or failure (e.g., due to resource constraints). We
assume that suitable (backup) devices are available for migration that can take over
the working of the (dangling) operator(s) on previously active devices. We utilize
available reliable communication primitives in the underlying network to overcome
38 system design
any network flaws, such as link fluctuations and routing issues, so that the messages
are delivered completely, in time, and with maximum possible throughput.
3.2.2.2 Adversary Model
Distributed systems can be subjected to a wide range of security/privacy attacks. In
the context of the IoT and D2D communication, the possibility of attacks becomes
even more pronounced, since we deal with wireless ad-hoc networks [230]. Such
attacks can range from eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks (leading to,
e.g., authentication violation, routing traps), to DoS attacks (causing, e.g., resource
depletion, system breakdown), as well as Byzantine and alteration attacks (through,
e.g., arbitrary falsified information) [120].
In this thesis, we primarily focus on preventing and overcoming attacks by honest-
but-curious adversaries, which mainly satisfy the properties of alteration and Byzan-
tine attacks, without adversely affecting their own resources. In our case, on the one
hand, the adversaries perform their delegated tasks—the execution of the CEP op-
erators by disseminating the events to the intended recipients—by conforming to
the corresponding operator graph (i.e., honest). On the other hand, they can resort
to malicious behavior by adversely affecting the system functionality to obtain as
much sensitive information as possible from the benign users in the environment
(i.e., curious). An analysis of all possible attacks in one such environment goes be-
yond the scope of this work. The other security/privacy attacks can be combated
using appropriate measures, as established in related literature [68, 120, 155].
In our work, being honest but curious, the adversaries attempt to manipulate the
system functionality through two types of attacks: collusion attacks [200] and on-
off [43] attacks. In collusion attacks, a set of adversaries cooperate with each other to
influence the event dissemination in the system, such that they attempt to redirect
the events from the benign users towards themselves. Our concept for a privacy-
aware implementation of distributed CEP is based on the inherent trust level between
the users as well as their recommendations, as briefly pointed out in Section 1.2.
Therefore, the adversaries in our system attempt to improve their trust level in the
eyes of the benign users, so that they may receive the (possibly sensitive) events.
In turn, they attempt to manipulate their trust recommendations to improve their
own reputation in the system. They do so by either increasing the recommended
trust levels of their fellow colluding adversaries (i.e., ballot-stuffing) or decreasing
the recommended trust levels of the benign users (i.e., bad-mouthing). In on-off
attacks, the adversaries pretend to behave benignly intermittently for short intervals
of time—improving their reputation in the eyes of the benign users as they do so—
before turning malicious. When malicious, the adversaries practice collusion with
other adversaries, as described.
3.3 component overview
Figure 6 presents an illustration of the main components involved in the privacy-
aware and reliable CEP system proposed in this thesis. As discussed in Section 3.2.2.1,
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we consider a D2D-based network of user smartphones that interact directly with
each other and process sensor-based information in a distributed and collaborative
manner. Consequently, each smartphone works as an individual CEP device to en-
able the execution of CEP operator graphs in collaboration with the other CEP de-
vices in the network.
In our proposed system, we assume that the query to be processed is provided
by the CEP application at hand. For example, a context-aware telephony application
used in Scenario A resolves a query to determine if a meeting scenario is taking place.
Accordingly, a similar CEP operator graph to that shown in Figure 4 is deployed
and executed on the available devices. We also assume that there exists a reliable
communication substrate underlying our implementation to facilitate data exchange
between the CEP devices, i.e., user smartphones. In turn, we implement our system
between the communication substrate and the CEP application.
Our proposed CEP system consists of three main components, in accordance with
the three main contributions of our thesis, as presented in Section 1.2.
(i) The first component called FamApp deals with the estimation of user relation-
ships based on their communication-based interactions. In particular, we pro-
pose and evaluate a method to analyze the historical communication data on
synchronous and asynchronous communication channels, and determine their
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correlation with the relationship type (social circle) and strength (tie strength)
of the users in question. To this end, we developed a smartphone-based applica-
tion called FamApp that extracts the required features from the communication
logs and classifies them into the different social circles (e.g., friends, family
members) and tie strength categories (e.g., strong and weak). Effectively, the
resulting analysis allows us to determine the key features that help in distin-
guishing between different relationship types, and thus derive the trust rela-
tions between the users.
(ii) The results of the FamApp component act as the input to the TrustCEP com-
ponent, which is responsible for the privacy-aware placement and execution of
CEP operator graphs in accordance with the trust relations between the users.
Using this information, the Trust Management Unit determines the trust vector
of the smartphone user with respect to the other users. In doing so, it also
weighs in possible user preferences, which include—(i) the general character
traits of the users in employing their trust level towards the other users [221],
and (ii) their privacy preferences with respect to the events to be disseminated.
The Trust Recommendation Analyzer is responsible for determining the credibil-
ity of incoming trust recommendations and to discover (possible) adversaries
in the environment. Based on the derived trust levels, TrustCEP prepares the
placement graph for the CEP operator graph at hand. Note that, as explained
above, the leader device takes over the responsibility of deploying the operator
graph, based on its trust level vectors as well as the recommendation vectors
received from the other devices.
(iii) Finally, the FlexCEP component accounts for the reliable execution of CEP
operator graphs, even in highly dynamic user environments. These dynamic
changes can occur due to changes in the trust relations, as dictated by the
TrustCEP component, or due to device movement or malfunction. To this end,
each smartphone employs a beaconing service to exchange status information
about themselves with the other user smartphones. The collected status infor-
mation beacons are then used to determine the probability of failure of the other
devices. The knowledge of failure probability allows us to flexibly migrate CEP
operators running on failure-prone devices to other capable devices. The Buffer
Management Unit accounts for the adaptive management of recovery buffers on
the CEP devices, so as to extract the required operator state as well as reduce
the required buffer space during migration.
The combination of these three main components contributes to the proposed sys-
tem for privacy-aware and reliable CEP in dynamic distributed environments.
4
E S T I M AT I N G U S E R R E L AT I O N S H I P S
Building a privacy-aware distributed processing system based on user trust firstrequires the establishment of trust relations between the devices in the system.
In our work, we model the trust between devices as an extension of the trust between
their users, where we mainly concentrate on the influence of user trust on the amount
of information shared among themselves. A key factor that dictates the trust level
between users is their relationship as well as their interaction patterns [133, 227].
The type and strength in a given human relationship plays a key role in establishing
the type and intensity of interpersonal communication—e.g., phone conversations,
e-mail correspondence, personal meetings [63, 142, 227]—which in turn helps in
determining the amount of trust between users.
In this chapter, we show our results on how we can determine the type and
strength of human relationships by analyzing their communication patterns. We first
provide a brief explanation of the dimensions of human relationships, followed by an
overview of our approach based on the background presented in Section 2.3. We
then detail our analysis of human relationships based on communication patterns
on users’ smartphones, before presenting the key influencing factors for the estima-
tion of human relationships. The obtained results act as the input to the next system
component, TrustCEP, where we establish the trust relations between the devices.
4.1 understanding relationship dimensions
Recall from Section 2.3 that human relationships can be perceived as a two-dimensional
social construct, comprising the type of relationship—i.e., the social circle(s) in which
the relationship falls—and the strength of the relationship—i.e., the tie strength. We
term this two-dimensional construct as the familiarity level of the relationship. The
familiarity level plays an important role in establishing how users interact with each
other, and therefore, how users share information with each other. For example, in
Scenario A as described in Section 3.1, Walt will be willing to share his location in-
formation with his work colleagues, but he may not be willing to share the same
information with his external clients. On the other hand, he may be less inclined on
sharing his location information with his colleagues in Scenario C, considering that
the action takes place outside working hours. Existing work on human-computer in-
teraction has shown that users do not use the privacy settings on their smartphones
or on OSNs appropriately, leading to inadvertent privacy leaks [220]. Understand-
ing human relationships, and in particular, estimating the social circle and the tie
strength of a given relationship, is a necessary step towards preserving privacy dur-
ing information exchange among users.
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There are a multitude of social circles present nowadays in human society, given
that each individual can assume multiple identities in the different relationships [160,
209]. In our work, we restrict the different social circles to the following—friend, fam-
ily, work, significant other, hobby, and others, where, the others mainly include people
with whom one does not communicate very often or not at all. We formed this list
based on existing work in the field privacy management and sharing patterns [51,
114, 153]. A person can also assume multiple roles with another person, depending
on their individual activities in daily life. Each of these roles, in turn, is reflected in
a distinctive pattern in their communication behavior [50, 227].
Recall from Section 2.3, the tie strength is characterized by four main dimen-
sions of the relationship—time spent together, emotional intensity, intimacy, and
reciprocity [82]. A standard procedure for measuring each of these theoretical di-
mensions is not very practical, primarily since the implications of these dimensions
depend on the corresponding interaction sequence—phone call, e-mail, in person,
etc. In our work, we consider the inference of these dimensions based on communi-
cation patterns available on user smartphones.
In order to approximate these theoretical dimensions, we consider so-called in-
dicators that act as a proxy for measuring each dimension [132]. Typical indicators
include the duration of communication (e.g., a phone call) and the frequency of in-
teraction on a particular communication channel [227]. Depending on the type of
interaction channel considered, other relevant indicators emerge, such as the diver-
sity of topics discussed and number of common friends or activities, that have been
proven to be significant indicators in recent social network research [17, 78].
Additional indicators that depict the temporal and locative dependencies in the
communication patterns between people help in distinguishing among the social cir-
cles to which they belong, as described in Section 2.3. The communication intensity
and frequency is also influenced by the amount of effort one puts into the relation-
ship, termed as relationship maintenance indicator [177]. This shows how mutual
and reciprocative the relationship is.
In accordance with sociological references [82, 132], we propose the following set of
indicators to estimate the type and strength of human relationships—communication
intensity and frequency (I); temporal dependency (T); locative dependency (L); and
the aforementioned relationship maintenance (M). The two-dimensional familiarity
of a relationship (R), which in turn comprises the social circle (C) and the tie strength
(S), can therefore be described as a (typically non-linear) function of the above indi-
cators:
fR : (wc, I,T,L,U,M)→ {C, S} (1)
where, wc is a set of weighting/correlation factors for each of the indicators, such
that the resulting function determines the social circle and the tie strength of the
relationship at hand. In order to obtain a cogent estimate of the familiarity of a given
relationship, the above indicators must be weighed in appropriately. The following
sections delve deeper into the extraction of the required indicators based on smart-
phone data, and the results obtained based on their analysis.
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The main objective of the relationship estimation component is to understand how
inter-user interactions, in particular over communication channels, can be used to in-
fer the relationship between users. In our work, we employ supervised machine learning
algorithms [117] to combine the indicators obtained from inter-user communications
in accordance to their relevance, based on a set of labeled data provided by the users.
The former aspect of our approach entails the extraction of the indicators of a user
relationship from the available communication history between two users, called
data extraction. The latter aspect of our approach involves the collection of the ground
truth1, so that we can correlate the communication indicators to the corresponding
social circle and tie strength of a given relationship.
For the purpose of extracting the required indicators as well as the ground truth,
we developed an Android-based2 smartphone application called FamApp3 (short for
Familiarity Application). With the help of this application, we can collect the relevant
data from user smartphones. Using FamApp, we put forth the following contribu-
tions towards estimating user relationships:
C4.1 We devise a method to extract the relevant indicators from user smartphones,
pertaining to the communication channels (calls and messages) (see Section 4.2.1).
We detail the steps taken towards the extraction of the indicators, including
their significance towards the relationship dimensions mentioned in Section 4.1.
C4.2 We describe the user interface of FamApp as well as the details of our user stud-
ies to obtain the ground truth required for our method based on supervised
machine learning (see Section 4.2.2). The obtained datasets can be utilized for
further research in the field of human-computer interaction.
C4.3 Finally, we perform a thorough analysis on the obtained datasets using super-
vised machine learning algorithms to understand the influence of the extracted
communication-based indicators on the estimation of the social circle and tie
strength of a relationship (see Section 4.3).
4.2.1 Data Extraction
Smartphones are the most predominant mobile devices used by people nowadays.
According to a recent survey, smartphones have shown a steady increase in the num-
ber of users over the past few years and are expected to continue increasing in the
future [66]. Based on this insight, we restrict the communication data for extraction
1 In machine learning jargon, the ground truth is the information obtained by direct observation (e.g.,
expert opinion, user input), and not based on inference. It assists in estimating the accuracy of a
classification algorithm in supervised machine learning. However, it can be error-prone because of the
subjective nature of its measurement.
2 https://www.android.com/
3 https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.solin.slc
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to the data available or accessible on user smartphones. In particular, we focus on un-
derstanding how the communication behavior on Instant Messaging (IM) applications
is influenced by a relationship. There has been a sudden proliferation of IM-based
services over the past few years, with a wide range of applications coming to the
fore—e.g., WhatsApp4, Facebook Messenger5, Google Hangouts6, Threema7. We extract
the necessary indicators from IM communication data on user smartphones, pertain-
ing to the relationship indicators introduced in Equation (1). In addition to the IM
data, we also extract relevant relationship indicators from call and SMS logs, as done
by other related work on human relationship estimation [142, 156, 227]. In doing so,
we want to validate the general assumption that call intensity and duration have a
positive correlation with higher values of tie strength.
In the following, we present the steps taken to set up our smartphone-based appli-
cation FamApp, especially in extracting the required indicators based on IM commu-
nication data. We first discuss the issues in extracting the required information from
user smartphones, before presenting the list of indicators extracted, corresponding
to the different dimensions of user relationships. The extracted indicators act as the
feature set for the supervised machine learning algorithms.
4.2.1.1 Using Smartphones as Information Sources for Data Extraction
WhatsApp has been the most dominant mobile IM application service in recent years.
A recent study showed that the number of messages exchanged over WhatsApp
already increased to 64 million in April 2014, with an exponential increase each
year [223]. Even the number of active users over the past 5 years has increased ex-
ponentially, recently having crossed the 1 billion mark [224]. Given the almost unan-
imous popularity of WhatsApp, we incorporate it as one of the IM applications for
data extraction. In addition to WhatsApp, we include the secure messaging service
called Threema, which has received a lot of popularity in Germany due to its secu-
rity and usability features. While we choose these two IM applications, it should be
noted here that the principles of our data extraction module can be applied to other
IM applications, too.
One major problem with the extraction of indicators from the IM applications is
the lack of suitable tools for retrieving communication histories [227]. Most existing
IM applications, including the ones mentioned above, have proprietary closed-door
models behind their Application Programming Interface (API), which does not allow
external applications to access their internal content. In order to circumvent this
problem, we decided to access the status bar notifications that are used to notify
users of any incoming messages. These notifications include all the necessary meta-
information about an incoming message (e.g., sender name and phone number), as
well as—at least in WhatsApp—the message content itself. This allows our data
extraction module to save the required indicators based on each notification as a log
4 https://www.whatsapp.com/
5 https://www.messenger.com/
6 https://hangouts.google.com
7 https://threema.ch/en
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entry. Of course, this does not provide the entire picture of a conversation, given that
we cannot track the outgoing messages. However, as we show later, we can still draw
reasonable interpretations based on these indicators with respect to a relationship.
In order to obtain the locative indicators mentioned in Equation (1), we extract the
phone location based on the cell tower IDs, to which the smartphone is connected
at a given point in time. By allowing the users to tag the cell tower IDs with the
corresponding logical locations (e.g., home, work), we allow for a battery-saving
and privacy-preserving alternative to GPS-based sensing. Furthermore, many users
tend to switch off their GPS sensing services on their smartphones due to the said
problems concerning privacy and battery drain [161]. Using the stored information
for future reference, we can infer the users’ logical location whenever they enter the
stored cell tower zones. We append this information about the users’ location to the
extracted indicators from the communication channels.
One of the key characteristics of messaging applications is the option to introduce
emotions into the messages with the help of emoticons/emojis. The analysis of emoti-
cons in text messages as well as their correlation with the actual human emotions has
been the subject of research in recent years [178, 179, 218]. Furthermore, the emotion
and opinions behind the message can also be interpreted by analyzing the usage of
words within the message. We analyze the influence of message contents on estimat-
ing human relationships by extracting the required indicators based on the message
sentiment and the usage of different types of emoticons.
To evaluate the usage of emoticons in messages, we group the most common emoti-
cons into three main categories—love/affection, negative/sad, and general—based
on the lists established by the Unicode Consortium8. In total, we consider 8 different
love/affection emoticons, 17 negative emoticons, and 37 general emoticons, which
express neutral and pensive emotions. We analyze the impact of the usage of emoti-
cons by counting the number of emoticons from each group used in each message.
We evaluate the sentiments behind message contents by applying the concepts
of opinion mining in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP) [109]. Generally
speaking, opinion mining aims at the identification of the overall contextual polar-
ity of a document by analyzing the opinions of the speaker/writer. In the context
of IM and SMS messages, we classify whether a certain message sent/received has
a positive or negative connotation. To do so, we use two well-established libraries
for opinion mining—SentiWordNet [16] for messages in the English language; and
SentiWS [173] for German messages. We adapt each of these libraries to return the
lexical sentiment score, which indicates whether a message is positive or negative.
This allows us to include a lighter version of the opinion mining engine in the smart-
phone application, without overloading the processor RAM on user smartphones.
4.2.1.2 Feature Extraction for Supervised Machine Learning
Using the above sources of information on smartphones, we apply supervised ma-
chine learning algorithms on the extracted indicators. To obtain the required indicators—
8 https://unicode.org/emoji/charts/full-emoji-list.html
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called features in the context of machine learning—we extract data from the commu-
nication activity on smartphones. Overall, we define a set of 127 features for the
supervised machine learning approach: 62 features based on messaging interaction
on IM and SMS applications, 56 features from call logs, and the remaining 9 features
as a combination of both the call-based and message-based interaction. These fea-
tures correspond to the indicators of human relationships, introduced in Equation
(1). The complete list of features used in our work is presented in Table 1. In the
following, we explain the importance of selecting these features from each communi-
cation channel with respect to the relationship dimensions introduced in Section 4.1.
Messaging Features. We consider incoming and outgoing messages in the SMS
channel, but only incoming messages in the IM channel, due to the limitations men-
tioned before. With respect to the IM channel, we analyze the number of messages
exchanged as well as their average length, which represent the features for message
intensity and frequency. It has been proven by existing work in social network re-
search that SMS interaction lacks temporal dependencies, given its asynchronous
nature of interaction [29]. Hence, we try to validate this observation on IM data by
measuring the time taken to respond to a message, thus accounting for temporal
dependence. However, given the lack of appropriate APIs to access this information,
we instead measure the time taken by a user to react to received messages. This is
done by measuring the time taken to open the corresponding IM application after a
message arrived. We thus calculate the percentage of IM messages read within 3 and
10 minutes.
Additionally, we include the analysis of emotion and sentiment within message
content in both SMS and IM, to account for channel usage indicators. We measure
the number of emoticons used per message as well as the percentage of messages
with emoticons. Furthermore, we calculate the percentage of general, positive, and
negative emoticons used in messages. We also calculate the percentage of messages
with positive/negative sentiment, as well as the standard deviation of message sen-
timent for IM, based on sentiment analysis libraries mentioned before. Given the
steady decline in popularity with respect to SMS interaction [227], we restrict its
analysis to the study of emoticons and message sentiment for both incoming and
outgoing messages.
Call Features. For the call-based features, we mainly rely on existing work in the
field of relationship estimation [142, 171, 227]. The main features include the total
number of calls and total call duration, which account for the intensity and fre-
quency of calls. To measure the temporal dependency, we distinguish call activity
on the weekdays to that on the weekends, and also differentiate between calls on
Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays, to deal with the different call practices in the social
circles considered. We account for locative dependencies by exploring call activity
at the logical locations home, work, and university. Furthermore, we measure the su-
periority of call-based interaction over the other channels by including the ratio of
call-to-overall communication. We also incorporate the number of lengthy calls by
accounting for all outgoing calls where the call duration exceeded 10 minutes, to
measure communication intensity.
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Combinatorial Features. There exists a fundamental dependence between the dif-
ferent communication channels, given that an event in one channel can result in an
event in another. For example, some text messages may require an immediate phone
call from the receiver, or vice versa. To account for these cases, we include combi-
natorial features, such as the total number of communication events, and the total
number of channels used. We also include certain features to account for temporal
dependencies, like the percentage of communication on the weekends.
In order to account for the fourth dimension, i.e., relationship maintenance, we
measure all the above features in two time frames—over a shorter period of the past
14 days, as well as a longer time period of 90+ days, depending on the available data.
Also, we include a feature for the number of days since the previous communication
event, which indicates how often people communicate with each other.
4.2.2 User Study
We conducted two separate user studies to evaluate the influence of IM patterns
on the estimation of human relationships. In the first user study, we mainly focus
on comparing the characteristics of IM usage with the usage of calls and SMS, and
analyzing their respective contributions to estimating the type and strength of hu-
man relationships. In the second user study, we delve further into the characteristics
of messaging services, mainly laying our focus on the contents of the messages ex-
changed and understanding their influence on the relationship.
4.2.2.1 Phase I
We carried out the first user study (Phase I) over a period of 4 weeks in July 2015. In
order to obtain participants for our study, we advertized FamApp among fellow work
colleagues as well as students at the university. All users were requested to install
the application on their phone and provide the application access to their contact list,
call and SMS logs, as well as the notifications on the status bar. In turn, of the 127
features presented in Table 1, we considered 80 features in Phase I, which includes all
call-based and combinatorial features but only the 16 basic IM/SMS features, not in-
cluding the features pertaining to message content (except basic emoticon features).
Considering that our approach is based on supervised machine learning, we col-
lect the ground truth data from the users, by asking them to assess a selection of
persons from their contact list. In order to account for all types of contacts—i.e.,
strong and weak relationships—we chose a balanced set based on the total duration
of calls with the respective contact persons, given the proven correlation between call
duration and tie strength [156, 227]. Android-based smartphones normally maintain
logs of the last 500 calls and typically 200 SMS messages per contact [142]. Hence,
upon installation of the application, the initial set of suggested contacts for assess-
ment is based on the median of the aggregated call duration over the past 90 days
from the call log. The remainder of the assessed contacts are suggested based on the
user’s interaction patterns on the observed communication channels. Consequently,
we mainly account for contacts that have recently been engaged in a conversation.
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Figure 7: The User Interface for Contact Assessment in FamApp
The collected ground truth is based on the responses to the questionnaires per-
taining to each suggested contact. In each questionnaire, the users are requested
to allocate the suggested contact to the corresponding social circle(s). We allow the
users to choose more than one social circle, so as to account for contacts that sat-
isfy multiple roles. Furthermore, we also allow the users to skip contacts, which
provides the means to account for uncertain or irrelevant contacts—e.g., landline
numbers, insurance companies, answering machine services—that do not exhibit a
typical communication pattern. Alternatively, the users can classify these contacts as
others.
In addition to that, the users are also asked to answer a set of four questions
pertaining to the tie strength with the suggested contact. The responses are collected
using a 10-step Likert scale from 0 to 100, in steps on 10. The four questions are based
on previous work in the field of sociology and human-computer interaction [78, 130,
227]:
1. How close do you feel to this person?
2. How strongly do you agree with the statement “I talk with this person about
important matters”?
3. How strongly do you agree with the statement “I would be willing to ask this
person for a loan of EUR 100 or more”?
4. How strongly do you agree with the statement “I enjoy interacting with this
person socially”?
The questions account for the amount of social interaction, willingness to bor-
row money, and general closeness (emotional intensity) between the user and the
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suggested contact. The ground truth for the corresponding tie strength is given by
the linear sum of the responses to each of the four questions. Figure 7 provides an
overview of the contact assessment page on FamApp, showing the questions for tie
strength analysis as well as the check-boxes for the social circles.
During Phase I, in order to preserve user privacy and increase user acceptance, we
did not collect any demographical data from the participants. Furthermore, all the in-
formation submitted by the participants were saved on their respective smartphones
for later retrieval. Each day, the saved datasets were uploaded securely to an external
server, where they were saved using a pseudonym based on the Android ID of their
smartphones.
4.2.2.2 Phase II
For the second user study (Phase II), we modified FamApp slightly to mainly account
for the contents of the messages exchanged using IM and SMS. In particular, we ac-
counted for the usage of emoticons and the sentiments in the messages exchanged, as
introduced in Section 4.2.1. In doing so, we mainly chose the 62 features based on IM
and SMS communication, as well as the combinatorial features based on messages,
as presented in Table 1.
We carried out Phase II over a longer time period of 4 months from March to
June 2016. Instead of entirely restricting our participants to fellow work colleagues
and students, we advertized the application on the Web and in other universities
in Germany. Furthermore, as an incentive for the participants, we provided them
the opportunity to win gift vouchers of up to 50€ from an online shopping website,
based on the number of contacts they assessed as part of the study.
Similar to Phase I, the participants were requested to install our application and
provide access to the above mentioned smartphone logs and services. In addition to
the tie strength and social circle related questions in the previous questionnaire, we
also included a question that pertains the language used for communication with the
suggested contacts. Considering that the application is based in Germany, we mainly
consider the languages of German and English. This allows us to apply appropriate
algorithms to analyze the sentiments behind the messages. Furthermore, this allows
us to obtain an overview of the demographic information of the participants.
4.3 evaluation and results
In this section, we provide an overview of the collected datasets in each user study
and detail our approach for evaluating the same with the help of supervised machine
learning techniques. We will first present the results of the evaluation of the datasets
obtained in Phase I, before shifting our focus to the analysis of message contents in
Phase II.
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Figure 8: Overview of the Data Extracted in Phase I
4.3.1 Results of Phase I: Analyzing Call and Messaging Indicators
In Phase I, we focused on evaluating call and messaging indicators to estimate the
type and strength in a human relationship, and to understand the key contributing
factors that characterize each relationship. A total of twelve users participated in
our study in Phase I. However, two of those users used the application for fewer
than ten days. In order to avoid the possibility of falsifying the models generated by
the machine learning algorithms, we decided to eliminate the datasets provided by
the corresponding users. Furthermore, two other users returned the default values
(50) for the questions pertaining to tie strength for all the suggested contacts. We
assumed that these values do not reflect the true tie strength, and therefore, decided
to eliminate their datasets, as well. After these changes, we obtained a final dataset by
eight users, comprising a total of 249 instances, where each user assessed an average
of 31 contacts (min = 4, max = 58,σ = 18.96).
Table 2 shows the distribution of the obtained dataset across the different social
circles considered in our work. We notice that most contacts were classified as friends;
there are considerably fewer number of contacts that were assessed as family members
or work colleagues; only 2 contacts were assessed as the users’ significant other. The
latter attributes to the low number of users that took part in our study. Considering
the low number of instances of significant others as well as the multifaceted nature
of the social circle others, we decided to disregard these two social circles in the
following evaluation.
Figure 8a shows the distribution of the communication events per user across the
two main channels—calls and IM—in Phase I. We notice that the number of instant
messages received is considerably higher, with a median of 13 messages received
compared to a median of 3 calls made/taken during the study period. This shows
a clear trend towards IM interaction. Overall, we extracted a total of 7191 communi-
cation events (calls, SMS, and IM), of which there were 680 calls, 246 SMS messages,
and 6265 IM messages.
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Before we proceed with the analysis of the extracted dataset, let us analyze the
usage of the communication channels in the different social circles in order to draw
an initial understanding of different usage patterns. To this end, we divided the
dataset into two subsets: Subset 1 with instances9 with at least one call event; and
Subset 2 with instances with at least one IM message. Table 3 shows the distribution
of the two subsets across the social circles considered. The row values ‘Linear decrease’
show the number of instances in each social circle if there were a linear decrease with
respect to the decrease in the number of instances in the overall dataset. For example,
the overall dataset decreases by 44% (from 249 to 139 instances) for Subset 1 if we
consider all contacts that at least had one call event. If we consider such a linear
decrease in each social circle, we observe that, e.g., the number of family instances
would be at around 20. The row values ‘% Rel. change’ show the relative deviation
of the true number of instances in each social circle in each subset to the number of
instances by linear decrease.
We observe that the number of instances of family and work is considerably higher
than the predicted number based on a linear decrease (+49.28% and +26.45%, respec-
tively). This shows a clear preference for call-based interaction in these two social
circles. Likewise, we also observe that the friend and hobby contacts show a distinct
tendency towards IM-based interaction, given the relative increase by 10.91% and
22.95% in the true number of instances in these two social circles, respectively. Fur-
thermore, we can discern that family and work instances tend to steer clear of IM-
based interactions, given their significantly negative deviation from a linear decrease
(-24.47% and -49.49%, respectively). Also, hobby instances do not show any notable
inclination towards call-based interactions (-59.63%), which attributes in general to
the usage of short message based interaction in this social circle.
Figure 8b provides an overview of the tie strength distribution over all instances
for the different social circles. As mentioned earlier, the tie strength ground truth is
based on the linear sum of the responses to the questions in the app-based question-
naires, such that a higher value denotes a higher tie strength. We observe that there
is a shift towards the higher regions of tie strength (mean = 250.6, σ = 97.9). This
indicates that people generally seem to save contacts in their smartphone contact
lists with whom they have an above-average tie strength. We also can discern that
the strong contacts primarily fall in the social circles of family and friend, whereas
exclusively work and hobby instances tend to have a weaker tie strength. Interestingly,
we observe that the work and hobby instances who have also been marked as friend
exhibit a much higher tie strength, with the contacts who belong to both work and
friend having a mean tie strength of 360, and that of hobby and friend lying at 307.5.
Given these findings, we include two additional datasets in the ensuing evaluation—
dataset OnlyC comprises only the data belonging to the 50 exclusively call-based
features, whereas dataset OnlyM consists of the data belonging to the 16 exclusively
messaging features, i.e., both IM-based and SMS-based features (see Table 2). In
doing so, our main focus lies in understanding the influence of each of these com-
9 An instance is an assessed contact person in the app-based questionnaire.
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munication channels on the estimation of the relationships. In turn, we also remove
the combinatorial features from the two datasets.
4.3.1.1 Dataset Preparation
Before we can proceed with the analysis of the obtained dataset for the estimation
of social circles and tie strength, we have to prepare the dataset accordingly. With
respect to the social circle, as seen in Table 2, there is clearly a significantly larger
number of friend instances compared to the other social circles, leading to strongly
imbalanced datasets. Given the low number of representative instances for the other
social circles—e.g., family or work—the social circle classifier would not be able to
classify them properly. One approach to overcome imbalanced datasets is resam-
pling [142, 171], where the instances in the original dataset are randomly selected
(i.e., resampled), such that all social circles (or classes in the machine learning jar-
gon) in the dataset are equally represented (or at least, have a sufficient number of
representative instances).
For the tie strength analysis, we consider a nominal approach and first group the
assessed contacts into strong and weak instances. We consider a score of 320 out of
400 (80%) as the threshold for the strong instances. In turn, we obtain a total of 72
instances for strong and 177 for weak (see Table 2). We term the corresponding dataset
as StrongWeak. In accordance with related work on tie strength analysis [199, 227], we
also consider an additional dataset to distinguish the highly strong ties from the rest
of the contacts. To this end, we divide the contacts into two categories—very strong
and weak—by setting the threshold at 90% (360 out of 400), resulting in 38 very strong
and 211 weak instances, thus forming the VerystrongWeak dataset (see Table 2). Due
to the imbalanced nature of these datasets, we employ a similar resampling approach
as described above to obtain better classifier models.
Two of the main issues in the generation of models based on machine learning are
the robustness and general applicability of the generated models, given the restricted
sample size in any user study. We approach this issue by (randomly) splitting the
original datasets into training and test sets (at the ratio 70:30), and only resampling
the training set in each case. In order to do so, we use the resampling technique with
replacement implemented in the machine learning toolkit WEKA [88]. This method
of splitting and resampling allows us to avoid the problem of overfitting10.
Overall, we carry out the above-mentioned method over ten runs for each class (i.e.,
each social circle and each tie strength category), each time randomizing the original
dataset before splitting it into training and test sets. In each run, we generate a
classifier based on the training set and analyze its performance on the corresponding
test set. Finally, we average the results over all ten runs to obtain the classification
results.
10 Overfitting implies that the generated model is overly tailored to the provided training data. This
impacts the performance of the model negatively, causing the model to lose its ability to generalize to
a wider range of datasets.
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4.3.1.2 Choosing the Machine Learning Algorithm
For the machine learning algorithm, we consider Support Vector Machines (SVM), rule-
based decision tree models—C4.5 and Random Forest—as well as the probabilistic
Näive Bayes approach [117]. We test them on the original dataset using a 10-fold cross
validation technique11. We use the corresponding implementations in WEKA (Lib-
SVM, J48, RandomForest, and NaiveBayes, respectively) to test the above algorithms.
Section A.1 in the appendix presents the empirical results obtained from the com-
parison of the above machine learning algorithms with respect to our dataset. Based
on the obtained results, we observe that the Random Forest algorithm performs best
with our dataset, achieving an average accuracy improvement of 5.71% over the other
algorithms. This mainly attributes to the diverse nature of our dataset—with a con-
siderable number of outliers—as well as the cluster-based approach employed by
this algorithm. Therefore, we employ the Random Forest algorithm for the rest of
our evaluation.
To better understand the results, we use the following evaluation metrics: accuracy,
Cohen’s Kappa κ, and the F1-score for true and false class estimation. The accuracy
gives the ratio of the number of correctly estimated instances to the total number
of instances in the dataset. Cohen’s Kappa κ ∈ [0, 1] shows the extent to which the
estimated model deviates from the observed data, not accounting for random agree-
ments. We use the F1-score in terms of F1-positive and F1-negative, which basically
dictate the ability of an estimation model to differentiate true class instances from
the non-class instances, and vice versa, respectively. Each of these metrics have a
positive correlation with the performance of the estimation models, i.e., the higher
the value of these metrics, the better is the performance of the models. In addition to
these, we also include an analysis of the information gain achieved by each feature
used in each dataset (using WEKA’s implementation of the Ranker algorithm [88]).
This mainly allows us to interpret the correlation factors assigned to each feature by
the estimation models, corresponding to Equation 1.
Note that, unless otherwise stated, we employ the above method to prepare and
evaluate our dataset extracted in Phase II, as well.
4.3.1.3 Social Circle Analysis
The classification results for each social circle based on the generated models are pre-
sented in Table 4. We observe that the average classification accuracy for the social
circle friend when using the AllComm dataset is moderate at 61.22%. This can be at-
tributed to the diversified perception of the term friend across different communities,
which in turn is reflected in their communication patterns. We notice that, while the
average accuracy does not change significantly for the OnlyC and OnlyM datasets,
the average F1-positive score decreases considerably by 6.5% for the OnlyC dataset.
11 The cross validation approach provides a measure of the ability of an algorithm to generalize across a
given dataset. As per the 10-fold cross-validation approach, the given dataset is randomly partitioned
into 10 equal subsets; 9 of them are used for training the model using the given machine learning
algorithm, and the remaining one fold is used as a test set for analyzing the performance of the trained
model. This process is repeated 10 times with each of the 10 folds acting as the test set once.
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Table 4: Evaluation Results for the Accuracy Analysis w.r.t. the Different Social Circles
(Phase I)
Social Circle Metric AllComm OnlyC OnlyM
Friend
Accuracy (%) 61.22 61.08 62.84
κ 0.2307 0.214 0.2489
F1-pos. (%) 59.01 52.53 57.90
F1-neg. (%) 62.85 66.83 66.40
Family
Accuracy (%) 81.49 82.97 65.68
κ 0.3780 0.444 0.1216
F1-pos. (%) 48.33 54.26 30.43
F1-neg. (%) 88.69 89.39 77.03
Work
Accuracy (%) 90.68 90.95 69.32
κ 0.2806 0.332 0.0632
F1-pos. (%) 32.67 37.75 15.08
F1-neg. (%) 94.94 95.11 81.23
Hobby
Accuracy (%) 76.08 70.68 68.92
κ 0.4413 0.421 0.2674
F1-pos. (%) 61.45 63.45 48.48
F1-neg. (%) 82.45 75.17 77.59
This can be accredited to the relatively distinctive messaging pattern exhibited by
friend instances. This is also reflected in the information gain analysis presented in
Table 5, where we notice that the number of IM messages and the total number of
communication events are the best positive indicators of friend instances.
While we achieve a significantly high average accuracy for the classification of
both family and work instances at 81.49% and 90.68%, respectively, we notice that the
κ and F1-positive values are relatively low at under 50% (whereas the F1-negative
score is markedly higher). This is mainly due to the low number of representative
instances for each of these classes in the overall dataset. However, we notice that the
performance of the OnlyC dataset is distinctly better than that of the OnlyM dataset
for both classes, with an accuracy increase of 17% and 21%, respectively. This can be
attributed to the distinctive call-based interaction patterns in each of these classes,
as well as a lack of distinctive interaction patterns in the messaging channels. We
can also observe this pattern in the information gain analysis (see Table 5), where
call-based features are the top three features in both classes. Furthermore, we also
observe typical temporal patterns in the communication behavior of both family and
work social circles, where family instances prefer communicating on weekends (here,
Saturdays), and work instances prefer weekdays.
For the hobby instances, we obtain the best classification result at an average accu-
racy of 76.08% (κ = 0.44) for the AllComm dataset, which is also reflected in the high
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Table 5: Information Gain Analysis w.r.t. the Different Social Circles (Phase I); Top Four
Features based on Ranker [88]
Social Circle Communication Feature Info Gain (Corr. Valency)
Friend
No. of IM messages 0.095 (+)
No. of all comm. events 0.08 (+)
No. of all comm. events [14 days] 0.077 (+)
No. of IMs [14 days] 0.077 (+)
Family
% Calls on Saturday 0.209 (+)
% Call duration on Saturday 0.179 (+)
Total duration of calls 0.172 (+)
% Calls to overall comm. 0.152 (+)
Work
% Call duration on weekdays 0.319 (+)
% Calls to overall weekday comm. 0.311 (+)
% Calls on weekdays 0.311 (+)
No. of IM messages 0.3 (-)
Hobby
% Calls to overall comm. 0.184 (-)
No. of calls 0.184 (-)
Total duration of calls 0.18 (-)
% IMs read within 3 mins [14 days] 0.15 (+)
average F1-positive and negative scores (61.45% and 82.45%, respectively). However,
we observe that, while the F1-positive score remains relatively constant, the aver-
age accuracy drops considerably (by 5.4%) for the OnlyC dataset in comparison to
the AllComm dataset. This attributes to the distinctive call-based interaction patterns
among hobby instances, as seen in the negatively correlated call-based features in the
information gain analysis in Table 5. We can also discern that, while the average ac-
curacy for both OnlyC and OnlyM datasets are similar, the F1-positive score drops
significantly for the OnlyM dataset by 12.97% with respect to the AllComm dataset.
This can be attributed to similar messaging patterns with friend instances. Interest-
ingly, we see that people tend to respond to IM messages by hobby instances quite
quickly, given that the percentage of IMs read within three minutes is a considerable
contributing factor.
4.3.1.4 Tie Strength Analysis
The evaluation results with respect to tie strength are presented in Table 6, which
are based on the Random Forest algorithm. We can discern that the best models
are created when we use all communication features (AllComm), given the higher F1-
positive score of 58.61% and 48.71% in comparison to OnlyC and OnlyM, respectively,
for each tie strength dataset. This is mainly attributed to the higher influence of
combinatorial features, such as the number of days of communication and the days
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Table 6: Evaluation Results for the Accuracy Analysis w.r.t. Tie Strength (Phase I)
Tie Strength Category Metric AllComm OnlyC OnlyM
Strong
Accuracy (%) 75.81 75.95 74.59
κ 0.4188 0.3715 0.2338
F1-pos. (%) 58.61 53.05 38.23
F1-neg. (%) 82.85 83.75 83.89
Very Strong
Accuracy (%) 80.13 81.60 71.47
κ 0.3680 0.3338 0.2323
F1-pos. (%) 48.71 44.15 39.51
F1-neg. (%) 87.63 88.89 80.91
Table 7: Information Gain Analysis w.r.t. Tie Strength (Phase I); Top Four Features based on
Ranker [88]
Tie Strength
Category
Communication Feature Info Gain
(Corr. Valency)
Strong
No. of days of comm. 0.146 (+)
Days since last comm. 0.129 (-)
Total duration of calls 0.117 (+)
No. of calls 0.116 (+)
Very Strong
No. of channels used 0.189 (+)
Avg. no. of emoticons per IM [14 days] 0.184 (+)
No. of days of comm. 0.169 (+)
% Calls, SMS, and IMs on Saturday 0.169 (+)
since last communication, as seen in the information gain analysis with respect to
the tie strength datasets in Table 7.
With respect to the StrongWeak dataset, we observe that, while the F1-negative
score remains relatively constant for all three feature datasets, the F1-positive score
drops significantly (by 20.38%) for the OnlyM dataset compared to AllComm. This
seems to indicate that call-based features (such as total duration of calls, as seen
in Table 7) have a higher influence on estimating strong instances than message-
related features. This conforms with the results of existing work in the field of tie
strength analysis where call intensity is considered a proxy for tie strength [156, 227].
Interestingly, we can see that this notion changes for the VerystrongWeak dataset,
where the average number of emoticons used per IM message has a high positive
correlation with the very strong instances. Another important feature in this regard
is the number of communication channels used, which has the highest influence in
differentiating between very strong from weak instances.
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Figure 9: Distribution of the Main Extracted Features per Participant (Phase II)
4.3.2 Results of Phase II: Analyzing Messaging Content
As part of Phase II, we undertake an analysis of additional characteristics of instant
messaging services and their influence in estimating the type and strength of a hu-
man relationship. In this study, we decided to exclude call-based features entirely,
considering that our results from Phase I proved their applicability for estimating
human relationships. Instead, we now focus on the additional messaging features
concerning the usage of different emoticons as well as the feelings or sentiments
behind the message contents.
We had a total of 26 participants who took part in the user study in Phase II. Con-
sidering the longer time span of this study as well as the fact that the monetary
incentive motivated application usage for at least 4 weeks, we did not have to elimi-
nate instances as in Phase I. Overall, we obtained a total of 547 instances, where each
user assessed an average of 21 contacts (min = 3, max = 51, σ = 14.14). Based on
the selected communication language in the questionnaires, 392 contacts communi-
cate in German, 84 communicate in English, and the remaining 71 contacts usually
communicate in a different language, giving us an overview of the demographic
distribution of the participants.
Table 8 shows the dataset extracted in Phase II, indicating again that the number
of friend instances is much higher than that of the other social circles. Family and
work instances make up a higher percentage—18% and 14.5%, respectively—of the
overall dataset compared to the dataset in Phase I. The number of instances for the
social circle significant other is considerably higher, given the larger number of par-
ticipants. In the social circle others, we obtained a varied set of contacts, including
flatmates, university classmates, Internet acquaintances, doctors, and restaurants. In
accordance with the study in Phase I, we exclude these two social circles from the fol-
lowing discussion. With respect to tie strength, we employ the same thresholds as in
Phase I to obtain the two nominal datasets StrongWeak (threshold at 80%) and Verys-
trongWeak (threshold at 90%). In doing so, we obtain a total of 149 strong instances
in the dataset StrongWeak, and 94 very strong instances in the dataset VerystrongWeak
(see Table 8).
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Table 10: Evaluation Results for the Accuracy Analysis w.r.t. the Different Social Circles
(Phase II)
Metric
Social Circle
Friend Family Work Hobby
Accuracy (%) 59.33 76.34 80.55 78.84
κ 0.192 0.115 0.059 0.076
F1-pos. (%) 58.51 24.89 16.03 18.78
F1-neg. (%) 59.96 85.82 88.95 87.79
Our Phase II dataset consists of 33618 communication events, of which 31570 are
IM messages and 2048 are SMS messages. Figure 9 shows the average distribution
of messages per participant over both these channels. An interesting observation
is the average number of messages containing emoticons in each of these messag-
ing channels—the number of IM messages containing emoticons/emojis is 8 times
higher than that for SMS messages. This can be attributed to the general proclivity
towards IM (especially WhatsApp) and its emoticon set. Looking at the usage of the
IM channel among the different social circles in Table 9, we can observe similar pat-
terns as seen in the dataset extracted in Phase I (see Section 4.3.1). Friend and hobby
instances tend to use IM more often (+16.35% and +7.13%, respectively), whereas fam-
ily and work instances seem to exhibit certain reluctance towards the same (-21.74%
and -9.29%, respectively).
For the analysis of the extracted dataset, we consider both the IM-based and SMS-
based features as one set of messaging features, coming to a total of 62 features
(compared to the 16 messaging features in Phase I). Just as we did in Phase I, we
employ random resampling to balance out the imbalanced training sets, especially
given the high number of friend instances compared to the other social circles, as well
as the high number of weak instances compared to the strong and very strong instances.
We split the original dataset into training and test sets at the ratio of 70:30, and apply
the generated training set model on the corresponding test set for the respective
analyses. Given the diverse and outlier-ridden nature of the dataset, just like in Phase
I, we use the Random Forest algorithm in WEKA for supervised machine learning
to generate the estimation models. Even here, we execute ten runs for each social
circle/tie strength category, where we randomize the original dataset in each run.
We use the same evaluation metrics used in Phase I—accuracy, Cohen’s Kappa, F1-
positive, and F1-negative—so that we can draw parallels between the two datasets.
In the following, we describe the analysis of the new features based on messaging
content in Phase II with respect to the social circles and tie strength categories.
4.3.2.1 Social Circle Analysis
Table 10 shows the evaluation results for the estimation of the social circles based
on the Random Forest algorithm. We can notice that the correct estimation of the
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Table 11: Information Gain Analysis w.r.t. the Different Social Circles (Phase II); Top Four
Features based on Ranker [88]
Social Circle Communication Feature Info Gain
(Corr. Valency)
Friend
No. of IM messages 0.039 (+)
IM avg. message length 0.039 (+)
Avg. general emoticons per IM 0.037 (+)
% IM read within 10 mins 0.033 (+)
Family
No. of IM messages 0.105 (-)
IM avg. message length 0.103 (-)
IM avg. sentiment score [DE] 0.088 (-)
% IM read within 10 mins 0.081 (-)
Work
No. of IM messages 0.108 (-)
No. of IM messages [14 days] 0.072 (-)
Outgoing SMS avg. sentiment score [DE] 0.047 (+)
IM avg. message length 0.038 (-)
Hobby
No. of IM messages 0.092 (+)
IM avg. message length 0.085 (-)
IM avg. message length [14 days] 0.066 (-)
No. of IM messages [14 days] 0.059 (+)
friend instances is still considerably difficult with an average accuracy of 59.33% (κ
= 0.19). This is mostly caused by the diversity present within the social circle friend,
as mentioned earlier in Section 4.3.1.3. The similar values of the F1-positive and neg-
ative scores are indicative of this diversity within this social circle. With respect to
the information gain analysis (see Table 11), we can see that the overall number of
IM messages and the average message length have the highest influence, albeit the
amount of influence is considerably low (0.038). We also notice that the average num-
ber of general emoticons has a positive influence towards estimating friend instances.
Coming to family and work instances, we observe a similar issue faced in the anal-
ysis of the dataset in Phase I, where the messaging features do not possess any dis-
tinctive characteristics that allow the machine learning algorithm to precisely classify
these instances from the others. While the average accuracy shows a significant in-
crease compared to that in Phase I, the lack of uniqueness can be noticed in the lower
values for Kappa (0.115 and 0.059, respectively) and F1-positive (24.89% and 16.03%,
respectively) for both these social circles. This can also be observed in the informa-
tion gain analysis, where most of the features have a negative influence on estimat-
ing these social circles. An interesting observation is that work instances seem to
make use of the SMS channel for positive messages, at least in the German-speaking
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Table 12: Evaluation Results for the Accuracy Analysis w.r.t. Tie Strength (Phase II)
Metric
Tie Strength Category
Strong Very Strong
Accuracy (%) 72.56 81.65
κ 0.191 0.249
F1-pos. (%) 35.09 35.17
F1-neg. (%) 82.57 89.25
community, given the positive influence of the sentiment score for outgoing SMS
messages.
The estimation models for hobby instances show a significantly improved average
accuracy at 78.84% (compared to 68.92% in Phase I). However, the κ and F1-positive
values are significantly poorer at 0.076 and 18.78%, respectively, indicating again
the lack of unique messaging patterns in the hobby social circle compared to the
others. The information gain analysis for hobby instances, however, shows familiar
communication characteristics—the number of IM messages has a positive influence,
whereas the average IM message length is negatively correlated with such instances.
4.3.2.2 Tie Strength Analysis
Table 13: Information Gain Analysis w.r.t. Tie Strength (Phase II); Top Four Features based
on Ranker [88]
Tie Strength
Category
Communication Feature Info Gain
(Corr. Valency)
Strong
Avg. emoticons per IM 0.053 (+)
% IMs containing emoticon 0.049 (-)
Avg. negative emoticons per IM 0.029 (-)
No. of IM messages 0.026(+)
Very Strong
IM avg. message length 0.109 (+)
Avg. general emoticons per IM 0.086 (+)
IM σ of sentiment score [EN] 0.059 (+)
Outgoing SMS avg. message length 0.056 (-)
The analysis of the messaging features with respect to tie strength yielded similar
results to those in Phase I, as seen in Table 12. For the StrongWeak dataset, we notice
that the values for κ and F1-positive are marginally lower than those in Phase I. How-
ever, for the VerystrongWeak dataset, we observe that the accuracy has increased con-
siderably (about 10%), while the κ and F1-positive values have remained relatively
constant in comparison to those in Phase I. This can be attributed to the fine-grained
content-based features considered in Phase II, which is also seen in the information
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gain anaylsis, where the number of general emoticons and the sentiment score in
IM messages have a positive influence in distinguishing very strong instances (see Ta-
ble 13). For the StrongWeak dataset, we notice that the average number of emoticons
in IM messages has a positive correlation with strong instances, whereas the average
number of negative emoticons has a negative correlation.
4.4 discussion
Based on the obtained results, we can ascertain that the two communication channels—
calls and instant messaging—have an influential role in estimating human relation-
ships. The distinctive characteristics of friend and hobby social circles in the IM chan-
nel does help in distinguishing them from the family and work social circles. Overall,
we obtain an average accuracy of 77.36% (κ = 0.33) in estimating social circles, and
an average accuracy of 75.81% (κ = 0.42) for identifying strong and weak instances,
when we use the essential communication features from both channels.
Using only features based on call-based interaction, we obtain an average accu-
racy of 76.42% (κ = 0.35) for social circle classification, and 75.95% (κ = 0.37) for tie
strength classification. On the other hand, using all messaging features, we only ob-
tain a lower average accuracy of 73.76% (κ = 0.11) across all social circles and 72.56%
(κ = 0.19) for tie strength, which is mainly caused by the lack of sufficient diversity in
the communication behavior within each of the different categories. However, based
on the information gain analysis for both social circle and tie strength categories,
we notice that each category does exhibit a relatively significant behavior in each
communication channel, which allows us to distinguish between them.
Looking at the complete picture, our results only depict the smartphone usage
patterns of a select set of users in Germany. Our approach is based on the extrac-
tion of a sparse set of communication data to understand the characteristics of a
given relationship. While the user study in Phase II was conducted over a sufficiently
longer period of time than in the study in Phase I, a complete evaluation of human
relationships requires a continuous collection of data over a period of years.
Considering that even meta-data extracted from user communication (i.e., the fea-
tures) can contain sensitive information about the user, we employed two privacy-
aware settings in our approach during the collection and analysis of the extracted
data. Firstly, during our field studies, we used a unique hash-based12 pseudonym for
each user based on their Android-ID, and used this pseudonym while storing the ex-
tracted data on an external server. The extracted dataset allowed us to draw fruitful
inferences on the estimation of user relationships from communication data, with-
out allowing us any insight into the actual identity of the users behind the dataset.
Secondly, during Phase II, apart from the collection of message-based features, we
used some of the revelations gained in Phase I to provide the users with some initial
estimations of their relationship with some of their smartphone contacts. In doing
so, we did not send their data to any external server, thus performing a phone-local
analysis.
12 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1
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Human relationships are in nature complex and dynamic structures. The social
circle friend comprises a large variety of relationship types, including childhood
best friends, schoolmates, and acquaintances at a party. Each of these sub-circles
entail different communication behavior, on different communication channels. Ex-
relationships, relationships over different time zones, as well as relationships with
differing levels of engagement (e.g., project members, temporary roommates), to
name a few, further complicate the creation of such estimation models.
Our research only focuses on a selection of IM application services—WhatsApp
and Threema. There are many other IM applications available and used frequently
nowadays, such as Facebook Messenger, Skype, and Google Hangouts. Furthermore,
as mentioned earlier, we could only analyze the incoming messages in the IM appli-
cations due to the lack of the necessary API to access the application-internal data.
Additional measures—e.g., understanding the touch patterns of smartphone users in
messaging applications [198]—have to be taken to fully understand the implications
of IM-based interactions on the estimation of user relationships.
Overall, our work focuses on the estimation of user relationships as the basis for
understanding user sharing patterns and therefore, their privacy constraints. We can
leverage findings in related literature to model the conditions in which people share
information and to understand how the social circle and tie strength influence the
data shared between people [51, 114, 153]. Furthermore, while social circle and tie
strength have been proven to have a direct correlation with the sharing patterns
within a relationship, one must also consider other factors while modeling one such
system—surrounding conditions, user context, and the nature of the users them-
selves. Extroverts and introverts interact differently, as shown by de Montjoye et
al. [143]. People also interact differently in groups, showing different communica-
tion and interaction patterns [107]. Adapting relationship estimation to dynamic user
behavior is still an open research question.
In this thesis, we use the findings from our analysis of user relationships to gen-
erate the trust relations between the users, and therefore, between the devices in a
D2D-based network. The trust relations provide us with a measure to quantify the
amount of information shared between users, in accordance with the social circle and
tie strength of the relationship at hand. We model the dyadic trust between two users
based on their chief behavioral characteristics on the different communication chan-
nels under consideration—here, phone call and IM channels—using the concepts of
behavioral trust [5, 190, 212]. In doing so, we focus on using the generated trust re-
lations in realizing a privacy-aware environment for distributed CEP in the IoT, as
discussed in the next chapter.

5
T R U S T- B A S E D E X E C U T I O N O F D I S T R I B U T E D C E P S Y S T E M S
Our main revelation in Chapter 4 is the influential nature of distinct communica-tion patterns on the estimation of different types of human relationships. In this
chapter, we employ the key communication characteristics from Chapter 4 to derive
the trust relations between the users, and thereby, between the devices themselves.
These trust relations can be classified in a category of trust called behavioral trust [5,
190], where the trust between users is quantified based on certain characteristics of
their communication or interaction behavior.
In general, D2D-based networks are built around the concept of physical proximity
communication, so that the devices may exchange information directly among each
other without having to rely on a cellular connection. This requires the knowledge of
the device mobility patterns as well as the social relations between the devices and
their owners to fully take advantage of the D2D environment [123, 154]. In turn, it is
necessary to make the D2D-based network socially-aware, so as to adapt the network
to the differing privacy constraints of the users involved. We use the concept of
behavioral trust to establish a privacy-aware platform for distributed CEP in a D2D
environment.
To this end, we introduce a privacy-aware placement algorithm for distributed
CEP that accounts for the (behavioral) trust level between users. We control event
dissemination and the placement of CEP operators with the help of a robust trust
management model, that also accounts for trust evolution and prevents attacks on
user privacy. Finally, we evaluate our model analytically as well as empirically as
part of a D2D-based distributed system using smartphones.
5.1 building the right candidate lists
Before we proceed with our trust-based approach for distributed CEP, we must first
understand the main issues to be tackled in one such privacy-aware system. The
main system prerequisite for the execution of an operator graph (see Section 2.1) in a
distributed environment is the placement of CEP operators on available devices, such
that the application requirements are fulfilled. These requirements can vary based
on the application at hand—low latency, load balancing, low energy consumption,
privacy awareness, etc. [121, 157, 187, 201, 231].
The issue of CEP operator placement basically translates to the building of the
right candidate lists on each device. For example, for a low-latency application, the
candidate list on each device includes other devices in the neighborhood along with
the communication latency between them. Thus, when the CEP operators need to
be placed on the devices, each device can choose a device in their candidate list that
offers the lowest communication latency at the current point in time. The main objec-
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Figure 10: Illustration of the Problem Statement for Privacy-Aware Distributed CEP
tive of our work is to build these candidate lists on the basis of the trust level between
the users who own the devices in the neighborhood, so as to enable a privacy-aware
environment for distributed processing, as shown in Figure 10.
In general, CEP operates on historical atomic data (e.g., sensor data) and discov-
ers higher-level patterns based on event observations. This requires the streaming
of atomic events to processing devices, as well as the storage of these events on the
devices for further processing. The privacy constraints of users depend on how sen-
sitive each transmitted event is. Each event can have a different degree of sensitivity,
or a sensitivity level. This again can vary from user to user, given that each user has
a different perception of the sensitivity of events. For example, in Scenario A intro-
duced in Section 3.1, Walt may consider his microphone data highly sensitive but
may be willing to share his accelerometer information with other users without any
concerns. The combination of events can further decrease or increase the sensitivity
of the previous events. For example, an adversary may be able to infer Walt’s stress
level based on the combination of past microphone and location events [129, 184],
but not by each event type individually. The dissemination of events must, therefore,
performed in accordance with the event sensitivity level as well as the trust level of
the possible event recipients.
In Section 1.1.1, we addressed the challenges faced in executing CEP in a D2D-
based environment as a result of its dynamic nature and the presence of adversaries.
The envisaged distributed CEP system must cope with variable data availability and
privacy constraints in a possibly hostile environment, and yet allow for collaborative
processing of context information among available devices. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.2, trust characterizes the willingness of a person (trustor) to rely on the actions
of another person (trustee), such that the trustor does not have any direct control
over the actions of the trustee [168, 190]. In any hostile environment, it is necessary
to account for the evaluation of trust as well as subsequent evolution of trust over
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time. In effect, the users need to fill their candidate list with the correct trust values
of the other users in the environment. In the following, we explain our proposed
approach for the trust management model and detail its main properties that satisfy
the above requirements.
5.2 trust-based distributed cep using trustcep
In our approach for a privacy-aware adaptation of distributed CEP, we develop a
trust management model called TrustCEP based on behavioral trust, which accounts
for the evaluation of direct trust between users as well as its evolution with time. As
mentioned above, the trust level between users as well as the sensitivity level of
the events disseminated dictate the placement of the CEP operators on the available
devices.
Recall that an operator ω ∈ Ω—part of an operator graph G—processes the in-
coming events Iω based on the prevailing operator rule model, and produces a set
of outgoing events Oω (see Sections 2.1 and 3.2.1). We consider that each event
e ∈ Oω ⊂ E has a certain sensitivity level Se, which basically indicates how sensitive
or private the event is to the given user. We assume that the users set a sensitivity
level for each outgoing event type by themselves based on their privacy preferences
as well as the context query that is currently processed. For example, in Figure 10, let
τJesse be the trust level assigned by Walt to Jesse. If Se1 is the sensitivity level of the
event e1 output by operator ω1 running on Walt’s device, then the next operator ω2
can be placed on Jesse’s device if and only if τJesse > Se1 . This ensures that devices
which receive events have a high enough trust level to store and process them.
As can be discerned from the above discussion, the crux of the problem lies in
determining the trust level τJesse that Walt has in Jesse. In general, the key aspect
behind our approach is the estimation and handling of trust in a distributed envi-
ronment. Therefore, in TrustCEP, we put forth the following three contributions
towards privacy-aware distributed CEP:
C5.1 We build on the observations made based on the analysis of user communica-
tion behavior to measure the direct trust relations between users. To this end,
we utilize the results from our analysis in Chapter4 of the interaction history be-
tween users on synchronous and asynchronous communication channels, tak-
ing the key aspects of behavioral trust into consideration (see Section 5.2.1);
C5.2 For the evolution of trust, as part of the Trust Recommendation Analyzer (see Sec-
tion 3.3), we develop an approach for robust trust recommendation where the
users in the environment may recommend their trust values to others. Further,
we also demonstrate how our approach is robust against collusion and on-off
attacks (see Section 5.2.2). In summary, we present (i) how recommendation
messages are exchanged between users, (ii) how we evaluate the credibility of
the recommended trust values using a similarity-based approach, and (iii) how
our approach prevents attacks on privacy;
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C5.3 Finally, we detail a privacy-aware placement algorithm that makes use of the
locally generated trust-based candidate list to find the right devices for the
placement and execution of CEP operators (see Section 5.2.3).
5.2.1 Establishing Direct Trust
Researchers in the field of sociology have long studied the characteristics of trust
and trustworthiness, and their correlation with the relationship between people [89,
207]. Furthermore, there has been a new wave of approaches that consider and em-
brace social awareness in the design of D2D-based networks towards 5G cellular
systems [123, 141, 154, 228]. These approaches focus on the extraction of valuable
information from social networks, including relationship details and recent commu-
nication history to estimate the objective trustworthiness of users, as mentioned in
Section 2.2. The main goal is to incorporate the social relationships and trust level
among devices to enhance the reliability and efficiency of IoT-based services and
applications.
Recall from Section 2.3 that the notion of tie strength, or the closeness within a
given relationship, is dependent on the intensity and reciprocity of the interactions
between people. Typically, as established in related literature [5, 227], the most com-
mon indicators of trust and strength of a relationship are the number and duration
of calls between users. This concept was validated and expanded in the results ob-
tained in Chapter 4, where we observed that the characteristics of synchronous (e.g.,
call-based) and asynchronous (e.g., messaging based) interactions have a significant
influence on the estimation of the relationship at hand.
To this effect, we propose an approach to establish the initial direct trust based
on the aspect of behavioral trust between two users, in accordance with their histor-
ical interactions on synchronous and asynchronous communication channels. Syn-
chronous communication includes, as the name suggests, all interactions that take
place instantly, in real time, between two people—e.g., face-to-face communication,
phone calls. In asynchronous communication, the sender and receiver do not have
to be engaged at the same time, leaving room for more contemplation and delib-
eration in the responses—e.g., SMS communication and instant messaging. In our
approach, we mainly consider the essential contributing factors in relationships and
incorporate these to calculate the trust between the users.
Taking interaction intensity as one of the factors, we denote s and a as the inter-
action intensity on synchronous and asynchronous channels, respectively. This can,
for example, be the number of calls and/or number of messages exchanged between
two users, which attributes to varying degrees of closeness and hence, trust. In ad-
dition to these, we also consider factors that describe distinct usage patterns on the
channels, and have been proven to have a significant influence towards the type and
strength of a relationship—total call duration dur and the number of emoticons used
in messages emo (see Section 4.3). To account for reciprocity, we introduce a degree
of reciprocity ρ ∈ [0, 1], that denotes the extent to which both users in a relationship
are involved in the communication flow between them. This in turn depends on the
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outgoing (out) and incoming events (in) in the respective channels—e.g., messages
sent/received; time spoken/listened. All of these factors have to be weighed in ap-
propriately, based on a weighting factorw ∈ [0, 1], to estimate the trust between users.
For example, the weighting factor ws,out accounts for the number of synchronous out-
going communication events.
For two given users υi and υj in the system, the (initial) direct trust level τ
υi
υj be-
tween them can be measured as a function of the synchronous and asynchronous
components of their interaction history, τs and τa, respectively, as follows (we have
left out the user indexes from the equations below for the purpose of comprehensi-
bility):
τs =
ρs · (ws,outsout +wdur,outdurout) + (1− ρs) · (ws,insin +wdur,indurin)
sout + sin + durout + durin
τa =
ρa · (wa,outaout +wemo,outemoout) + (1− ρa) · (wa,inain +wemo,inemoin)
aout + ain + emoout + emoin
(2)
Consequently, the direct trust value of υi towards υj is given by,
τυiυj = wsync τs + (1−wsync) τa (3)
where wsync is the weighting factor that balances the direct trust between the syn-
chronous and asynchronous trust values. If we consider a set of nΥ users, each
user υi ∈ Υ ∀ i ∈ (1, 2, . . . ,nΥ) maintains a trust vector TυiΥ . The trust vector
comprises υi’s trust level towards the other users in the environment, such that
TυiΥ = {. . . , T
υi
υj , . . .}∀υj ∈ Υ 3 j 6=i. Trust is generally considered a multi-dimensional
construct [168, 190], as discussed in Section 2.2, such that it has varying values de-
pending on the context—e.g., location, time, co-location, etc. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we only consider one dimension of trust in our work. However, the concepts
introduced here as well as the trust-based approach for operator placement can be
easily extended to multiple dimensions, by introducing additional vector columns to
the overall trust matrix, TΥ.
In the above equations, the weighting parameters—wx,y, wsync, and ρ—may be de-
pendent on each other, considering that the communication patterns themselves are
correlated to each other to a certain extent. We assume that the users manipulate the
different variables by themselves depending on the their proclivity to trust people
and their disposition to build connections to other users. Given that the weighting
parameters lie in the range [0, 1], the resulting trust values also lie in the same range.
We define 0 as the value representing complete distrust; 1 represents complete trust;
and, 0.5 represents neutral trust. The more the trust value goes towards one of the
extremities of the trust vector, the higher the (un-)trustworthiness of the correspond-
ing user. We consider neutral trust as the trust level between users that do not have
any or very few prior interactions.
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5.2.2 Trust Recommendations
Our implementation of behavioral trust using historical interaction patterns primar-
ily captures the trust τυiυj that user υi has towards user υj, which we in turn term
the direct trust between the two users. However, this concept does not help in estab-
lishing trust between users that have hardly interacted with each other. Restricting
the trust evaluation to only previous interactions limits the devices in the respective
candidate lists available for the placement of CEP operators, and therefore, reduces
the viability of collaborative processing in a distributed environment.
In order to improve the scope of the system, we leverage the concept of trust propa-
gation established in related literature [10, 127, 190]. Basically, taking the illustration
in Figure 10 as an example, trust propagation accounts for the amount of trust Walt
bestows upon Gus (whom, let us assume, Walt does not know) based on his existing
trust level towards Jesse, and Jesse’s trust level in Gus. It must be noted here that
propagation of trust does not imply transitivity of trust, although the converse is al-
ways true [49, 190, 233]. While the amount of trust derived from propagation trust is
context-dependent (e.g., if Jesse trusts Gus in a specific context, the trust propagated
to Walt is also only applicable in that context), the principles of our single-context
approach can be applied in a multi-contextual scenario, as well.
We incorporate the concept of trust propagation by allowing for the evolution
of trust with the help of trust recommendations from other users. Therefore, the
trust level of user υi towards υj, who have had minimal to no interaction with each
other, depends on the trust recommendations from other users, τυtυj ∀ υt ∈ Υ 3
t 6= i, j. As mentioned earlier, the incorporation of trust recommendations allows for
an expansion in the number of devices available to occupy the candidate lists, and
therefore, improve the efficiency of the distributed system on the whole.
However, the inclusion of trust recommendations makes the system susceptible
to adversary threats in the form of collusion attacks. Adversaries can employ ballot-
stuffing—i.e., improving their trust levels in the eyes of the other users—and bad-
mouthing—i.e., reducing the trust levels of certain users to gain an advantage over
them, as mentioned in Section 3.2.2.2. It is necessary to incorporate the incoming
trust recommendations appropriately, in order to allow for improved system scope
and yet prevent attacks on privacy due to the presence of adversaries.
In our work, we propose a robust trust recommendation approach that allows the
benign users to prevent privacy attacks by adversaries in the system. To this end,
we facilitate a user to (i) estimate the credibility of incoming trust recommendations,
(ii) revise their trust vector based on the credible recommendations, and (iii) detect
malicious behavior on the part of other users, including behavioral changes, e.g.,
from benign to malicious. In the following, we explain our approach in further detail
with respect to the aforementioned points.
5.2.2.1 Analyzing Trust Recommendations
In our work, for a given user υi, the corresponding trust recommendation vector is
defined by RecυiΥ , such that Rec
υi
Υ ¬ T
υi
Υ (i.e., vector Rec
υi
Υ is not necessarily equal
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to vector TυiΥ ). Each user can manipulate their recommendation vectors to suit their
needs, depending on how they want to influence event dissemination in the system.
We consider a round-based exchange of trust recommendation vectors among the
users. The exact time interval for each round depends on the application at hand.
For example, a financial application where trust plays a very important role may
require trust transactions every minute; whereas, an application that involves social
network analysis can have a larger interval for each round (e.g., 1 day). Each user υi
modifies their trust recommendation vector to υj such that rec
υi
υt |t=i,j = ∅, so that the
mutual trust levels are not revealed to each other, considering that these are sensitive
information.
Users benefit from trust recommendations such that they can update their trust
level towards the other users, especially the ones who are (relatively) unknown. In
order to incorporate them appropriately, we consider the credibility of incoming rec-
ommendations χ. We define the credibility of an incoming trust recommendation
vector based on its cosine-based similarity measure with the other trust recommenda-
tion vectors—mainly to detect colluding users, as explained later in Section 5.2.2.2—
as well as the trust vector of the recipient user to determine the revised trust level
towards the other users.
Upon reception of trust recommendations, each user selects two sets of recommen-
dation vectors for further analysis—(i) they first select the trust recommendations of
the users whom they highly trust (e.g., τ > 0.9), and (ii) further, they also consider
those trust recommendation vectors among the remaining vectors that have a high
credibility χ with respect to their own trust vector. In doing so, each user mainly
considers those recommendation vectors that have a high degree of semantic similar-
ity with its own trust vector [238]. Basically, we leverage on the notion that a user
is more likely to follow other users who think alike, i.e., have similar trust vectors.
For a user υi with trust vector T
υi
Υ , who receives the recommendation vector of user
υj, Rec
υj
Υ , the credibility level of υj with respect to the received recommendation vec-
tor, χυiυj ∈ [0, 1], is given by the cosine of the angle between the two vectors in an
n-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system, where n is the number of users in the
system, as in Equation (4).
χυiυj =
TυiΥ ·Rec
υj
Υ
|TυiΥ | · |Rec
υj
Υ |
=
∑n
t=1;t 6=i,j τ
υi
υt · recυjυt√∑n
t=1;t 6=i(τ
υi
υt)
2 ·
√∑n
t=1;t 6=j(rec
υj
υt)
2
(4)
The dot product in the above equation does not apply for t = i, j because of the
exclusion of mutual trust values in the trust recommendations, as mentioned above,
although it is inconsequential from a mathematical point of view. We consider a
cosine-based approach to account for the relative predisposition that a user has to-
wards the other users [221]. Basically, we compare the predisposition that a user has
towards others and use this knowledge to select the trust recommendation vectors
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(a) Starkly Dissimilar Trust Vectors (b) Relatively Similar Trust Vectors
Figure 11: Comparison Between Cosine-based and Euclidean-based Similarity Measure
that are most credible with respect to the user. Different weighting factors for esti-
mating the trust vectors, as in Equations (2) and (3), will lead to different trust values
for each user.
Consider Figure 11, where we depict the comparison between two non-similar
trust vectors (Figure 11a) and two similar trust vectors (Figure 11b), with respect to
the cosine of the angle between them. We observe that, in Figure 11a, the trust vector
T3 is significantly dissimilar to trust vector T1 because of the large angle between
them (42.88°). In this case, even the Euclidean distance between the two vector tips
will provide a reasonable estimate of the (dis-)similarity between the two vectors,
given the large value of 0.64. However, in Figure 11b, the two trust vectors are very
similar to each other, since they both exhibit a similar proclivity towards other users,
given the low angle between them, cos−1(χT1T2) = 4.76°. In this case, the Euclidean
distance between the two vectors provides a false estimate of the similarity between
the vectors, given its disregard to the inclination of the trust vectors and a relatively
large value of 0.36.
Each user considers the recommendation vectors that have a credibility level χ >
χthreshold. Among the selected recommendation vectors, each user measures the diver-
gence δ (or the displacement) of the recommended trust values from those in their
own trust vector, to identify the trust values that may need adjustment. The mean
divergence of the recommended trust values is then passed through a weighting func-
tion based on the credibility level with respect to the corresponding recommender,
which results in the trust divergence with respect to a given user. For example, if user
υi is measuring the trust divergence with respect to the existing trust value towards
υj, then the recommended trust values from the other users recυtυj |t 6=i,j are consid-
ered, if they satisfy the credibility check mentioned above. The trust divergence for
υj with respect to υi is given by Equation (5).
δυiυj =
∑n
t=1;t 6=i,j χ
υi
υt · (τυiυj − recυtυj )∑n
t=1;t 6=i,j χ
υi
υt
(5)
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We adopt an additive increase, multiplicative decrease approach to modify the trust
values based on the trust divergence. This approach is based on the well-known prin-
ciple used for TCP congestion control, which allows a system to get to equilibrium
in a fair manner [104]. In our work, this offers a conservative notion for modifying
the trust values, such that the (suspected) adversaries are punished heavily for any
discrepancies. In this manner, the benign users are assisted in their trust evaluation
of the other users, allowing them to hinder any attacks on privacy by the adversaries.
In order to avoid a ceaseless modification of the trust values, we consider a thresh-
old value δthreshold, such that the trust values are modified only when the absolute
value of trust divergence exceeds the above threshold. In other words, the trust
value of υi towards υj, τ
υi
υj , is only modified if |δ
υi
υj | > δthreshold. We consider two
coefficients to account for the additive increase, multiplicative decrease principle
mentioned above—trust increase coefficient τinc, which attributes to the additive in-
crease factor, and trust decrease coefficient τdec, which attributes to the multiplicative
decrease factor. Effectively, the trust value τυiυj is modified using Equation (6) as fol-
lows:
τυiυj =
τυiυj + τinc, if δυiυj < 0τυiυj/τdec, otherwise 3 |δυiυj | > δthreshold (6)
As part of the analytical evaluations in Section 5.3.1, we assess the consequences
of different conservative and liberal values for both τinc and τdec.
5.2.2.2 Preventing Attacks on Privacy
While the above sections show how the incoming trust recommendations should be
analyzed in order to modify one’s own trust vectors, this section focuses on mitigat-
ing adversary attacks by identifying the benign and malicious users in the system,
and appropriately handling their trust values. Going by the adversary models de-
scribed in Section 3.2.2.2, we now explain how our approach handles such adversary
actions. The corresponding approach is also described in Algorithm 1.
Collusion Attacks. As mentioned earlier, adversaries attempt to influence the sys-
tem functionality by colluding with other users, and adjusting their trust recom-
mendations to suit their needs. By circulating falsified trust recommendations, they
attempt to manipulate the trust vectors of benign users. To detect such adversary
attacks, each user first measures the credibility level of each incoming recommenda-
tion vector against the other incoming recommendation vectors (Line 7). Based on
the obtained values, each user υi determines the cumulative recommendation credibility
measure, χυjυi , for each user υj. Each user then uses its collective set of cumulative
recommendation credibility measures, χRec, to detect the users that have provided
the most uncorrelated values (Lines 9–13). We employ a standard deviation based
outlier detection approach for identifying those users whose credibility level varies
strongly from that of the rest of the recommending users (Line 13). The recommen-
dation vectors of these users are rejected from further analysis. Further, in order
to hinder any possible future attempts from these (suspected) adversaries, they are
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Algorithm 1 : Preventing Privacy Attacks (w.r.t. User υi)
Description :Algorithm used to process incoming trust recommendations and
detect adversaries based on the credibility level of the incoming
recommendations
Variables : TυiΥ ← current trust vector of υi
markCount← ∅
χRec ← ∅ // set of cumulative recommendation credibility measures
recHist← ∅ // history of received recommendations
χthreshold ← credibility level threshold
1 for roundNumber = 1 to nround do
2 for j = 1 to nΥ and j 6=i do
3 function receiveRecommendations(RecυjΥ ) 3 rec
υj
υi,j=∅
4 if calcSim(RecυjΥ , recHist[j]) < χthreshold then
5 if roundNumber > 1 then markCount[j] += 1;
6 else if markCount[j] < malValue then
7 χυiυj ← calcSim(TυiΥ , Rec
υj
Υ );
8 recHist[j]← RecυjΥ ;
9 for j = 1 to nΥ and j 6=i do
10 for k = 1 to nΥ and k 6=i do
11 χRec[j] += calcSim(Rec
υj
Υ , Rec
υk
Υ );
12 for j = 1 to nΥ and j 6=i do
13 if |(µχRec − χRec[j])| > σχRec then
14 markCount[j] += 1;
15 if roundNumber > nwait then
16 for each j ∈ markCount < malValue do
// loyalty-based trust
17 markCount[j] −= 1;
18 τυiυj += τinc 3 max(τ) = 1;
19 modifyTrustBasedOnDivergence(TυiΥ ,χ);
20 for each j ∈ markCount > malValue do
21 τυiυj /= τdec;
marked (Line 14). Evidently, it may be possible that certain benign users are marked
unfairly. Therefore, each user waits a few rounds, nwait, before taking action against
the suspected adversaries.
The marked users are punished based on the number of marks they obtain due
to their discrepancies in their credibility level. If the mark count goes beyond the
malicious threshold, malValue, then the corresponding users are marked as malicious
and their trust level is decreased based on the multiplicative decrease principle men-
tioned in Section 5.2.2.1 (Line 21). On the other hand, it is also necessary to vindicate
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the benign users that have been marked as suspicious, if their mark count does not
exceed the malicious threshold. To this end, we introduce the concept of loyalty-based
trust, where the trust value of (presumably) benign users is increased by the trust
increase coefficient τinc, if the waiting period nwait has elapsed (Lines 17–18). The
effective value for the malicious threshold malValue plays a very important role in
deciding the functionality of the system—a larger value may allow the adversaries
to remain undetected for a longer period of time; a shorter value may lead falsely
categorizing benign users as adversaries. We evaluate the implications of malValue
on the trust values in Section 5.3.1.
On-off Attacks. To account for on-off attacks, we assume that adversaries can
behave benignly for a given period in time, nbenign before starting to collude with
other users, as in the above case. One can handle such attacks by penalizing the
adversaries strongly, using a high value for the trust decrease coefficient τdec, as in
Equation (6). We also tackle frequent aberrations in the trust recommendations by
measuring the credibility level among the past recommendation vectors sent by a
given user (Line 4). Each user marks those users where χ < χthreshold and deals with
them as described above. We shall prove the effectivity of the above approach in the
analytical evaluation in Section 5.3.1. However, we do not account for all types of on-
off attacks. For improved approaches to combat more complicated versions of on-off
attacks, we refer the interested readers to the work by Chae et al. [43].
5.2.3 Privacy-Aware Operator Placement and Execution
In this section, we explain our approach to use TrustCEP for privacy-aware place-
ment of CEP operator graphs in a distributed environment. Algorithm 2 describes
the approach, primarily from the perspective of the leader υi (see Section 3.2.2).
At the beginning, υi, as well as the other users in the environment, build their
respective candidate lists by searching for the neighboring users. It must be noted
here that the candidate lists do not have to be restricted to users in the immediate
neighborhood, but can include all users who have been encountered, in general.
However, for the processing of a given query, only the users in the immediate vicinity
are considered. Based on the historical interaction patterns with the corresponding
users, υi then sets up the trust values for the users in the candidate list, producing
the trust vector TυiΥ . These trust values are then updated using the current trust
recommendation vectors RecυjΥ ∀υj ∈ Υ 3 j 6= i, as explained in Algorithm 1.
For a given context query Q, the leader, as well as the other users taking part in the
said query, set up the sensitivity levels Se for the events e ∈ E to be disseminated.
This is done in accordance with their respective privacy preferences. Based on the es-
tablished sensitivity levels S as well as the query at hand, the leader then sets up the
corresponding operator graph G (Lines 7–8), similar to related work on distributed
CEP [54, 157].
If there are no users discovered in the vicinity (Line 1), then υi executes the gener-
ated operator graph on their own device. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, we mainly
consider user smartphones as the sensing and processing devices in our system. If
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Algorithm 2 : Trust-Based Operator Placement (υi as Leader)
Description :Algorithm used by υi as leader to incorporate the trust relations
in the placement of CEP operators on the available devices
1 Υ← findNeighboringUsers();
2 if Υ 6= ∅ then
3 TυiΥ ← evaluateDirectTrust(Υ);
4 RecΥ ← obtainTrustRecommendations(Υ);
5 TυiΥ ← modifyTrustValues(TυiΥ , RecΥ);
6 function rcvQuery(Q)
7 S← setupEventSensitivity(Q);
8 G← establishOperatorGraph(Q,S);
9 if Υ = ∅ then
10 executeOperatorGraph(G);
11 else
12 ΓυiΥ ← establishPlacementGraph(G, TυiΥ , RecΥ);
13 sendPlacementRequests(ΓυiΥ ,Υ);
14 function rcvResponse(Υ,CΥ)
15 if CΥ 6= ∅ then // trust conflict
16 ΓυiΥ ← modifyPlacementGraph(ΓυiΥ ,CΥ);
17 sendPlacementRequests(ΓυiΥ ,Υ);
18 else
19 executeOperatorGraph(ΓυiΥ );
the candidate list of the leader υi is not empty, then υi sets up the placement graph
ΓυiΥ based on the established trust vector as well as the recommendation vectors re-
ceived from the other users. The recommendation vectors are used to understand
how the other users trust each other and determine the appropriate devices for col-
laboration. Upon setting up the placement graph, υi assigns the operators to the
corresponding user devices in the form of placement requests (Lines 12–13).
Since each user can have different sensitivity levels for their outgoing events, each
of the neighboring user devices that receives a placement request first checks if their
privacy constraints may be violated based on the current placement graph. If so, a
conflict message CΥ is sent back to the leader, to alert them about the said conflict
and also inform them about any possible substitute user device that can manage the
execution of the conflicted path (Line 15). The leader modifies the placement graph
based on the trust conflict vectors sent by the other users, and then sends out the
new placement requests. If there are no conflicts left and the trust negotiations have
been concluded, the leader initiates the execution of the operator graph.
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5.3 evaluation
We evaluate the designed trust management model TrustCEP with respect to two
aspects: (i) We analytically analyze the efficacy and applicability of TrustCEP for
enabling trust evaluation and evolution in a possibly hostile environment with col-
luding adversaries, and (ii) we evaluate the performance of TrustCEP in terms of
battery consumption and network data usage as part of a prototypical implementa-
tion of a distributed CEP system, spanned over a smartphone-based D2D network
for context processing. In the following, we shall describe our evaluation set-up and
approach for both these aspects and present the corresponding results.
5.3.1 Analytical Evaluation of TrustCEP
We conduct the analytical evaluation of TrustCEP by undertaking a simulation-
based approach, where we examine the (average) trust value obtained by the dif-
ferent users in the environment, by varying the behavior of the adversaries and their
attacks.
5.3.1.1 Analytical Evaluation: Approach Overview
As explained in the previous sections, we mainly focus on the evaluation of Trust-
CEP against collusion and on-off attacks. In case of collusion attacks, we assume
that there is a group of adversaries among the benign users, who collude among
themselves to manipulate the trust values in the system. These adversaries either
increase or decrease the trust values in their recommendation vectors, depending
on whom they send their recommendation vectors. A benign user υi will receive a
recommendation vector RecυjΥ from an adversary υj, where the trust values for other
benign users are reduced by 0.5 (bad-mouthing), and that for the other adversaries is
increased by 0.5 (ballot-stuffing), subject to τ ∈ [0, 1] in both cases.
In case of on-off attacks, we design the adversaries to pretend to be benign for
Nbenign rounds before they turn malicious and start to collude among themselves.
However, in this case, instead of infiltrating every benign user in the environment
with falsified trust recommendation vectors, we design the adversaries to only pro-
vide falsified data to a (randomly) selected set of benign users. In turn, we analyze
the effects of partial infiltration on the part of the adversaries.
In both cases, the initial direct trust vectors for each user are generated at random
using a uniform distribution function between 0.5 and 1, covering all possible trust
values from trust neutrality to complete trust. We purposely choose this range based
on the premise that the users do not usually have any distrusted neighbors at the
beginning, without prior interactions. Each simulation setting is executed for a fixed
number of rounds, by modifying the different variables introduced and discussed in
Section 5.2. The key variables that play an important role in the ensuing evaluation
are presented in Table 14, where the default values of the variables are written in
bold and underlined, unless otherwise stated in the discussion below. In each sim-
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Table 14: Default Parameters for the Analytical Evaluation of TrustCEP
Parameter Value
Number of users, nΥ 20
Number of simulated rounds, nround 20
Waiting period, nwait 0, 4, 10
Benign period (for on-off attack), nbenign 10
Adversary population (%) 40, 70
Similarity threshold, χthreshold 0.95
Divergence threshold, δthreshold 0.1
Trust increase coefficient, τinc 0.025, 0.05, 0.1
Trust decrease coefficient, τdec 0.5, 0.75, 0.9
Malicious threshold, malValue 100τinc
ulation run, we observe the average trust value assigned by the benign users to the
adversaries as well as the other benign users.
5.3.1.2 TrustCEP against Collusion Attacks
We first analyze the performance of TrustCEP against collusion attacks with increase
in the number of rounds executed, and observe the trust values obtained by the be-
nign users and adversaries. Figure 12 shows the results obtained for two sample
cases with different adversary populations in the form of box plots—the line in the
middle of the box represents the median of the corresponding trust value distribu-
tion; the top and bottom edges of the box represent the 25th and 75th percentiles; and,
the whiskers represent the 5th and 95th percentiles.
In Figure 12a, we see the trust value distribution for a sample case with 40% ad-
versaries among the 20 users in the environment, representing a case with the ad-
versaries in the minority. We observe clearly that the trust value obtained by the
adversaries reduces exponentially with increase in the number of rounds, after the
waiting period nwait has elapsed. Over 75% of the adversaries receive a trust value of
0.5 or below by round 9. This is mainly attributed to the standard deviation based
outlier detection (Line 13 in Algorithm 1) and the multiplicative decrease coefficient
τdec, as also seen in the decline of the variance of the distribution over the number of
rounds. We also observe that the trust value towards benign users improves steadily
with increase in the number of rounds, after a minor drop after nwait. This can be ac-
credited to loyalty-based trust (Line 18 in Algorithm 1), with over 50% of the benign
users achieving almost the complete trust level by round 16.
On the other hand, Figure 12b shows the trust value distribution for a sample
case with 70% adversary population, such that the adversaries are in the majority.
We observe an inverse outcome in the trust value distribution with increase in the
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(a) Minority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 12 Benign, 8 Adversary
(b) Majority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 6 Benign, 14 Adversary
Figure 12: Trust Value Distribution upon Collusion Attack for Two Sample Cases with
Different Adversary Populations
Figure 13: Trust Value Distribution upon Collusion Attack over Increasing Adversary
Populations
number of rounds. After the initial waiting period of 4 rounds, we notice that the
trust value obtained by the benign users decreases steadily, such that more than 50%
of the benign users obtain an average trust value of 0.3 or below by round 12. This
is mainly caused by the standard deviation based outlier detection approach, where
now the benign users are suspected to be malicious and assumed to be providing
falsified trust recommendation vectors. As seen in the trust value distribution among
the adversaries, where almost 50% of the adversaries obtain an average trust value
of 0.8 or higher at the end of 20 rounds. However, we notice that the variance in the
obtained trust values among the adversaries is quite high, which can be attributed
to the different initial trust values assigned to them by the benign users as well as
the differing credibility levels, accordingly.
The results in Figure 12 only show the changes in trust value distribution across
benign users and adversaries for two sample cases, with increase in the number of
rounds. In Figure 13, we see the performance of TrustCEP in terms of the trust value
distribution for benign users and adversaries for different adversary populations,
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from 10% to 90%. In this plot, we present the average trust value obtained by the
benign users and adversaries at the end of 20 rounds. For each adversary population,
we randomized the initial trust value distribution 10 times and present the average
and standard deviation values (the whiskers), accordingly.
Overall, we observe a similar pattern as seen in the above sample plots for 40%
and 70% adversary populations. For adversary populations of 50% or lesser, we no-
tice that the benign users obtain a high trust value of 0.9 or higher, whereas the
adversaries obtain a very low trust value of less than 0.1 on average. However, we
observe that the situation changes when the adversaries become the majority popula-
tion, especially when the adversary population increases beyond 70%. This behavior
is an expected observation based on the information exchanged among the users in
our trust management model. Interestingly, we observe that the final average trust
value obtained by the adversaries remains at trust neutrality when the adversary
population is at 60%, although the average trust value obtained by the benign users
drops significantly compared to the case with 50% adversaries.
5.3.1.3 TrustCEP against On-Off Attacks
Similar to the analysis of TrustCEP against collusion attacks, in this section, we an-
alyze the performance of TrustCEP against on-off attacks. In the first step, we con-
sidered the same sample cases that are used for the collusion attack analysis, where
the adversary population is in the minority (40%) and in the majority (70%). We re-
tained the same set of initial trust values for these two sample cases. Here, unlike the
above analysis, the adversaries remain benign for nbenign = 10 rounds before turning
malicious and colluding with fellow adversaries in the system. Furthermore, as men-
tioned earlier, in this case, the adversaries only send falsified trust recommendations
to a (randomly) selected set of benign users, accounting for a partial infiltration of
the environment. The results of the on-off attack analysis for the two sample cases
are presented in Figure 14.
Figure 14a presents the trust value distribution over increasing number of rounds
for all users, with 40% of them being adversaries. We observe that, similar to the
results in the collusion attack analysis, the trust value obtained by the adversaries
decreases rapidly, owing to the multiplicative decrease coefficient τdec. However, in
this case, this rapid decrease of trust only occurs after nbenign rounds, when the adver-
saries switch their behavior from benign to malicious. We notice that the trust values
obtained by the adversaries remains almost constant in the phase between nwait and
nbenign. Interestingly, we can also discern that the average trust value obtained by
the benign users is affected considerably due to the brief falsehood on behalf of the
adversaries, where around 50% of the benign users obtain an average trust value of
0.8 or lower, and certain benign users are also considered malicious at the end of 20
rounds.
The results of the on-off attack analysis for the sample case where the adversaries
are in the majority are presented in Figure 14b. We observe that while the average
trust value obtained by the adversaries increases steadily after nwait rounds, it drops
quite drastically after they switch their behavior to malicious after nbenign rounds.
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(a) Minority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 12 Benign, 8 Adversary
(b) Majority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 6 Benign, 14 Adversary
Figure 14: Trust Value Distribution upon On-Off Attack for Two Sample Cases with
Different Adversary Populations
Figure 15: Trust Value Distribution upon On-Off Attack over Increasing Adversary
Populations
More than 75% of the adversaries obtain an average trust value of 0.3 or lower by
round 18. This is mainly attributed to the aforementioned property of selective in-
filtration on the part of the adversaries, such that the benign users can identify the
adversaries based on the recommendation vectors received from the other users. We
also observe that the average trust value obtained by the benign users falls in the
trust neutrality range, with the median trust value lying at just above 0.6 after 20
rounds. This is mainly due to the previous benign behavior by the adversaries that
led to certain benign users to be marked as malicious, having exceeded the malicious
threshold malValue.
Figure 15 shows the trust value distribution for all users under an on-off attack
over an increasing adversary population from 10% to 90%, similar to the collusion
attack analysis presented in Figure 13. Similar to the results obtained in the above
sample cases for minority and majority adversary populations, we observe that the
adversary users obtain a significantly low average trust value over all adversary
populations, primarily due to the consequences of the above-mentioned selective in-
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filtration of the environment. When the adversaries are in the majority, their average
trust value increases slightly, but it is nevertheless around 0.2, which is noticeably
low. Among the benign users, we observe that the brief benign phase by the adver-
saries does affect their average trust values. The average trust value of the benign
users remains around 0.6 for all adversary populations up to 60%. A further increase
in the adversary population leads to a slight deterioration in the average trust value
of the benign users, dipping below 0.5 after 20 rounds for the case with 90% adver-
saries. The relatively low average trust value of benign users (c.f. Figure 13) is again
attributed to the standard deviation based outlier detection, which leads to certain
benign users being falsely judged as malicious.
5.3.1.4 Influence of Trust Modification Coefficients: Conservative Case
In this section, we analyze the influence of the trust modification coefficients—the
trust increase and decrease coefficients, τinc and τdec, respectively—on the trust value
distribution under the influence of a collusion attack. In this section, we restrict our
focus to the analysis of collusion attacks; for the results from the analysis of on-off
attacks with respect to the trust modification coefficients, we request the interested
readers to refer to Section A.2 in the appendix.
For the subsequent analysis, we consider two evaluation settings—(i) a conservative
setting with lower values than before for the trust modification coefficients; and (ii)
a liberal setting with considerably higher values than before. For the conservative case,
we set the (additive) increase coefficient τinc to 0.025 and the (multiplicative) decrease
coefficient τdec to 0.5. We proceed in the same way as in Section 5.3.1.2, such that we
consider the same sample cases along with the same set of initial trust values.
Figure 16 shows the results for the trust value distribution in the conservative
case using box plots, as before. In Figure 16a, where the adversaries are in the mi-
nority at 40%, we observe that the average trust value obtained by the adversaries
decreases even more rapidly than in the non-conservative case, with over 75% of the
adversaries obtaining an average trust value of 0.3 or lower by round 7, compared
to round 13 in Figure 12a. However, we also observe that the average trust value ob-
tained by the benign users reduces drastically with increase in the number of rounds,
with all benign users obtaining an average trust value of 0.3 or lower by round 8. This
is a natural consequence of using conservative settings for the trust modification co-
efficients. Another contributing factor is the resulting low value for the malicious
threshold, malValue which is set to 100τinc = 2.5. The low value for the malicious
threshold leaves little room for any aberrations in the trust recommendations from
the benign users.
When the adversaries are in the majority at 70%, as seen in Figure 16b, we observe
that the average trust value of the benign users reaches a lower value after 20 rounds
than in the non-conservative case, with all benign users obtaining a trust value of 0.1
or lower. However, given the conservative approach towards increasing trust values,
we observe that the average trust value obtained by the adversaries settles down
around the trust neutrality value of 0.5. The large variance in the obtained trust
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(a) Minority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 12 Benign, 8 Adversary
(b) Majority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 6 Benign, 14 Adversary
Figure 16: Trust Value Distribution upon Collusion Attack for Conservative Trust
Modification Coefficients
Figure 17: Trust Value Distribution upon Collusion Attack over Increasing Adversary
Populations for Conservative Trust Modification Coefficients
values among the adversaries can again be attributed to the different initial trust
values and the differing credibility levels, as in the non-conservative case.
The trust value distribution for the conservative case across all adversary popula-
tions in Figure 17 shows us that the benign users suffer most, obtaining a very low
average trust value throughout the entire simulation. This is mainly due to the low
value of the malicious threshold, which in turn is breached in all adversary popula-
tions because of two main reasons—the lower credibility levels of the benign users
against each other, and the falsified trust recommendations sent by the adversaries
that are assumed to be true. We notice that the average trust value received by the
adversaries increases steadily from the point when the adversaries go into the major-
ity. It finally settles down at the trust neutrality value of 0.5, which concurs with our
observations in the majority sample case above (see Figure 16b).
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5.3.1.5 Influence of Trust Modification Coefficients: Liberal Case
For the liberal case, we set the trust (additive) increase coefficient τinc to 0.1 and the
(multiplicative) decrease coefficient τdec = 0.9, such that they are considerably higher
than those used for the normal analysis (see Table 14). Figures 18 and 19 present the
results of the corresponding analysis of the modification coefficients, using the same
approach as before (i.e., same initial trust values and same sample cases).
In Figure 18a, we observe that the benign users in the system have a steady increase
in the average trust value they obtain, mainly accounting for the loyalty-based trust,
as seen in Section 5.3.1.2 (c.f. Figure 12a). Given the liberal settings in this case, we
observe that all benign users obtain an average trust value of at least 0.8 by round 9,
unlike the non-liberal case, where it takes 17 rounds. Interestingly, we observe that
the adversaries obtain a very high average trust value at the beginning until round
11, but then slowly lose their trust value. We notice that there is a steady decline in
their average trust value from round 12 onward. This can be attributed to the high
trust the benign users have bestowed upon the other benign users by this round,
leading to the adversaries being discovered based on the standard deviation based
outlier detection approach.
We see the results of the analysis of the liberal case for a majority adversary popula-
tion in Figure 18b. Quite as expected, we notice that the average trust value obtained
by the adversaries increases steeply within the first 5 rounds after nwait, causing
the adversaries to obtain complete trust level by round 9. However, we observe that
even the benign users obtain increasing trust values with increase in the number of
rounds, albeit at a relatively lower rate than that in case of the adversaries. This can
be attributed to the relatively high value of the malicious threshold malValue as well
as the loyalty-based trust that leads to the decrease in the mark count. The gradual
decline of the average trust value obtained by the adversaries attributes to the same
phenomenon observed in the minority case. Given the high trust value bestowed
upon fellow benign users, the benign users tend to discover the adversaries through
their falsified recommendations, leading to a gradual tendency towards lower trust
values for the adversaries.
Figure 19 shows the trust value distribution for the liberal case over all adver-
sary populations. We observe that, in accordance with the revelations in the two
sample cases above, the average trust value obtained by the benign users remains
significantly high (above 0.8), even in the presence of a large number of adversaries.
While their average trust value remains at complete trust when the adversaries are
in the minority, it begins to drop when the adversaries go in the majority, settling be-
tween 0.8 and 0.9 after 20 rounds for 90% adversary population. Overall, we observe
that the adversaries show a steady increase in the average trust value they obtained,
which is however significantly higher than the average trust values obtained in the
non-liberal case in Section 5.3.1.2 (c.f. Figure 13). The minor aberration in the average
trust value for the case with 10% adversary population can be attributed to the low
number of adversaries and their initial trust values at the beginning of the simula-
tion. With increase in the number of adversaries in the system, we observe a more
steady behavior, with a lower variance across different initial trust values.
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(a) Minority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 12 Benign, 8 Adversary
(b) Majority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 6 Benign, 14 Adversary
Figure 18: Trust Value Distribution upon Collusion Attack for Liberal Trust Modification
Coefficients
Figure 19: Trust Value Distribution upon Collusion Attack over Increasing Adversary
Populations for Liberal Trust Modification Coefficients
5.3.1.6 Influence of the Waiting Period nwait
Another parameter that plays a considerably important role in TrustCEP is the wait-
ing period, nwait, i.e., the number of rounds each user waits before applying the trust
modification coefficients on the existing trust values. We analyze the influence of
shorter and longer waiting periods (compared to the default setting of nwait = 4 in
the above experiments) on the trust value distribution in the system under a collu-
sion attack. We restrict our analysis to the case with a minority adversity population
of 40% to understand the implications of the waiting period. We employ the same ini-
tial trust values as in the above evaluation approaches, and analyze the average trust
value obtained by the benign users and adversaries over the course of 20 rounds.
For these evaluations, we considered the default values for the trust modification
coefficients, as in Table 14. The results are plotted in Figure 20.
Figure 20a shows the results for the case without any waiting period, i.e., nwait
= 0. We observe that the lack of waiting period leads to an initial increase in the
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(a) 20 Users, 12 Benign, 8 Adversary
nwait = 0
(b) 20 Users, 12 Benign, 8 Adversary
nwait = 10
Figure 20: Trust Value Distribution upon Collusion Attack for Different Waiting Periods
average trust value obtained by the adversaries. This is mainly caused as a result
of the (positive) changes to the trust values until the malicious threshold is reached,
after which the corresponding users are termed malicious and their trust values are
decreased using the multiplicative decrease coefficient τdec. We observe this behavior
at the end of 5 rounds, after which the trust values obtained by the adversaries
declines exponentially. However, given this mild aberration in the initial few rounds,
we observe that some of the benign users obtain a lower trust value for a longer
period, before the users correct their initial mistake and restore trust in the benign
users. This leads to an average trust value of 0.8 or higher for at least 75% of the
benign users at round 18.
We present the results for the case with a larger waiting period of nwait = 10 in
Figure 20b. We observe that the average trust value obtained by the adversaries
declines immediately after the waiting period elapses, considering that they shall
have already exceed the malicious threshold by then. Consequently, the average trust
value obtained by the benign users increases steadily after the waiting period, which
attributes to the loyalty-based trust increments. The longer waiting period primarily
leaves adversaries and true benign users undiscovered for a longer time interval. It
is necessary to adapt the application logic in an appropriate manner to achieve a
privacy-aware placement of the CEP operators.
5.3.2 Performance Evaluation of TrustCEP
For the performance analysis of TrustCEP, we developed a prototypical evalua-
tion platform using user smartphones. We implemented TrustCEP in a smartphone-
based distributed CEP system, which allows the users to interact directly with each
other and exchange information using D2D communication. This forms the basis
for the processing of operator graphs in a distributed manner. The main goal of
this evaluation is to understand the feasibility and practicability of using TrustCEP
in a real-life distributed CEP system, comprising user smartphones. We based our
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prototypical smartphone-based evaluation platform on existing research standards
towards D2D communication in the IoT, where users can collaborate with each other
and process the necessary contextual information from the environment [31, 140].
This allows for reduced load on the cellular instances as well as improved latency
considerations [219].
Apart from cellular communication, modern smartphones provide an array of op-
tions for D2D communication in the close neighborhood—Bluetooth1, Wi-Fi Direct2,
NFC3. In our work, we choose Bluetooth, mainly due to its pervasive nature nowa-
days as well as its improved support for low-power and low-bandwidth data trans-
mission (in comparison with other popular standards like Wi-Fi Direct) [74]. We
designed the evaluation platform using five Google Nexus® 5 smartphones (each
with Bluetooth 4.0), which are all Android-based and running an OS version of 4.3
or higher. We installed an application-based interface of TrustCEP in each of these
smartphones to evaluate the performance analysis, including the battery consump-
tion and network data usage. In order to simplify Bluetooth-based communication
and the subsequent evaluation, we paired all smartphone devices beforehand.
Upon installation, each user can apply their event sensitivity levels and the re-
quired weights for the estimation of trust, based on their preferences and privacy
constraints. For the initial trust vectors, we randomly generated historical interac-
tion patterns on the two communication channels established in Section 5.2.1—calls
and instant messaging—accounting for users with high and low communication in-
tensity, as well as some without any prior interaction (corresponds to trust neutral-
ity). In the following, we consider the smartphone devices to be an extension of the
corresponding users and their privacy constraints.
5.3.2.1 Performance Evaluation: Execution
In the implemented smartphone application, we focus on Scenario A among the
motivating scenarios described in Section 3.1, primarily due to the multitude of (pos-
sibly) sensitive events being exchanged between users. We mainly consider low-level
(atomic) events generated from the microphone, GPS, and accelerometer sensors
present in the smartphones. Since these atomic events are generally noise-ridden
and may contain events that are not pertinent to the given scenario, we first apply a
filter operator ωφx ; x ∈ {1, 2, 3} on each of these sensors. The filtered events are then
processed further using the CEP operators—aggregation, composition, derivation
(ωL, ωM, ωA, and ωF)—as indicated in the corresponding operator graph, depicted
in Figure 4a in Section 3.2.1. Figure 21 shows this operator graph along with the ad-
ditional filter operators added to each of the producer outputs. In total, we consider
7 operators as part of the operator graph, which can be processed on the 5 devices in
a collaborative manner. We modeled all events as event objects, concurring with our
model for CEP introduced in Section 3.2.1. All events are appended with appropriate
attributes for further processing, including a time stamp and a source node ID.
1 https://www.bluetooth.com/
2 http://www.wi-fi.org/discover-wi-fi/wi-fi-direct
3 http://nearfieldcommunication.org/
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Figure 21: Illustration of the Operator Graph Used for the Performance Evaluation of
TrustCEP
As part of the performance evaluation, we mainly focus on the analysis of battery
consumption and network data usage during the processing of the above-mentioned
operator graph. For the purpose of measuring the battery consumption, we first
charge all the smartphone devices up to 100% in advance. Subsequently, we record
the battery level on each smartphone device at the end of 100 execution runs of the
operator graph. In order to obtain a realistic observation of the battery level change,
we blocked all other communication services—especially cellular communication—
and reduced the screen brightness to the minimum.
In the subsequent evaluation, we primarily focus on the analysis of battery con-
sumption of the leader device, considering that it takes over the major functions of
deploying an operator graph—establishment of the placement graph, placement of
the operators on the respective devices, as well as trust negotiations and conflict
resolution. Considering that our main motivating scenarios focus on collaboration
among the devices, we compare our trust-based approach against other possible col-
laborative scenarios as well as scenarios without any collaboration. To this end, we
consider the following use cases in our evaluation:
1. Use Case S: This case accounts for the non-collaborative scenario where all
the operators are executed on a single device (of the leader) (S for single). The
leader device does not search for any other devices.
2. Use Case DT: In this case, which represents the second non-collaborative sce-
nario, the leader device attempts to discover other devices in the environment.
However, due to stringent privacy constraints, it does not trust any of them,
and therefore, decides to execute the complete operator graph by itself (DT for
distrust).
3. Use Case CT-A: In this first of three collaborative use cases, we consider all
devices to trust each other completely. Here, the leader device primarily takes
over the processing of the atomic events (CT-A for complete trust – atomic), while
the remaining collaborating devices process the higher level events generated
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by the leader device. Consequently, the leader device places the ωφx filter op-
erators on itself, while delegating the remaining CEP operators in the operator
graph to the other devices.
4. Use Case CT-H: This use case is similar to the previous use case CT-A, where all
devices have complete trust towards each other. However, unlike the previous
use case, the leader device primarily takes over the processing of the higher-
level events by placing the corresponding operators on itself (CT-A for complete
trust – higher-level operators). The remaining devices process the atomic events
by executing the filter operators.
5. Use Case TM: In this use case, we employ TrustCEP for trust-based operator
placement and execution (TM for trust management). Here, the devices trust
each other in accordance with their trust vectors and event sensitivity levels.
They collaborate with each other based on the trust management model, by
incorporating recommendation vectors and trust negotiations, to process the
atomic and higher-level events generated during the execution of the opera-
tor graph. For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider the presence of any
adversaries in the system.
5.3.2.2 Performance Evaluation: Results
In this section, we present the results of our prototypical evaluation based on the
use cases introduced above. In order to understand the implications of the various
collaborative scenarios on the battery consumption and the size of network data
exchanged, we vary the number of devices available and the number of operators in
the operator graph for each use case.
Varying Device Availability. For analyzing the implications of D2D collaboration
on battery consumption, we first executed the complete operator graph for the use
cases CT-A and CT-H with 3, 4, and 5 devices in the system. To this end, we set
the trust levels on all devices to the complete trust setting, τ = 1. Upon observing
the results of this analysis, presented in Figure 22a, we notice that the processing of
atomic events is very battery-intensive compared to the that of the higher-level events.
We also notice that the leader device expends more battery power in use case CT-H
with increases in the number of collaborating devices in the system. This behavior
is mainly due to the increase in the number of control messages required to place
the operators on the respective devices and to maintain collaboration among them.
Furthermore, we observe a drop in the battery consumption of the leader device
with increases in the number of collaborating devices in use case CT-A. This can be
attributed to the increased device availability and their adoption of the higher-level
operators.
Use Cases Analysis. Subsequent to the above evaluation setup, we analyzed the
effects of the 5 use cases on the battery consumption of the leader device. Unlike the
previous setup, all 5 devices were considered for collaborative processing. Figure 22b
shows the results obtained for each use case, where the average battery consumption
of the leader device was measured. We observe that the battery consumption is least
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(a) Average Battery Consumption of
Leader Device over 100 Runs at
Varying Device Availability
(b) Average Battery Consumption of
Leader Device over 100 Runs for All
Use Cases
(c) Average Bytes Exchanged per Run
under Varying Number of Operators
and Devices
Figure 22: Evaluation Results of the Performance Analysis of TrustCEP in Terms of Battery
Consumption and Network Data Exchange
for use case S, where there is no communication and no collaboration with the other
devices. This basically provides us with the baseline for the analysis of the other
use cases. In use case DT, we observe that the battery consumption increases by
10.2%, mainly due to the communication costs for discovering the other Bluetooth-
enabled devices in the neighborhood. Comparing the battery consumption levels in
use case TM to that in use cases CT-A and CT-H, we observe that there is a marginal
increase of 2% and 6%, respectively. Although, the operator placement can vary in
each of these use cases, depending on the level of trust between devices, this marginal
increase is mainly caused due to the additional recommendation messages and trust
negotiation messages exchanged among the devices in use case TM.
Network Data Analysis. In Figure 22c, we present the results of our analysis of
the number of data bytes exchanged among the devices in use case TM for varying
numbers of devices in the environment and operators in the operator graph. For
the operator graph with 5 operators, we only considered microphone and location
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events, and modified operator ωF to compose both events and derive the final con-
text; for the operator graph with 3 operators, we only considered microphone events.
We observe that increases in the number of collaborating devices and number of op-
erators in the operator graph leads to an increase in the number of bytes exchanged.
This is a logical consequence, considering that increases in devices and operators
causes an increase in the number of control messages required—operator placement
requests, trust recommendation messages, trust negotiations. Furthermore, the num-
ber of atomic events disseminated varies based on the different event types. Overall,
the small size and low amount of data exchanged among the collaborating devices
encourages the use of Bluetooth for wireless transmission, which in turn induces
minimal additional battery consumption when using TrustCEP.
5.4 discussion
With the help of the above evaluations in terms of the efficacy and performance
of TrustCEP, we show its applicability as a trust management model for privacy-
aware placement of CEP operators in D2D environments. Its robust recommenda-
tion scheme allows for the evolution of trust by accounting for the credibility of the
incoming trust recommendations. In doing so, our approach manages to prevent
collusion and on-off attacks when the number of adversaries is not higher than the
number of benign users in the environment. We also observed that our approach
does discover adversaries, even when they are in the majority, if they do not attack
all benign users.
In terms of its usage for context-aware applications, we can establish that Trust-
CEP introduces a very minimal additional battery consumption of less than 0.5%
per operator graph execution per device, in comparison to other privacy-negligent
collaborative approaches. However, we can also confirm that TrustCEP is not very
suitable when the user context can be processed based on sensor data available on a
single smartphone, given that the considerably lower battery consumption for single-
device execution in Figure 22b. Having said that, context-aware applications in the
IoT process data originating from multiple distributed information sources, which
requires appropriate, privacy-aware collaboration among the devices.
In terms of the efficacy of the trust management model, the trust modification
parameters, τinc and τdec must be set appropriately, so that the evolution of trust does
not undergo drastic fluctuations over time. As seen in Figures 16 and 18, a wrong
set of trust modification coefficients can either lead to punishing benign users or
overlooking adversaries. Similarly, the waiting period nwait also has a considerable
influence in the functioning of the CEP system, given its influence on the time period
required to detect (possible) adversaries.
Overall, in a trust-based approach for distributed CEP, it is pivotal to adapt the
event sensitivity levels in accordance with the privacy constraints of the users. In
doing so, only the highly trusted users receive the highly sensitive data. The trust
management model may require multiple rounds to detect adversaries. This is at-
tributed to three main factors—(i) the initial (direct) trust level of the users towards
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the adversaries, (ii) the similarity of the trust recommendations to a user’s own trust
vector, and (iii) the attacking strategy chosen by the adversaries. It is, therefore, pru-
dent to employ the calculated trust vectors after a set number of rounds for operator
placement and execution. This also depends on the CEP application running above,
given that certain events (e.g., microphone and location readings) can become more
sensitive if historical information is available. One can avoid possible violations of
the privacy constraints by either adapting the event sensitivity levels, accordingly, or
by randomizing the event recipients in each round, until the trust levels stabilize in
their value.
6
E N S U R I N G R E L I A B I L I T Y I N D Y N A M I C D 2D E N V I R O N M E N T S
In Chapter 5, we have seen how we can realize distributed CEP under privacy con-straints of the users involved, by exploiting their inherent trust values towards
each other. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the user environment in the IoT
is characterized by dynamic changes due to device movement, failure, or varying
trust relations. Ensuring reliability (and also maintaining the established privacy con-
straints) in such dynamic D2D-based networks becomes increasingly difficult when
dealing with resource-constrained devices, such as user smartphones (e.g., due to
limited battery life or memory space).
In this chapter, we present FlexCEP, an adaptive approach to migrate CEP op-
erators between devices by accounting for the mobility as well as the resource-
constrained nature of the devices involved. FlexCEP adaptively varies the frequency
of data migration as well as the amount of data to be migrated based on the exe-
cution model of CEP operators as well as the failure probability, Pfail, of the devices
involved (explained in Section 6.2). This added flexibility allows FlexCEP to achieve
lower communication overhead and lower recovery times compared to traditional
reliability mechanisms in CEP.
In the following sections, we first explain the main problem statement by under-
standing the weaknesses of the state-of-the-art approaches. We then describe our
FlexCEP approach for flexible operator migration, detailing the answers to the fol-
lowing questions—(i) Which data must be migrated? (ii) How should these data be
migrated? (iii) When should these data be migrated? Finally, we conclude the chapter
by presenting and discussing some of the evaluation results of our approach.
6.1 need for a flexible operator migration approach
In CEP systems (and event processing systems in general), the flow of events dic-
tates the inference of higher-level situational context. The loss of some events or any
malfunction during the execution of an operator graph can result in falsified output
events. The occurrence of false negatives—non-inference of events that actually took
place—and false positives—inference of events that actually did not take place—can
have severe consequences on the application at hand. For example, in Scenario B
(see Section 3.1), any false negative or false positive can result in wrong speed or
lane changes, effecting accidents and/or unnecessary traffic jams. Similarly, in Sce-
narios A and C, the non-inference of a meeting or a polluted environment can lead
to embarrassing situations or health-related issues.
The main problem with distributed CEP in D2D-based networks is the possibility
of network discontinuity due to node1 movement or failure [60, 122], which in turn
1 We use the terms node and device interchangeably in the chapter.
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Target Zone 
Figure 23: Comparing Approaches on Reliability in CEP
leads to the loss of events and/or falsified output events. As shown in the above
scenarios, node mobility is quite prevalent in such environments. The performance
of devices, like smartphones, can fluctuate due to the restricted amount of resources,
such as battery life and memory space. Hence, in order to maintain reliability, it
becomes vital to adapt the execution of CEP operator graphs to the dynamic changes
in the environment.
Existing approaches based on active replication and roll-back recovery (see Sec-
tion 2.1.2) do not address these concerns appropriately. Figure 23 shows the runtime
communication overhead and recovery time values for both active replication and
roll-back recovery approaches for an increasing event generation rate, Reg. Recall
from Section 2.1.2 that a typical active replication approach mainly accounts for hor-
izontal dependency through redundant processing paths. In turn, it results in a low
recovery time upon failure (ideally zero) but exacts increasing communication over-
head and unnecessary processing resources on the backup nodes during failure-free
operation, especially in relatively stationary or quasi-stationary scenarios. This can be
seen in the figure, where the runtime overhead increases from the order of 103 to
nearly 107 for Reg = 1 event/s to 100 events/s, respectively.
On the other hand, rollback recovery approaches target vertical dependency by
maintaining large buffers—sometimes in the order of GBs [189]—to allow for com-
plete recovery. However, while they have considerably lower processing and com-
munication overhead during runtime, they suffer from higher recovery times (and
recovery communication overhead [not shown in figure]) upon failure, in the order
of multiple seconds, as seen in Figure 23. Thus, such approaches effect higher num-
ber of false positives or negatives due to the possible loss of events, as we show in
our evaluations in Section 6.4.
Any reliable CEP system has to account for horizontal and/or vertical dependen-
cies between the different operators in the operator graph. Given the characteristics
of D2D-based networks mentioned above, it is necessary to mitigate unnecessary
processing and communication overhead, while still allowing for fast recovery mech-
anisms. Consequently, in our approach, we mainly target the striped region in the
figure. Given the constrained view of the network, it is also important to improve
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Figure 24: Overview of FlexCEP’s Message Exchange and Buffer Maintenance
coordination among the devices through appropriate control messages, so that the
buffer space and replicated content are updated appropriately. In turn, in our ap-
proach, we mainly address the following research questions:
RQ6.1: Which CEP operator state (i.e., the input events and the internal processing
state) are required during migration to fully restore the operator graph?
RQ6.2: How can we account for both horizontal and vertical dependencies by intro-
ducing minimal overhead?
RQ6.3: How can we determine when and where to migrate operator state?
6.2 flexible operator migration using flexcep
In this section, we describe our approach called FlexCEP for flexible operator mi-
gration2 in distributed CEP systems. We target dynamic D2D environments with
mobile and resource-constrained nodes, where reliable event processing cannot be
guaranteed with just the initial placement of the operators on the available nodes.
In FlexCEP, we provide a flexible and proactive approach that adheres to different
network conditions, depending on the mobility of the nodes, the frequency and in-
tensity of the generated events, as well as sudden network/node failures. We deal
with horizontal and vertical dependencies by adapting our approach to the prevail-
ing conditions, where we control the amount of operator state and the frequency of
state migration among the available nodes, accordingly.
2 For the sake of convenience, we use the term operator migration in place of operator state migration, but
we always imply the latter.
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Figure 24 provides an overview of FlexCEP, including the messages exchanged
and the buffers maintained to facilitate efficient operator migration. For a given
query, we assume that the initial placement of the operator graph is performed using
an appropriate placement algorithm, based on the criteria for the given application—
either performance-related criteria [38, 121, 157] or based on our TrustCEP approach.
We term these devices as the primary nodes on which the operator graph is executed.
Each primary node executes at least one operator and sends the resulting complex
events to the downstream nodes in the operator graph, until the final results reach
the interested consumer node(s).
For the purpose of migration, we consider a set of background nodes that can
act as backup to the primary nodes. The primary nodes keep track of each other
as well as the background nodes with respect to their location, speed, movement
direction, and energy resource conditions. We consider a hybrid, proactive approach,
where we apply the principles of both active replication as well as rollback recovery,
based on network conditions. In particular, the upstream nodes keep track of their
downstream counterparts, and initiate migration based on their prediction of the
location and resource availability of the corresponding devices (e.g, if they realize
that they are moving away from each other). An upstream node initiates a fine-
grained passive replication when it estimates the non-availability of the downstream
node in the near future (e.g., an outward movement of the downstream node or
depleting resource availability), by selecting one (or more) suitable backup node(s)
based on the above-mentioned criteria. It also maintains a checkpointing buffer for
upstream backup called the restore buffer, Brestore, in order to maintain the relevant
events for facilitating recovery upon abrupt failures.
To this end, we answer the three research questions established in Section 6.1 with
the following three contributions, respectively:
C6.1: We present a fine-grained view of the operator execution model to understand
the essential components of a CEP operator and their working. In doing so,
we determine the key execution stages for a given operator and ascertain the
intermediate states that are relevant for replication and checkpointing (see Sec-
tion 6.2.1 and Section 6.2.2).
C6.2: In order to account for the different operation states and the different depen-
dency models, we maintain additional buffers on the nodes. In Section 6.2.3, we
show how we manage the different buffers, as part of the Buffer Management
Unit (see Section 3.3, by adapting the control and synchronization messages,
appropriately.
C6.3: Finally, in Section 6.2.4, we present our predictive analysis of the available
nodes using the Failure Probability Calculator to facilitate a proactive approach
for operator migration. We show how the nodes keep track of each other by
exchanging vital information about their instantaneous characteristics, in order
to help detect the opportune moments for migration.
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Figure 25: Illustration of a CEP Operator State Model
6.2.1 Fine-Grained Operator Execution Model
Our work deals with the migration of CEP operators and the involved events in order
to allow for a reliable processing environment. To this end, we first understand how
CEP operators handle events internally and how they produce outgoing complex
events, thus allowing us to obtain a fine-grained look into the working of a CEP
operator. Figure 25 depicts the internal logic of a typical operator ω used in CEP,
which accepts an incoming event stream Iω and produces an outgoing event stream
Oω.
The incoming event stream Iω is first stored in an input buffer BI, until the events
are either selected or discarded by the internal processing logic for the given operator
ω. Similarly, the complex events ce produced by the operator are stored in the output
buffer BO, to be delivered to the next downstream operator. The contents of the
output buffer BO are removed as and when they are acknowledged of receipt by the
downstream operators.
The intermediate processing engine of an operator comprises three components—
selector(s), the internal correlation function fω, and a serializer. The selectors are
responsible for analyzing the input buffer BI and determining the set of events e
in Iω that satisfy the criteria specified in the processing logic for the given operator
ω. For example, the selector of a WINDOW-based operator only accepts events that
occur in the specified time window for the given query. The accepted events e are
said to be consumed by ω, so that BI can make room for the next set of incoming
events. There can be more than one selector, depending on the processing logic for
a given operator. For example, a JOIN operator combines two (or more) incoming
event streams based on a specified condition to produce a new output event stream.
In this case, it contains as many selectors as the number of incoming event streams.
Alongside the input and output buffers, we consider an intermediate buffer Bint
between the selector(s) and the internal correlation function fω of the operator. The
intermediate buffer mainly maintains the events on which the correlation function
must be applied to obtain the output complex events ce. The state of the selector and
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the contents of the intermediate buffer depend on the processing state of the corre-
lation function fω. For example, for a WINDOW-AGGREGATE operator, the intermediate
buffer stores the events that occur in the specified time window. The corresponding
correlation function fω applies the aggregate function (e.g., sum or average) on these
events to produce the output complex events, and then updates the state of the selec-
tor accordingly, such that the contents of Bint shift to the next time window. We shall
delve deeper into the significance of the intermediate buffer with respect to different
operators in the next section (6.2.2).
Finally, the events (ce1, ce2, . . . , cen) ⊆ CE ∈ E produced by fω are appended with
a sequence number and the source ID of the device by the serializer and sent to the
output buffer BO. The internal state of the serializer is basically the sequence number
to be assigned to the next event produced by fω. In our work, we use the system
timestamp (using the Unix time format in milliseconds) to set the sequence number
of a given event. We assume that there exists an appropriate time synchronization
algorithm [180] underlying our approach to allow for collision-free sequence num-
bers. Consequently, the essential components of operator state of ω at time t, Ψω(t),
consists of the contents of BI, BO, and Bint, as well as the processing state of fω
(including that of the selector) and the serializer.
In general, any operator migration approach for operator recovery requires the
replication of operator state between the primary and backup nodes. Different types
of operators possess different levels of state. The crux of the problem lies in the
amount of state information that needs to be replicated and the amount of state
information that can be stored and replayed for migration. This forms the basis of
our approach for adaptive operator migration, where we exploit the intermediate
state of certain common CEP operators to minimize the amount of state information
required for a successful migration.
6.2.2 Intermediate State of a CEP Operator
As indicated above, the intermediate state of a CEP operator contains information
about the events that are relevant for further processing, which we store in the inter-
mediate buffer Bint. To better explain the significance of the contents of this buffer, we
consider the following set of common CEP operators—FILTER, AGGREGATE, SEQUENCE,
and JOIN. We choose these operators to show the different possible intermediate
states and their implications on the amount of data to be migrated. An exhaustive
discussion of all possible CEP operators will go beyond the scope of this thesis; for
a detailed list of all operators, please refer to Cugola and Margara’s survey on in-
formation flow processing (IFP) [53]. The four operators are presented in Listing 1
using the Siddhi Query Language (SiddhiQL) [205].
FILTER. Basically, a FILTER operator (part of the family of single-item operators [53])
selects all the events e in the incoming event stream Iω (stored in BI) that satisfy a
particular criterion (or many criteria), and discards the rest of the events. The out-
put event stream Oω then contains the selected events e. For example, one such
operator can be used to accept only temperature events if the temperature value is,
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e.g., greater than 30°C, as shown in Listing 1. Typically, a FILTER operator is used
to select those events that are relevant for a more complex query. In terms of the
internal functionality, the selector and serializer are effectively stateless, since the
correlation function fω mainly sorts out the incoming event stream. Thus, the main
events necessary for migration are the contents of the input and output buffers, BI
and BO.
Listing 1: Selected CEP Operators
define stream temperatureStream1(roomName string, value double, time long)
define stream temperatureStream2(roomName string, value double, time long)
FILTER:
from temperatureStream1[value > 30]
select roomName, value
insert into outputStream
AGGREGATE (Average):
from temperatureStream1#window.lengthBatch(10)
select roomName, avg(value) as avgValue
insert into outputStream
SEQUENCE:
from e1 = temperatureStream1
-> e2 = temperatureStream1[value > e1.value && time > e1.time]
-> e3 = temperatureStream1[value > e2.value && time > e2.time]
within 10 seconds
select e1.roomName, e1.value, e2.value, e3.value, e3.time
insert all events into outputStream
JOIN:
from temperatureStream1#window.length(10) as T1
join temperatureStream2#window.length(20) as T2
on T1.value == T2.value
select T1.roomName, T2.roomName, T1.value
insert all events into outputStream
AGGREGATE. Often, CEP operators need to consider a certain set of events that fall
in a given time period or spacial range, specifically defining the scope of their op-
eration. An AGGREGATE operator selects those events in BI that fall in the specified
time window (time-based) or lie within a given number of events (length-based),
and then finds the aggregate (e.g., sum, average) over those events to produce the
output event stream. For one such operator, either a (fixed-size) sliding window is
used—where the upper and lower bounds of the window advance as and when new
events enter BI—or a batch window is considered—where the time window always
moves by the specified window size, and each event in the window is processed only
once. In a time-based window, the selector compares the timestamps of each event
in BI against the specified time window and stores the selected events e in Bint. Fol-
lowing that, the correlation function fω calculates the average over these events and
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sends the output event ce to BO (through the serializer). For example, the AGGREGATE
operator described in Listing 1 is used to determine the average temperature in a
room, such that the temperature readings are analyzed (continuously) over a batch
window of the past 10 events. Here, the current state of the content of Bint at a given
point in time indicates the current set of events pertinent to the given operator. Con-
sequently, this allows us to discard the irrelevant events at regular intervals, thus
reducing the number of events to be transferred during migration.
SEQUENCE. A SEQUENCE operator analyzes the incoming event stream(s) within a
given time window to discover inherent sequential patterns in them, where a certain
set of events occur one after another in temporal order. For example, the SEQUENCE
operator in Listing 1 analyzes an incoming event stream containing temperature
events, and detects the sequence of three temperature readings that show an increase
in the temperature value, within a time window of 10 seconds. One such burst of
temperature readings can indicate that the air-conditioning system in a room is mal-
functioning. Typically, it may so happen that the events arrive in a haphazard order
at the operator. The correlation function fω adapts the functionality of the selector
to the contents of the intermediate buffer Bint, such that the selector only permits
the events e that satisfy the above sequence in the specified time window. In the
above example, if an event e1 has been detected and stored in Bint, the selector only
permits an event e2 or e3 by discarding all the other events in between in the given
time window. Upon detection of the required sequence (or after the time window
expires), the correlation function fω sends the corresponding output event ce to the
output event stream. In this case, capturing the instantaneous state of Bint as well as
fω allows us to determine the relevant events for migration.
JOIN. JOIN operators allow for the merging of two (or more) incoming event
streams based on certain criteria. Typically, each event in one incoming event stream
Iiω are matched against all events in another incoming event stream I
j
ω within a
given time window based on the specified condition(s) (see Listing 1). The correla-
tion function fω then generates an output event for all matching event pairs. In this
case, the intermediate buffer Bint contains the set of matched events from the event
streams, that are relevant for further processing. Based on the the timestamps of the
events in Bint, it is possible to discard the irrelevant events in all incoming event
streams.
Apart from the single-item FILTER operator, the remaining operators possess signif-
icant intermediate state, which becomes increasingly important for operator migra-
tion in resource-constrained and dynamic environments. Instead of replicating/log-
ging entire sets of events to maintain reliable execution of CEP operator graphs, the
extraction of the intermediate state—especially the intermediate buffer Bint—cuts
down the transfer/storage of irrelevant events and thus, reduces computation inten-
sity on the primary as well as the backup nodes, considerably. In turn, the backup
nodes may resume processing where the primary nodes left off.
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6.2.3 Adaptive Buffer Synchronization
Having analyzed the significance of the intermediate state for different CEP oper-
ators, we now present our approach for maintaining the internal buffers involved
in a FlexCEP node, in order to facilitate efficient operator migration. Our approach
entails an adaptive content synchronization mechanism among the different inter-
nal buffers—the input buffer BI, the output buffer BO, the intermediate buffer Bint,
as well as the restore buffer Brestore (introduced above)—on the primary and backup
nodes, depending on the prevailing network conditions. The main steps of this ap-
proach are detailed in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 : Adaptive Buffer Synchronization
Description :Algorithm for the management of the intermediate buffer Bint
on the primary downstream node and the restore buffer Brestore
on the primary upstream node
Variables :Rint ← rate of incoming event stream
φrestore ← restore buffer synchronization factor
Rmin ← minimum rate of acknowledgment
1 function receiveEvents(〈InputEventStream〉)
2 for each e ∈ 〈InputEventStream〉 do
3 BI.add(e);
4 t1 ← currentTime();
5 for each e ∈ consumedBySelector() do
6 BI.remove(e);
7 if e.toBeProcessed() then
8 Bint.add(e);
9 t2 ← currentTime();
10 Rint ← Bint.size()t2−t1 ;
11 sendAckToUpstreamNode(Bint,φrestore,Rint, 0);
12 saveStateSnapshot();
13 function sendAckToUpstreamNode(〈InBuffer〉,φ,R,Rmin)
14 for i = 1 to InBuffer.size() do
15 ackWait← 0;
16 if i > (max(φ·R,Rmin) + ackWait) then
17 sendAck(InBuffer.getSeqNo(i));
18 ackWait← i;
19 function receiveAck(seqNo)
20 for each e ∈ Brestore do
21 if seqNo > e.getSeqNo() then
22 Brestore.remove(e);
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As mentioned in Section 6.2.1, a typical CEP operator accepts incoming event
streams in the input buffer BI and inserts the produced complex events in the out-
put buffer BO. Once the events are consumed by the selector—either selected for
further processing or discarded upon not meeting the specified criteria—they are re-
moved from the input buffer to make room for the next set of events in the incoming
event stream(s) (Lines 5–6). The events selected for further processing are inserted
into the intermediate buffer Bint (Lines 7–8). The contents of the output buffer are
transferred to the input buffer of the subsequent downstream operator(s)3, and are
evicted from the output buffer upon receipt of the corresponding acknowledgments
from the successors. This functionality of the input and output buffers is well es-
tablished in current CEP systems to ensure proper transfer of events through the
operator graph [116].
Typically, in existing literature on active replication and rollback recovery [22, 65,
86, 116, 217] in order to minimize the control communication overhead, the rate of ac-
knowledgments Rack is adapted to the rate of event reception Rer, i.e., the rate at which
the events enter BI in the downstream node. In doing so, Rack = max(φack Rer;Rmin),
where the constant φack ∈ (0, 1] is the cumulative acknowledgment factor, and Rmin is
the minimum rate of acknowledgment that has to be maintained for reliable com-
munication. Consequently, the receipt of every b 1φack cth event is acknowledged by the
downstream node as a cumulative acknowledgment for the past b 1φack c events (of
course, subject to Rmin).
However, considering that our approach deals with a resource-constrained and
mobile environment, we refrain from using acknowledgments for event reception. In
turn, as soon as an event is sent out of the output buffer BO of an upstream node
to the input buffer BI of the downstream node, the corresponding event is removed
from the output buffer to make space for the next set of events. In order to allow for
efficient recovery purposes, we instead introduce an additional buffer on each node,
called the restore buffer Brestore.
The restore buffer stores all the events that enter the output buffer BO but are not
yet consumed by the internal processing logic of the downstream operator. Based
on the events that are consumed for further processing by the downstream opera-
tor, i.e., based on the instantaneous contents of the corresponding Bint, the contents
of Brestore on the upstream operator are updated. Data synchronization acknowledg-
ments, much akin to event acknowledgments described above, are sent from the
downstream node to the upstream node, so that the irrelevant events as well as the
events in Bint on the downstream operator can be evicted from the corresponding
Brestore (Lines 20–22). If we define the rate at which events enter Bint as Rint, then
the rate of restore buffer synchronization between the downstream and upstream
nodes, Rrestore, can be defined as Rrestore = φrestore Rint, where φrestore ∈ (0, 1] is the re-
store buffer synchronization factor (Line 11). The restore buffer acts as each operator’s
3 For the sake of simplicity, in the ensuing discussion, we restrict the number of primary upstream and
downstream nodes (and therefore, the number of operators that run on each node) to one each. This
also applies for backup and background nodes. However, the concepts developed can be applied to
multiple-node scenarios.
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log for operation checkpoints, thus allowing for rollback recovery in case of abrupt
node/network failures. The main premise behind this design decision is the mainte-
nance of only those events that are relevant for the execution of the prevailing context
query, and reducing the amount of data to be stored on one device for the purpose
of migration.
With the requisite input events available in Brestore on the upstream node, the main
contents of Ψω on the downstream node at a given point in time t include the con-
tents of Bint as well as the processing state of fω and the serializer. Additionally, we
also include the contents of Brestore of the downstream node itself in Ψω to account for
the outgoing event stream. We take a snapshot of Ψω at regular intervals, such that
this snapshot can be used to restore the operator ω upon migration by instantiating
ω with the exact state on the backup node. This allows us to resume operation on
the backup node as it were on the primary node, by using the contents of Brestore on
the upstream node as the initial input event stream.
The use of the above buffers allows us to store and transfer the required amount of
data (events and operator state) to the backup nodes to complete operator migration
successfully. However, the question of when and where to transfer the data is an
important one. Updating the state of an operator Ψω on the backup nodes can effect
a large communication overhead. It is essential to determine the moments in time
when one such migration is necessary and also, to determine the right candidates
that can act as backup nodes, depending on the device and network conditions.
6.2.4 Mobility-Aware Operator Migration
As part of FlexCEP, we devise a proactive approach for operator migration that ac-
counts for the dynamic changes in D2D-based networks mentioned in Section 6.1,
such that the communication and processing overhead is kept to the required min-
imum, while still facilitating reliable processing. Using estimates of the movement
and resource availability of the available nodes, we establish how backup nodes are
chosen, when they are activated, and how operator state is replicated/synchronized
between the primary and backup nodes. Consequently, we present an approach that
allows for flexible execution of an operator graph, depending on the prevailing net-
work conditions (see Algorithm 4).
Each node captures and stores status information about its location (e.g., GPS
coordinates) as well as its resource characteristics, i.e., battery level and memory
space, at regular intervals of time. This set of information is exchanged among the
nodes using the beaconing component (see Section 3.3), by sending the information
as beacons at regular intervals of time. The rate of beaconing, Rbeacon, can be varied
to handle different mobility patterns. This helps the primary nodes keep track of
the other nodes in the processing chain, thus allowing for proactive measures in
case of any aberrations. The status information of the other nodes is used to predict
their failure probability in the near future. We define the failure probability of node
i for the time period (0, t) as Pifail(t), which chiefly depends on three factors—the
probability of moving out of range, PiOOR(t), based on the relative velocity of the
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Algorithm 4 : Mobility-Aware Operator Migration w.r.t. node j
Description : Algorithm for processing incoming beacons and calculating the
failure probability Pfail of the corresponding node. If
Pfail > failValue, the node initiates migration to closest viable
backup node.
Variables : nodeID← unique ID of a node
tcapture ← time instant at which the beacon was captured
〈loc〉 ← location data in X and Y coordinates
bat← current energy value as percentage
mem← current memory capacity as percentage
POOR ← probability of moving out of range
Pres ← probability of resource depletion
Pcrash ← probability of abrupt crash
wOOR,wres,wcrash ← weighting factors
backupLimit← degree of horizontal dependency
1 function receiveBeacon(nodeID=i, tcapture=tc, 〈loci〉, bati, memi)
2 locLog〈i, tc〉 ← 〈loci〉;
3 PiOOR(tc)← calcProbOOR(locLog〈i, tc〉, locLog〈j, tc〉);
4 Pires(tc)← calcProbResDepletion(bati, memi);
5 Picrash(tc)← calcProbCrash(nicrash(tc));
6 Pifail(tc)← calcProbFail(PiOOR(tc),Pires(tc),Picrash(tc),wOOR,wres,wcrash);
7 for each node ∈ 〈backgroundNodes〉 do
8 if node.getProbFail() < passValue then
9 backupCandidates.add(node);
10 else
11 backupCandidates.remove(node);
12 backupCandidates.sortByLocation(locLog〈j, tc〉);
13 if downstreamNode.getProbFail() > failValue then
14 for k = 1 to backupCandidates.size() do
15 if k 6 backupLimit then
16 backup.add(backupCandidate(k));
17 initiateMigration(〈backup〉, downstreamNode, backupLimit);
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node with respect to the others; the probability of resource depletion on the node,
Pires(t), based on the instantaneous status of node energy and memory capacity; as
well as the crash probability, Picrash(t), which depends on the number of past abrupt
crashes. Each node estimates the failure probability of the other nodes based on the
status information obtained via beaconing as well as past experiences with respect
to abrupt crashes. The failure probability estimated by node j with respect to node i
for the time period (0, t) (i.e., the previous estimate was made at t = 0) is given by,
Pifail(t) = min (wOOR · PiOOR(t)|j +wres · Pires(t) +wcrash · Picrash(t); 1) (7)
where the parameters wOOR, wres, and wcrash are weighting constants. such that
wOOR +wres +wcrash = 1 (Line 6). Here, POOR is subject to the relative distance and
velocity between the nodes; each node can therefore have a different failure probabil-
ity with respect to the other nodes.
The probability of moving out of range POOR depends on the (relative) speed of
the node and (relative) angle of movement, as calculated by other nodes based on
the location information exchanged. If (locix, loc
i
y)|(t=t1) and (loc
j
x, loc
j
y)|(t=t1) are the
location coordinates of nodes i and j, respectively, at t = t1, then the slope of the
imaginary line connecting them is given by mi,j(t1) =
locjy−loc
i
y
locjx−loc
i
x
. By comparing the
slopes of the connecting line at a different instant of time t = t2, we can obtain the
relative angle of movement θ of node i with respect to node j, as in Equation (8). The
instantaneous speed ν of node i is also calculated based on the location coordinates
at the two time instants.
θ(t2) = tan
−1
(
mi,j(t2) −mi,j(t1)
1+mi,j(t1)mi,j(t2)
)
ν(t2) =
√(
locix(t2) − loc
i
x(t1)
)2
+
(
lociy(t2) − loc
i
y(t1)
)2
t2 − t1
(8)
We consider a node to be have a higher probability of moving out of range if the
(instantaneous) angle θ > pi2 (i.e., 90°) or if it fluctuates over time [150]. We also
ascertain that the node’s (relative) speed is directly proportional to its probability
of moving out of range. Basically, each measuring node observes the instantaneous
difference in the speed of the other nodes with respect to its own. Considering that
the probability of a node moving out of range increases with increases in the relative
difference in speeds—with the upper limit at 1—we employ an exponential model
to depict the probability of a node moving out of range.
Consequently, since changes in the angle of movement as well as the speed are in-
dependent of each other (especially on highways with multiple lanes), we define the
probability of node imoving out of range of node j in time period (t1, t2), PiOOR(t2)|j
as shown in Equation (9) (Line 3).
PiOOR(t2) = min
(
1−
1
ανi(t2)−νj(t2)
+min
(
θi(t2)
pi
2
; 1
)
·
(
1−
1
α
dθi(t2)
dt
)
; 1
)
(9)
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The term α represents the type of exponential curve applicable for the calculation
of the out-of-range probability. This depends on the real-world communication range
values for the application case at hand. For example, in Scenario B in Section 3.1, the
point at which a vehicle exits the range of the other vehicles can be used to deter-
mine the type of curve that applies for the given scenario using logistic regression
techniques4.
Similarly, if we define bati(t1) and memi(t1) as the percentage of battery power and
the memory space available on node i at time t = t1, respectively, we can define the
probability of resource depletion for the period (t1, t2) as in Equation (10) (Line 4).
Pires(t2) =
(
1
bati(t1) + 
+
1
memi(t1) + 
)
(10)
Note that  accounts for a negligibly small positive value to avoid possible division-
by-zero errors. If this applies, the resulting value of probability becomes very high
(tending to infinity), which we then substitute with 0 for further calculations.
And finally, the crash probability Picrash(t2) of node i for the above period is given
by Picrash(t2) =
(
1−α−n
i
crash(t1)+
)
(Line 5). Here, nicrash(t1) stands for the number of
abrupt crashes node i has had until time instant t = t1. We define abrupt crashes
as occasions where a node is assumed to be no longer reachable, either due to lack
of acknowledgments or due to lack of status information beacons. Again, the term
α depends on real-world scenarios which allow for the estimation of the logistic
regression curve between the probability values and the number of crashes.
An upstream node in the operator graph estimates the failure probability of the
corresponding downstream node using Equation (7) to determine when the migra-
tion approach should be initiated. The upstream node also selects a background
node that can act as backup if the primary downstream node fails. Based on the sta-
tus information beacons from the background nodes, each primary node first selects
the background nodes that have a failure probability lower than a threshold called
passValue (Lines 7–11). If a background node’s failure probability goes beyond the
pass threshold, they are removed from the list. Among the shortlisted background
nodes, the primary upstream node selects the closest node that has the least fail-
ure probability and notifies it about the corresponding primary downstream node
(Lines 12–16). The number of backup nodes selected can also be controlled based on
the degree of horizontal dependency required for the application at hand, defined
by the backup limit (Line 15).
When an upstream node detects that the failure probability of the corresponding
downstream node is estimated to be above a threshold called failValue, it informs
the backup node to contact the downstream node and initiate the passive replica-
tion phase (Line 17). This mainly entails the replication and synchronization of the
intermediate state of the downstream node on the backup node, so that the backup
node can take over operations immediately. The backup synchronization rate, Rbackup,
depends on the size of the intermediate buffer of the corresponding operator run-
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logistic_regression
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ning on the downstream node. The downstream node synchronizes its state with the
chosen backup node at regular intervals, to account for any abrupt crashes on its part.
In this thesis, we set Rbackup = Rrestore, so as to avoid any possible inconsistencies in
operator state migration. Finally, when switching to the backup node for subsequent
processing, the contents of Brestore on the primary upstream node are transferred to
BI on the backup node. This two-step process—(i) entailing passive replication of
intermediate state from the downstream node and rollback recovery of the relevant
events on the upstream node, and (ii) the failure probability measure—allow us to
control the working of the backup node according to the application’s needs.
6.3 evaluation setup
Before we proceed to the evaluation of our approach, we need to define the evalua-
tion criteria based on which we analyze our approach. In the following, we describe
our evaluation setup and then explain the procedure followed to simulate the evalu-
ation environment and to obtain the results as per the established criteria.
6.3.1 Evaluation Criteria
In our evaluations, we compare our FlexCEP approach against the two main cat-
egories of reliability approaches in related literature—active replication and rollback
recovery/upstream backup. In addition to these two approaches, we also consider an im-
proved active replication approach that combines the properties of rollback recovery
and active replication. For our evaluations, we implemented the above approaches
as below:
Active Replication (AR). Active replication entails the replication of events on one
(or more) redundant paths in order to support reliable processing in case one of the
paths fails due to node failure, as shown in Figure 3a in Section 2.1.2. For the sake
of comparison, we only consider one redundant path (i.e., with one backup node)
alongside the primary processing path in our evaluations. The primary upstream
node transmits all output events to both the primary downstream node as well as
the backup node. In return, the primary downstream node as well as the backup
node acknowledge reception of the events by sending back the sequence number of
the received events.
Rollback Recovery (RR). For rollback recovery, we consider an additional buffer
on the primary upstream node that holds all output events that have been sent to the
primary downstream node. We consider a traditional rollback recovery approach
without any checkpointing, so as to understand the consequences of allowing for
fail-safe reliability. The downstream node sends acknowledgments to the upstream
node at regular intervals based on the acknowledgment threshold (as described in Sec-
tion 6.2.3). If the upstream node does not receive acknowledgments for a certain
period (based on the established acknowledgment rate), it assumes the downstream
node to have failed, and therefore initiates rollback recovery by transferring all events
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Figure 26: Illustration of the Improved Active Replication Approach (iAR Used in the
Evaluations)
in the buffer to the backup node (see Figure 3b in Section 2.1.2). Note that the CEP
operator on the upstream node is blocked for the duration of the restore process.
Improved Active Replication (iAR). Figure 26 illustrates the improved active repli-
cation approach, where we combine the benefits of active replication and rollback re-
covery based on the beacons exchanged between the nodes (as also seen in FlexCEP).
Unlike the typical active replication case, only the primary processing path is used
at the beginning, leaving the backup node in standby mode (passive) during failure-
free runtime operation. If the primary upstream node observes a failure probability
above failValue with respect to the primary downstream node, it initiates rollback re-
covery by replaying all its current output events to the backup node, and continues
to use both processing paths until the primary downstream node disappears/fails.
In this way, the backup node is only engaged when the primary upstream node
suspects an imminent failure in the primary processing path. However, unlike our
approach, this approach does not consider the processing state of the operators. We
include this approach in our evaluations to evaluate the consequences of a simple
combination of the two traditional approaches, without accounting for operator state
information.
The main goal of our evaluation is to investigate the performance of the above
approaches against our approach with respect to the following criteria:
Communication Overhead. We define the communication overhead as the number
of messages exchanged between the nodes, excluding the events transferred from one
node to another for processing the given query. In our evaluations, we differentiate
between runtime communication overhead and recovery overhead to understand
the effects of failure-free and failure-ridden operations. We define runtime overhead
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as the control messages exchanged between the nodes during normal failure-free
operation, which include—(i) messages exchanged to keep track of other nodes (e.g.,
beacons, acknowledgments), and (ii) messages sent to the potential backup nodes
for reliability reasons (e.g., snapshots, event replication). Recovery overhead, on the
other hand, includes all messages exchanged between the nodes to recover after a
failure (or a possibly impending failure) has been recognized, typically sent by the
primary upstream node to the backup node to restore the processing state.
Recovery Time. The recovery time is the amount of time required by the CEP
system to restore the normal processing state after a failure occurs. Basically, the
recovery time of any reliability approach has three main factors—(i) the amount
of time required for the upstream node to detect failure of the downstream node;
(ii) the amount of time required to start and set up the required operator on the
backup node; and finally, (iii) the amount of time required to restore the state of the
backup node operator to that on the failed node. As mentioned above, the primary
upstream node gets blocked during recovery until the required set of events (in the
corresponding buffer) are sent to the backup node. We calculate the recovery time
based on the time taken for the backup node to start disseminating non-duplicate
events, such that the consumer node (or the next downstream node) can continue
processing the generated events as they arrive.
Duplicate Count. For each of the above approaches, we also count the number of
duplicates arriving at the consumer node, based on the events sent by the primary
downstream node and those sent by the backup node. We do so by comparing the
content as well as the sequence numbers of the events received at the consumer node.
Event Loss. In order to verify the correctness of the events received at the consumer
node, we compare them against the expected set of events in terms of their expected
timestamp (in case of normal operation) and their event value. Any aberrations in the
set of output events with respect to the expected set are considered as event losses,
since they normally result from the loss of certain intermediate events. Furthermore,
any events that are not processed by the primary upstream node due to the blockage
during event restoration are also considered as lost events.
6.3.2 Evaluation Environment
Our CEP processing platform is based on the open-source CEP engine called Sid-
dhi [205]. Siddhi allows for a fast and multi-threaded runtime environment to exe-
cute CEP operators by analyzing event streams in a continuous manner. Each node
in our distributed CEP environment executes a separate Siddhi instance to execute
the operator placed on it. Given the open-source nature of the Siddhi CEP engine,
we can access the intermediate events inside the operators and extract the necessary
information to facilitate adaptive buffer management in our approach.
We developed an experimental CEP system based on the Java programming lan-
guage, and used Siddhi as the underlying CEP library. Each of the nodes in the dis-
tributed CEP system were implemented as Java applications, such that they each ran
on a separate Java Virtual Machine (JVM). We deployed the nodes on a high-end server,
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such that each node obtained a RAM space of 2 GB and a compute unit equivalent
to a 2.1 GHz processor, which corresponds to the (minimum) specifications available
on most modern smartphones on the market nowadays. Each node communicates
with the other nodes using sockets. To keep the amount of information exchanged
between nodes to a minimum, we employed User Datagram Protocol (UDP) as the
underlying transport protocol. By restricting the deployment of the nodes to a single
server, we mainly focus on evaluating the cost of migration in terms of communica-
tion overhead and recovery time, instead of dealing with environmental delay and
loss factors. An on-field evaluation of our approach is the subject of future work in
this field.
In order to simulate a mobile environment, each node obtains a set of mobility
traces, which include the location coordinates and the corresponding timestamp for
the given node. This information is also used to send out beacons at regular intervals
of time, so as to inform the other nodes about one’s status. For the mobility traces,
we considered the open-source trace set provided by Gramaglia et al. [80], based
on vehicular data on a set of highways around the city of Madrid in Spain. These
traces include the location information of the vehicles—captured at a granularity of
500 ms—which enter and leave a fixed road segment of around 10 km. Using these
traces, we can simulate Scenario B in Section 3.1 as part of the mobile evaluation
scenario.
6.3.3 Evaluation Procedure
Our approach FlexCEP supports reliable CEP in a dynamic D2D environment, where
the devices involved can have different degrees of mobility, from stationary to highly
mobile. In our evaluations, we consider two different environments to account for
these extremities—(i) we consider a quasi-stationary environment where the devices
do not move over the course of the execution of an operator graph, but may incur
abrupt crashes given their resource-constrained nature, and (ii) we consider a highly
mobile automotive environment, where the execution of an operator graph can get
disrupted in case one of the processing devices leaves the processing environment. In
both the cases, using the FlexCEP approach, devices keep track of each other using
the beaconing service.
For the purpose of our evaluations, we consider a simplified five-node D2D net-
work as shown in Figure 27, consisting of the following nodes—(i) a producer node
that acts as the event source, (ii) a consumer node that receives the processed events
at the end of the operator graph, (iii) a primary upstream node and a primary down-
stream node, where the initial placement of the operators in the operator graph has
been made, and (iv) a backup node that is in place for recovery purposes.
Evaluation Query and Operator Graph
To demonstrate the influence of intermediate operator state, we consider a query
involving a WINDOW-AVERAGE operator as part of our evaluations (see Code 2). As
part of the corresponding operator graph, the primary upstream node executes a
6.3 evaluation setup 113
𝝎𝑭 
  𝒑 
 𝒄 
Producer 
Primary Upstream 
Node 
Consumer 
𝝎𝑨 
Primary 
Downstream Node 
Backup Node 
Figure 27: Evaluation Setup and Corresponding Operator Graph
FILTER operator (Query1, ωF), in order to filter out unnecessary events from further
processing based on a certain THRESHOLD (e.g., to filter out bad sensor output or out-
liers). The primary downstream node then executes a FILTER-based WINDOW-AVERAGE
operator (Query2, ωA) to output the average value of the relevant incoming events
(SENSOR_TYPE) at regular intervals (based on WINDOW_SIZE) to produce the output
events that the consumer node in the given scenario is interested in.
Listing 2: Evaluation Query
define stream inputStream(sensor string, reading double)
Query1 (ωF):
from inputStream[reading > THRESHOLD]
select sensor, reading
insert into outputStream
Query2 (ωA):
from outputStream[sensor == ’SENSOR_TYPE’]#window.lengthBatch(’WINDOW_SIZE’)
select sensor, avg(reading) as newReading
insert all events into consumerStream
The given query can be used in the motivating scenarios described in Section 3.1
as follows: In Scenario A/C, Walt is interested in knowing the average sound levels
in the concerned environment, by aggregating across a set of microphone readings at
regular intervals. The primary upstream node receives events from different sensors
and filters out the unwanted events. The primary downstream node then selects the
pertinent events and finds the average over them. Similarly, in Scenario B, Walt is
interested in obtaining the average speed information of a road section ahead of
him, but only in the lane he is currently driving on. In this case, after the primary
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Table 15: Parameters Used for the Performance Evaluation of FlexCEP
Parameter Value
Number of input events 20, 50, 100, 1000, 10000, 100000
Event generation rate, Reg (events/s) 1, 2, 10, 100, 1000
Window size 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64
Cumulative acknowledgment factor, φack 1
Restore buffer synchronization factor, φrestore 2/WINDOW_SIZE
Failure threshold, failValue 0.7
Beacon sending rate, Rbeacon (beacons/s) 1, (2)
upstream node filters out the bad sensor data, the primary downstream node selects
the events pertinent to Walt’s driving lane and provides him with the average speed
information at regular intervals.
Before the start of our evaluations, we assume that the operators, corresponding
to the queries Query1 and Query2, have been placed on the primary upstream and
downstream node (based on an operator placement algorithm). For the purpose of
evaluating the performance of our approach against that of the existing state of the
art approaches, we only consider cases where the primary downstream node fails at
an unknown instant of time (either abruptly or by moving out of range). We then
evaluate the costs of supporting reliability for FlexCEP as well as each of the above-
mentioned approaches in terms of the established evaluation criteria.
Independent Evaluation Variables
Table 15 shows the set of independent variables pertinent to the evaluation of our
approach. We vary the number of events to be processed as well as their rate of
generation to evaluate the performance of the approaches for varying degrees of
event load. We created a set of synthetic event traces to simulate different event
loads, by varying the number of events generated from 20 to 100000. Each event
contains a data field, comprising a string for the event name (e.g., sensor type) and
the corresponding data value (e.g., sensor reading). Further, each event also has a
timestamp value, which is indicative of the time it was created as well as its sequence
number. Finally, additional boolean fields are included to indicate whether the event
has been acknowledged or consumed. In total, each event varies between 200 and
208 bytes, depending on the string length of the event name.
For the quasi-stationary scenario, each of these traces are used as input with differ-
ent values of the event generation rate, Reg, from 1 event/s to 100 events/s. Further-
more, to reduce the evaluation design space, we also set the length of the operator
window in accordance with the number of events per run, varying from 2 to 64.
The dependencies between the number of events, Reg, and the window size for the
quasi-stationary scenario are shown in Table 16.
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Table 16: Dependencies Between the Evaluation Variables of FlexCEP in the
Quasi-Stationary Evaluation Scenario
Number of Events Reg (events/s) Window Size
20 1 2
50 2 4
100 10 8
1000 10 16
10000 100 32
100000 100 64
Table 17: Dependencies Between the Evaluation Variables of FlexCEP in the Mobile
Evaluation Scenario
Number of Events Reg (events/s) Window Size
100 1 4
1000 10 8
10000 100 16
100000 1000 32
In the traditional approaches of AR and RR, the rate of acknowledgments corre-
sponds directly to the rate of incoming events. For the purpose of facilitating fail-safe
event processing, we consider both these approaches with a cumulative acknowledg-
ment factor φack = 1, such that every incoming event is acknowledged immediately.
For the FlexCEP approach, we considered the restore buffer synchronization factor
φrestore = 2/WINDOW_SIZE, such that the primary downstream node sends an acknowl-
edgment to the primary upstream node whenever the number of consumed events
equals half or full of the window size. In turn, the primary upstream node receives
two acknowledgments for each window-length of consumed events. This allows us
to analyze the importance of the intermediate buffer in our approach. All acknowl-
edgments have a fixed size of 8 bytes, corresponding to the long Unix time format in
milliseconds.
In our approach and in iAR, each node sends beacons with status information to
the other nodes at regular rates of Rbeacon = 1 beacon/s (unless stated otherwise). Each
beacon contains the following fields: nodeID, timestamp, locationX, locationY. To
reduce the complexity of the evaluations, we did not consider energy and memory
readings as part of the beacons. Also, considering that each event trace set is executed
independently, we do not consider the abrupt crash factor ncrash in our evaluations.
Consequently, each beacon has a total size of 56 bytes. Upon receiving a beacon,
each node calculates the failure probability of the corresponding sending node with
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respect to its status information, as per the algorithm described in Algorithm 4. A
lack of 2 beacons in succession is considered as a sign of failure.
In the quasi-stationary evaluation scenario, we consider different instants of time
to simulate an abrupt failure of the primary downstream node. We consider two
time instants for node failure: an early failure which occurs after 30% of the input
events has arrived, and a late failure which occurs after 80% of events has arrived.
This allows us to analyze the effects of abrupt node failure on the recovery overhead
and recovery time for each approach, and compare the runtime overhead in each
case to the case with failure-free operation.
For the mobile evaluation scenario, we allowed the primary downstream node to
fail once its measure of the failure probability of the primary upstream node goes
beyond 0.99, considering that this indicates an out-of-range condition on its part. We
chose the vehicular traces for the three CEP nodes in such a way that the primary
downstream node moves away after a certain time, while the primary upstream node
and the backup node remain in range for the duration of the execution of the given
operator graph. Consequently, in Equation 9, we choose α = 2, such that the nodes
are assumed to be moving out of range when their relative speed increases beyond
10 km/h. In order to measure the effects of different event loads on the CEP system
before the primary downstream node fails (i.e., moves out of range), we changed Reg
and window size for the different event trace sets, as seen in Table 17.
6.4 evaluation results
We now present the results of our evaluation based on the evaluation setup described
above. We divide our evaluation into two scenarios: one in a quasi-stationary envi-
ronment and another in a mobile environment. For each of these evaluations, we
ran the operator graph for three different event types and present the results as the
average over the individual runs.
6.4.1 Performance Analysis in Quasi-Stationary Environments
In this section, we focus on the comparison among the approaches AR, RR, and
our approach FlexCEP with respect to their performance in case of abrupt failure
on the part of the primary downstream node. As part of FlexCEP, given the quasi-
stationary nature of the environment, we used a set of constant location traces as the
status information for beaconing. In the following, we shall present our results with
respect to the evaluation criteria described in Section 6.3.1.
Communication Overhead: Runtime
We first look into the communication overhead incurred by each of the approaches
under consideration during failure-free and failure-ridden operation. In particular,
we look at the runtime overhead and recovery overhead to understand how each of
these approaches tackle abrupt failures at different points in time.
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(a) Comparison of Runtime Overhead during Failure-Free Execution
(b) Comparison of Runtime Overhead with Failure of Downstream Node after 30% Input
Events
(c) Comparison of Runtime Overhead with Failure of Downstream Node after 80% Input
Events
Figure 28: Comparison of Runtime Overhead for Active Replication, Rollback Recovery, and
FlexCEP under Different Failure Conditions in Quasi-Stationary Environments
Figure 28 shows the comparison between the different approaches with respect
to the runtime overhead for different number of events transmitted. In AR, the run-
time overhead is mainly dictated by the replicated set of events sent to the backup
node in parallel to the events sent to the primary downstream node, as well as the ac-
knowledgments sent by both nodes to the primary upstream node. The RR approach
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only has runtime overhead coming from the acknowledgments sent to track event
delivery. In our approach, runtime overhead is introduced by the beacons exchanged
between nodes as well as the regular transfer of the operator state from the primary
downstream node to the backup node.
In Figure 28a, we observe the results for failure-free operation. Notice that both the
axes are represented in the logarithmic scale. We observe that the runtime overhead
incurred by AR surpasses both the other approaches, considerably, when the num-
ber of events transmitted—and therewith, the window size—increases. However, we
see that FlexCEP incurs more runtime overhead for smaller number of events and
smaller window sizes. This is mainly because of the size of the operator state and
the frequency of state transfer from the primary downstream node to the backup.
RR introduces a minimal runtime overhead for lower sets of events, but increases
linearly with an exponential increase in the number of events. We notice that, while
the number of messages exchanged using FlexCEP is below RR by a factor of 11.5
for the case with 100000 events, the total runtime overhead message size exceeds RR
by a factor of 7.
Even during failure-ridden operation, we observe a similar pattern in the amount
of runtime overhead incurred by each approach, as seen in Figures 28b and 28c.
While the magnitude of the runtime overhead reduces for the case with an early
failure, the reduction is proportional to the number of messages exchanged in total.
We observe that FlexCEP incurs a relatively higher runtime overhead in the lower
event regions, increasing to almost 10 times that of AR, compared to 8 during failure-
free operation. Again, this is attributed to the size of the intermediate operator state
transfer, which is done for every intermediate event with a window size of 2 (for the
case with 20 events).
Communication Overhead: Recovery
Figure 29 presents the evaluation results with respect to the recovery overhead for
each of the above approaches. Considering that AR requires minimal time to re-
cover after failure (ideally zero), given that the second processing path already exists
beforehand (via the backup node), we only evaluate the difference in recovery over-
head between RR and FlexCEP. Again, notice the logarithmic scale of the axes in
both figures.
We observe that the recovery overhead for rollback recovery is significantly higher
than that of FlexCEP, in either case of failure. RR incurs a large recovery overhead
due to the replay of buffered events to the backup node after failure is detected.
The size of the buffer increases linearly with the number of events transmitted. On
the other hand, FlexCEP integrates a regular trimming of the restore buffer Brestore
on the primary upstream node as and when events fill the intermediate buffer Bint
on the primary downstream node (based on the acknowledgment rate, Rrestore). As
a result, a largely reduced number of events need to be transferred to the backup
node for restoration purposes. We observe this more clearly in Figure 29b, where the
gap between the recovery overhead for RR increases even further in comparison to
that for FlexCEP, especially in the lower range of events. This is mainly due to the
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(a) Comparison of Recovery Overhead with Failure of Downstream Node after 30% Input
Events
(b) Comparison of Recovery Overhead with Failure of Downstream Node after 80% Input
Events
Figure 29: Comparison of Recovery Overhead for Rollback Recovery and FlexCEP under
Different Failure Conditions in Quasi-Stationary Environments
relatively constant number of events to be migrated in FlexCEP, despite the later
occurrence of node failure.
Recovery Time
Having seen the differences between the three approaches in terms of communica-
tion overhead during failure-free and failure-ridden operation, we now look into the
amount of time required by the approaches to recover after failure is detected. Note
that the detection of failure is dependent on the rate of acknowledgments in RR and
the rate of beacon transmission in FlexCEP.
Figure 30 shows the recovery time analysis with respect to different number of
input events, as well as different failure time instants. Again, we use the logarithmic
scale to accommodate the exponential growth in numbers. As mentioned earlier, AR
incurs minimal delays in establishing the new path over the backup node, consider-
ing that the replicated path is already established beforehand.
In both Figures 30a and 30b, we observe that the recovery time for RR increases
linearly with increase in the number of events, reaching a total of 470 seconds for
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(a) Comparison of Recovery Time with Failure of Downstream Node after 30% Input Events
(b) Comparison of Recovery Time with Failure of Downstream Node after 80% Input Events
Figure 30: Comparison of Recovery Time for Rollback Recovery and FlexCEP under
Different Failure Conditions in Quasi-Stationary Environments
100000 input events. Contrarily, recovery time using FlexCEP is relatively constant
through all input event sizes (µ = 2.3s). The main contributing factor towards recov-
ery time in FlexCEP is the time taken to recognize the occurrence of a failure, based
on the beaconing frequency Rbeacon.
Runtime Overhead vs Recovery Time
Figure 31 shows the comparison of runtime overhead against recovery time for dif-
ferent input event sizes, similar to the figure shown in Section 6.1. In order to under-
stand just the recovery time after failure has been detected, we subtracted the failure
recognition time from the overall recovery times for FlexCEP and RR. We observe
that RR exhibits an exponential approach curve, starting low for lower input events
and increasing steadily with increase in events.
In both the failure cases, we notice that our approach FlexCEP moves between AR
and RR, demonstrating a considerably shorter recovery time in the order of a few
hundred milliseconds across all event sizes as well as a lower runtime overhead in
comparison to AR. By varying the restore buffer synchronization factor φrestore, we
can achieve different levels of recovery time and runtime overhead, depending on
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(a) Comparison of Runtime Overhead against Recovery Time with Failure of Downstream
Node after 30% Input Events
(b) Comparison of Runtime Overhead against Recovery Time with Failure of Downstream
Node after 80% Input Events
Figure 31: Comparison of Runtime Overhead against Recovery Time for All Approaches
under Different Failure Conditions and Different Number of Events in
Quasi-Stationary Environments
the needs of the application at hand. We discuss this trade-off setting in more detail
in Section 6.5.
Faulty Events
Finally, we compare the performance of the three approaches in terms of event loss
and duplicates, both of which we term together as faulty events. Recall from Sec-
tion 6.1 that a loss of events can lead to increases in either false positives or false
negatives, which can in turn have dire consequences for the end application. Fur-
thermore, an increase in the number of duplicates requires the consumer node to
introduce additional filter operations to sort out the valid entries from the invalid
ones. Effectively, it is highly desirable for any reliability mechanism to incur mini-
mal event loss and duplicates.
Figure 32 shows the results for event loss and duplicate count for increasing num-
ber of events. In Figure 32a, we observe that, given the nature of AR to always have
at least one redundant path, the number of events lost is zero (shown as 1 in the log
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(a) Comparison of Event Loss for Different Failure Conditions
(b) Comparison of Number of Duplicates for Different Failure Conditions
Figure 32: Comparison of Event Loss and Duplicates across All Approaches under Different
Failure Conditions in Quasi-Stationary Environments
plot to make them visible). However, RR incurs an excessively high number of lost
events when the number of events generated increases beyond 10000, which also in-
dicates a higher Reg of 100 events/s as per Table 16. This is mainly due to the fact that
the primary upstream node has to be blocked during the recovery process, resulting
in a loss of incoming events due to buffer overflow. Notice that the event loss is lower
when the failure occurs later, considering that fewer events are lost during recovery
blockage. The minimal number of lost events using FlexCEP is also caused due to
the short period of time, where the primary upstream node is blocked in order to
transmit the contents of Brestore to the backup node. While the loss count is negligibly
small compared to that for RR, it can be further reduced by increasing the restore
buffer synchronization factor, φrestore.
The number of duplicates received at the consumer node for different event sizes
is shown in Figure 32b. Note the linear scale used on the y-axis for the number of
duplicates, still keeping the x-axis logarithmic. In AR, the number of duplicates is
equal to the events processed by the backup node during failure-free runtime, and
by the primary downstream node during failure-ridden runtime. Similarly, in RR,
the events generated by the backup node after restore partially includes some events
that were generated by the primary downstream node before its failure. In the case
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of FlexCEP, given the transfer of operator state to the backup node, the processing
operation can be continued exactly where the primary node left off. This property of
FlexCEP effects zero duplicates at the consumer node (again, shown as 1 in the log
plot).
6.4.2 Performance Analysis in Mobile Environments
In this section, we look into the performance results for the evaluation of the ap-
proaches FlexCEP and iAR in mobile environments. As described in Section 6.3.3,
we use the mobility trace datasets based on vehicular traffic on the Spanish highways
around Madrid to simulate high-speed nodes. Note that we use different values for
Reg and the window size, as seen in Table 17. As per the mobility trace dataset, the
beaconing rate Rbeacon increases to 2 beacons/s. We set the failValue to 0.7, such that
the primary upstream node starts migration to the backup node when this failure
probability is reached with respect to the primary downstream node.
Communication Overhead
Just as we did in the quasi-stationary scenario, we first look into the communication
overhead incurred by both the approaches under consideration. Considering that we
have a highly mobile environment, we do not consider the scenario of failure-free
operation during this analysis.
Figure 33 shows the results for the comparison between iAR and FlexCEP with re-
gard to the runtime overhead for increasing Reg, and therefore an increasing window
size from size 4 for a rate of 1 event/s and size 32 for 1000 events/s, respectively.
iAR mainly incurs a runtime overhead because of the beacons exchanged among all
nodes as well as the set of events sent to the primary downstream node during the
period between the detection of impending failure and subsequent failure of the pri-
mary downstream node. In FlexCEP, as before, the runtime messages are comprised
of operator state transfer to the backup node, acknowledgments for restore buffer
trimming, and beacon exchange.
Interestingly, we observe that the number of messages exchanged during normal
runtime is relatively constant between the two approaches. However, we notice that
the message overhead in bytes in FlexCEP increases steadily with the number of
events transmitted, reaching a value of 473 kB for 1000 events/s, compared to just 75
kB for iAR. This is mainly caused by the increased amount of operator state transfer
in FlexCEP with increases in Reg.
In Figure 34, we look at the recovery overhead in each of these two approaches
when an impending failure of the primary downstream node has been detected
(based on Pfail > failValue). Just as in RR, iAR needs to transfer all the output events
stored in its buffer to the backup node to restore the current processing state on
the backup node. Consequently, we observe that the recovery overhead for iAR in-
creases linearly with increases to Reg, since this implies that more number of events
are stored in its buffer for restoration purposes. Contrarily, FlexCEP incurs almost
a constant recovery overhead across all values of Reg, owing mainly to the constant
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Figure 33: Comparison of Runtime Overhead for Improved Active Replication (iAR) and
FlexCEP in Mobile Environments
Figure 34: Comparison of Recovery Overhead for Improved Active Replication (iAR) and
FlexCEP in Mobile Environments
trimming of the restore buffer Brestore on the primary upstream node. This results in
the stark differences in recovery overhead between FlexCEP and iAR, especially for
the case with Reg = 1000 events/s, where the recovery overhead of iAR is almost 300
times that of FlexCEP. In FlexCEP, the slight increase in the number of messages
and the recovery overhead size is caused by the increase in window size, resulting in
more events in Brestore. This can be combated by increasing the acknowledgment rate
Rrestore, trading off with increased runtime overhead.
Recovery Time
Figure 35 shows the results for the comparison between the two approaches with re-
spect to recovery time, after an impending failure of the primary downstream node
has been detected. Notice that we use a linear scale on the y-axis for the recovery
time in this case. We can see that, much like RR, iAR suffers from increased recovery
times for increases in Reg. While the recovery time of iAR for Reg = 1 event/s is rela-
tively comparable to that of FlexCEP at 466 ms and 349 ms, respectively, it increases
dramatically to 7.9 seconds and 8.2 seconds when Reg increases to 100 events/s and
1000 events/s, respectively. This attributes to the increased number of event mes-
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Figure 35: Comparison of Recovery Time for Improved Active Replication (iAR) and
FlexCEP in Mobile Environments
Figure 36: Comparison of Event Loss and Duplicates for Improved Active Replication (iAR)
and FlexCEP
sages to be restored on the backup node upon failure detection, as seen in Figure 34.
Just as we observed in Figure 30 for the quasi-stationary case, FlexCEP does not
incur any major increases in recovery time with increases in Reg, increasing to just
459 ms (from 349 ms) for the case with 1000 events/s.
Faulty Events
Finally, we look at the performance of the two approaches with respect to the number
of faulty events—i.e., number of events lost and number of duplicate events—with
increases in Reg. Figure 36 shows the corresponding results, using a logarithmic scale
for the number of lost events/duplicates. We have substituted the zero values in the
number of lost events/duplicates with 0.001 in order to make them visible on a log
plot. In terms of event loss, we observe that iAR incurs larger event losses when Reg
increases to 100 events/s and beyond. Just as seen in the quasi-stationary case, this
is caused due to the blockage of the primary upstream node during the restoration
phase. Furthermore, it can also be attributed to the inability of the backup node to
process the larger surge of events caused by larger number of buffered events. Even
FlexCEP suffers from increased loss of events for the case with Reg = 1000 events/s,
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resulting in an average event loss of 13 events, albeit negligible compared to around
8000 in iAR.
With respect to the number of duplicates, FlexCEP again proves that appropriate
operator state transfer can help in avoiding unnecessary additional duplicate filtering
at the consumer node. In case of iAR, we observe that the number of duplicates
increases steadily with increases in Reg, increasing from an average of 2 events for
Reg = 1 event/s to 70 events for 1000 events/s. This is mainly caused by the parallel
processing of events during the period between failure detection and eventual failure
of the primary downstream node.
6.5 discussion
In this chapter, we designed and evaluated a novel approach called FlexCEP for flex-
ible execution of CEP operators in a dynamic D2D environment. We introduced an
adaptive buffer management scheme, which incorporates fine-grained intermediate
state of the CEP operators to reduce the amount of recovery overhead and recovery
time incurred during operator migration. Furthermore, to reduce the amount of run-
time overhead during failure-free operation, even in highly mobile environments, we
introduced a mobility-aware predictive mechanism that incorporates the exchange of
beacons to estimate the failure probability of the other nodes in the system.
Through our evaluations in both a quasi-stationary environment as well as a highly
mobile vehicular environment, we showed that we achieve lower runtime overhead
compared to active replication and significantly lower recovery overhead and recov-
ery time compared to rollback recovery, especially at larger rates of event generation.
Considering that FlexCEP incorporates the transfer of fine-grained and up-to-date
operator state information, it incurs near-zero event loss and event duplication.
In our evaluations, we considered a case where the restore buffer Brestore on the pri-
mary upstream node is updated (and trimmed) in accordance with the restore buffer
synchronization factor, φrestore = 2/WINDOW_SIZE. By varying the value of φrestore be-
tween 1 and WINDOW_SIZE, we can achieve different degrees of runtime and recovery
overhead, thus allowing for an adaptive approach for different application settings.
For example, with φrestore = 1/WINDOW_SIZE, FlexCEP allows us to choose those op-
portune moments when the state of the operator is effectively null, which roughly
corresponds to the savepoint approach developed by Koldehofe et al. [116]. A larger
value of φrestore reduces the runtime overhead considerably (by 2 in our case), but can
potentially increase the recovery overhead significantly. Similarly, setting φrestore = 1
(i.e., trimming the restore buffer for every event that arrives in the intermediate
buffer) will result in a considerably higher runtime overhead (comparable with that
of active replication), but lead to much lower recovery overhead and time, given that
the size of Brestore will be at the optimal minimum.
While our evaluations showcase the advantages of FlexCEP over active replication
and rollback recovery, they do not consider the possible consequences of network
failure and real-world connectivity. Possible loss of connectivity or loss of events
due to the wireless infrastructure can be detrimental factors to the functioning of a
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distributed CEP system. In our work, we mainly focused on analyzing the option to
adapt operator migration in dynamic environments in accordance with the operator
state and the node characteristics. The evaluation of one such approach in real-world
CEP systems, with possibly multiple node failures, is an open research question.
Finally, FlexCEP can also be used to migrate CEP operators from (seemingly)
less-trustworthy nodes to more-trustworthy nodes, if the trust relations of the users
change during the execution of an operator graph. In our work, TrustCEP first an-
alyzes the trust recommendations and then uses the established trust levels for the
placement and execution of CEP operators. However, it can be modified to incorpo-
rate trust recommendations on the fly, based on the activity of other users. Conse-
quently, the migration of the operators can be done in accordance with the current
trust values (which are also exchanged using trust recommendations). While we in-
dicate this connection between the TrustCEP and FlexCEP components for now, the
evaluation of their combined functionality is subject to future work.

7
C O N C L U S I O N
We now conclude this thesis by summarizing the main contributions of our work.We discuss the results obtained from the evaluation of the three components
of our work and draw conclusions on their applicability in the future. In doing so,
we also discuss the open issues and provide an outlook towards future work.
7.1 summary of the thesis
In our work, the main goal was the development of a distributed CEP system that
allows for privacy-aware and reliable processing of context data in dynamic D2D
environments as part of the IoT. In Chapter 1, we motivated the usage of CEP for
context processing in the IoT, and provided an extensive overview of the fundamen-
tals behind CEP in Chapter 2. Proceeding from the basics of CEP, we motivated the
main challenges in Chapter 1—differing privacy constraints, presence of adversaries,
and dynamic changes in D2D environments—that must be overcome by one such
distributed system.
Based on the system requirements derived from the above challenges, we iden-
tified event processing, trusted computing, and human relationship analysis as the
three main fields for our work. We comprehensively analyzed existing state of the art
in the above fields in Chapter 2, focusing on prevalent approaches towards privacy-
awareness and reliability. In turn, as our overall contribution, we proposed a dis-
tributed CEP system that incorporates trust-based and flexible execution of CEP
operators in dynamic D2D environments; Chapter 3 presents an overview of the pro-
posed system. In the following, we shall summarize the key aspects of the three main
contributions of our work, along with a discussion of the corresponding evaluation
results.
Contribution 1: Estimating User Relationships to Identify Their Privacy Constraints
Our first contribution deals with the automatic estimation of user relationships in
order to identify the privacy constraints of the users. We leverage sociological find-
ings that the type (social circle) and strength (tie strength) of a human relationship
have a direct correspondence with the trust in the relationship, and therefore, with
the amount of information shared and disclosed between the two users. In turn, we
present a method to estimate the social circle and tie strength based on the commu-
nication characteristics between the users, presented in Chapter 4.
Based on our evaluations using supervised machine learning algorithms, we ob-
tained an average accuracy of 77.36% (κ = 0.33) in estimating the social circles, and
75.81% (κ = 0.42) in identifying the strong relationships. We observed that family and
work contacts exhibit typical temporal communication patterns. We also observed
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certain interesting characteristics—e.g., the number of communication channels per
contact and the number of emoticons used in messages are positive indicators of
a stronger relationship—allowing us to establish diverse interaction patterns across
different relationships.
Contribution 2: Trust-Based Execution of Distributed CEP Systems
The results from our FamApp analysis provided the basis for our next contribution
called TrustCEP, explained in Chapter 5. As part of this contribution, we proposed
a trust-based approach for distributed CEP, by facilitating a privacy-aware operator
placement and execution in D2D environments. Leveraging the concept of behavioral
trust that formulates trust based on user behavioral patterns (e.g., communication
patterns), we propose a trust management model, TrustCEP. TrustCEP evaluates
the direct trust between users based on observations in their communication patterns
and interaction history, using the key influential features established in Chapter 4.
Furthermore, TrustCEP accounts for the evolution of trust by incorporating a robust
scheme for trust recommendations, which also allows us to identify the adversaries
in the system. The derived trust relations between the users allow us to deploy a
privacy-aware placement algorithm to place and execute the operators on the devices
that are trustworthy.
Based on analytical evaluation tests, we found that our approach prevents adver-
sary attacks as long as the adversaries are not in the majority. We also observed
that our approach allows for the detection of adversaries in the majority, when the
adversaries fail to infiltrate the entire network. We also conducted a performance
analysis of our approach by deploying it in a smartphone-based distributed CEP sys-
tem, which allows for direct interaction and collaborative processing. We observed
that our approach inflicts only a marginally higher battery consumption (2-6%) on
contemporary smartphones, in comparison to other privacy-negligent approaches.
Contribution 3: Reliable Execution of Distributed CEP Systems in Dynamic Environments
Finally, our third contribution deals with the reliable execution of CEP operators in a
dynamic D2D environment, focusing on the resource-constrained and mobile nature
of D2D-based networks in the IoT. To facilitate a reliable execution of distributed CEP,
we developed a flexible operator migration approach called FlexCEP, as described
in Chapter 6. Through FlexCEP, we devised a fine-grained and proactive approach
to migrate CEP operator state from one node to another, depending on the mobility
as well as the prevailing internal conditions of the nodes in the network. In particu-
lar, we propose an adaptive buffer management approach to allow for appropriate
rollback recovery in case of failures. Furthermore, we propose a predictive analysis
of the availability of the nodes by keeping track of vital information about the nodes’
instantaneous characteristics—e.g., location coordinates or energy levels.
In our evaluations, we compared our approach against active replication and roll-
back recovery approaches in both quasi-stationary as well as highly mobile environ-
ments. Our evaluation results show that we achieve significantly lower communica-
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tion overhead (runtime and recovery) and lower recovery times compared to both
approaches towards reliability in distributed CEP systems. FlexCEP also results in
near-zero event loss and duplicates, owing mainly to the fine-grained nature of op-
erator state transfer for recovery. By varying the rate at which the nodes trim their
buffer content, we can achieve a wider spectrum of communication overhead and
recovery time, depending on the requirements of the application at hand.
7.1.1 Conclusions
With the advent of user-centric applications based on situational context in the IoT,
the need for preserving user privacy becomes increasingly important. Furthermore,
the dynamic nature of the IoT introduces additional challenges to the proper working
of these applications, especially given the distributed nature of information sources
and interested consumers in the IoT. The combination of the three main contributions
of this thesis allows for the realization of a privacy-aware and reliable CEP system
for dynamic D2D environments, as described in Section 3.3.
In our work, we maintain the users as the central stakeholders of the system. Con-
sequently, our approach for a privacy-aware and reliable CEP system incorporates
the privacy constraints of the users as well as the resource-constrained and mobile
nature of their devices. By incorporating the trust relations between the users dur-
ing the placement and execution of the CEP operators, we allow for event transfer
only to those devices that are trustworthy to the user(s) at hand. We model the
trust relations based on the behavioral aspects of user relationships, thus avoiding
burdensome methods that require the attention of the users [142, 170]. Finally, by
accounting for their mobility and device resources, we provide for an adaptive and
flexible approach to facilitate reliability in dynamic D2D environments.
7.2 outlook
The results of this thesis can be used in many application scenarios pertinent to
the IoT. The three scenarios described in Section 3.1—and used as the basis for
the evaluations—are inherent aspects of context-aware applications for traffic mon-
itoring, home automation, healthcare, and environmental planning, among others,
where the sensor data from the environment are processed to obtain higher-level in-
formation about the situational user context. While this thesis only concentrates on
D2D environments, with short-range communication between devices, the transfer
of these approaches to the global scale is subject to future work. Fog computing [35,
214] is an upcoming network paradigm that brings cloud computing to the edge
of the network, and therefore allows for low-latency and mobility-aware services,
especially in the context of the IoT [34, 35]. Another bright prospect for a new com-
munication paradigm is Named-Data Networking (NDN) [105], which deals with the
direct retrieval of information based on its name, instead of the host-based packet
delivery prevalent in the Internet nowadays. The combination of NDN and fog com-
puting is a very promising field for future research—as shown in the initial work by
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Amadeo et al. [8]—where the approaches proposed in this thesis provide the initial
groundwork for privacy-aware and reliable communication.
An important aspect of our work revolves around the trust relations between users.
While our work incorporates one dimension of trust, in reality, human relationships
exhibit different trust levels in different contexts, e.g., depending on the locative and
temporal conditions. Many articles in related literature have focused on understand-
ing the nuances of sharing patterns based on human relationships [27, 51, 114, 153,
170], and pointed out the significance of contextual information in governing the
sharing patterns. Incorporating these factors into the trust measurement framework
and dealing with trust recommendations in multiple contexts present interesting di-
rections for future work in trusted distributed computing in the IoT.
A correlated aspect to trust is security in distributed D2D environments. While cap-
turing the trust relations allows us to incorporate privacy-awareness in the proposed
system, the ultimate implementation of the system necessitates strong underlying se-
curity mechanisms. Recently, Intel® released a new technology called Software Guard
eXtensions (SGX) to allow application developers to shield selected parts of their code
from any external modifications using secure enclaves [102]. In turn, Intel SGX ensure
the confidentiality and integrity of the data within enclaves [11]. However, while SGX
are currently available for Intel® motherboards, there are no feasible hardware mech-
anisms available for user smartphones at the moment. Another promising mecha-
nism is homomorphic encryption, which allows for the processing of encrypted data
without revealing the contents of the data themselves [162]. While current implemen-
tations of homomorphic encryption are either insufficient for IoT-based applications
or unfeasible for resource-constrained devices such as user smartphones [195], a pos-
sible future research direction is the development of such encryption mechanisms
for the IoT.
Concerning reliability in distributed CEP, in our work, we proposed a flexible
approach that allows for different trade-offs in terms of communication overhead
and recovery time, depending on the needs of the application at hand. An interest-
ing direction for future research is the development of transition mechanisms that
adapt the underlying algorithm to the environmental conditions. For example, when
the node mobility is low, the amount of runtime communication overhead can be
reduced, considering that the probability of node failure is lower. Conversely, in
highly-mobile environments, the runtime overhead can be traded off for reduced re-
covery overhead and recovery time. The Collaborative Research Centre “MAKI” is
currently working on transitions in event-based communication systems, and espe-
cially on the proactive planning and coordination of transitions in such systems [37].
Adapting the functionality of a distributed CEP system to varying environmental
conditions is a compelling aspect for future work.
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A
A P P E N D I X
a.1 comparison of supervised machine learning algorithms
As part of the estimation of the social circle and strength of user relationships, we
employed supervised machine learning algorithms to determine the correlation be-
tween the extracted features and the ground truth provided by the users in our
field studies, Phase I and Phase II. We analyzed the performance of four popular ma-
chine learning algorithms for binary classification—Support Vector Machines (SVM),
rule-based decision tree models C4.5 and Random Forest (RF), and the probabilistic
model, Näive Bayes (NB). For the further analysis of the obtained datasets, we tested
these four algorithms using the 10-fold cross-validation approach, as described in
Section 4.3.1.2.
For the subsequent analysis, we used the performance metrics: accuracy and Co-
hen’s Kappa κ. Accuracy provides a measure of the number of correctly estimated
instances among all instances in the dataset. Cohen’s Kappa κ ∈ [0, 1] provides a
measure of the performance improvement that the algorithm provides with respect
to the given dataset, in comparison to a random agreement. We measure the accuracy
and κ values for each of the above algorithms with respect to the four main social
circles—friend, family, work, and hobby—to determine the algorithm that performs
best with respect to our dataset.
Table 18: Comparison of the Four Main Machine Learning Algorithms w.r.t. our Dataset in
Phase I
Accuracy (%) Kappa
J48 LibSVM NB RF J48 LibSVM NB RF
Friend 55.47 59.11 58.30 62.35 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.25
Family 65.75 63.01 64.38 65.75 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.32
Work 64.86 62.16 64.86 78.38 0.26 0.23 0.31 0.55
Hobby 73.61 56.25 65.28 67.36 0.47 0.12 0.31 0.35
Average 64.92 60.13 63.21 68.46 0.29 0.20 0.26 0.36
Std. Dev. 6.43 2.67 2.85 6.01 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.11
Table 18 presents the results of the comparison. We evaluated each of the above-
mentioned machine learning algorithms using their equivalent implementations us-
ing the machine learning tool WEKA. Accordingly, we used the LibSVM implemen-
tation for SVM; the J48 implementation for C4.5; and the namesake implementations
for RF and NB.
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From the results in Table 18, we can clearly see that the performance of the RF
algorithm is superior to that of the other algorithms, both in terms of accuracy as
well as κ. It achieves an average of 5.71% improvement over the other algorithms in
accuracy, and a higher κ by 0.11. While the standard deviation of the accuracy across
the four social circles is higher than that of LibSVM and NB, RF performs better than
these algorithms with respect to all social circles. Consequently, we decided to pro-
ceed with the estimation of the user relationships using the RF algorithm provided
by WEKA.
a.2 analysis of trustcep against on-off attacks (continued)
Figure 37: Trust Value Distribution upon On-Off Attack with Increase in Number of Rounds
Minority Adversary Population: 20 Users, 12 Benign, 6 Adversary
In this section, we show some results from our analytical evaluations of TrustCEP
with respect to on-off attacks. We particularly focus on the analysis of the trust level
distribution for different trust modification coefficients. Just to recall, we model on-
off attacks such that adversaries behave benignly for a fixed period of time called
nbenign, before turning malicious. Figure 37 illustrates the distribution of the trust
levels, from the benign users’ point of view, for a sample case with on-off attacks,
where the adversaries are in the minority. We observe a clear increase in the trust
values obtained by the adversaries after the initial waiting period, nwait = 10, elapses.
However, after the adversaries turn malicious after nbenign = 25, we observe a rapid
decline in their obtained trust values. We also observe that the initial rise in the trust
values of the adversaries has led to a decrease of trust value for some of the benign
users. However, more than 50% of the benign users obtain a trust value of 0.8 or
higher.
In the above figure, we used the default values for the trust modification coef-
ficients, τinc = 0.05 and τdec = 0.75. In the following two sections, we look at the
performance of TrustCEP against on-off attacks when we assume either a conserva-
tive or a liberal set of values for the coefficients.
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(a) Minority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 12 Benign, 8 Adversary
(b) Majority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 6 Benign, 14 Adversary
Figure 38: Trust Value Distribution upon On-Off Attack for Conservative Trust Modification
Coefficients
a.2.1 Influence of Trust Modification Coefficients: Conservative Case
For the conservative case, as mentioned in Section 5.3.1.4, we lower the values of
the trust modification coefficients, such that τinc = 0.025 and τdec = 0.5. In turn, any
negative trust divergence1 leads to a minor increase in the corresponding trust value.
However, a positive trust divergence halves the corresponding trust value.
Figure 38 shows the trust value distribution for two samples cases, one with the
adversaries in the minority, and the other with them in the majority. In Figure 38a,
we observe that the conservative nature of the trust modification coefficients lead to a
drastic decrease in the trust values of both the benign users as well as the adversaries,
as soon as the waiting period nwait = 4 elapses. Interestingly, even in Figure 38b,
where the adversaries are in the majority, we observe a similar phenomenon, such
that all users obtain a trust value of less than 0.1 by the end of 9 rounds. Although
we notice that the benign users obtain higher trust values in the first rounds after
the waiting period, we can see that their trust value decreases rapidly afterwards.
The main reason for the poor performance of TrustCEP in the conservative case is
due to the partial coverage on the part of all users in the on-off case. Recall from Sec-
tion 5.3.1.3 that the adversaries only infiltrate a partial set of benign users in this case.
This also affects the trust values obtained by the benign users due to the discrepancy
in the trust recommendations obtained by each user. Furthermore, recall that the
malicious threshold malValue is dependent on the trust increase coefficient τinc. Ac-
cordingly, the lower value of malValue implies that fewer aberrations are condoned
by the users, leading to quicker punishments and therefore, lower trust values.
1 Note that a negative trust divergence indicates that the recommended trust values are higher than the
current trust values. See Equation 6 in Section 5.2.2.1 for more details.
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a.2.2 Influence of Trust Modification Coefficients: Liberal Case
For the liberal case, we used τinc = 0.1 and τdec = 0.9, such that the trust values obtain
a large additive increase if the trust divergence with respect to the trust recommen-
dations is negative. Similarly, a positive trust divergence leads to minimal decrease
in the trust values.
(a) Minority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 12 Benign, 8 Adversary
(b) Majority Adversary Population:
20 Users, 6 Benign, 14 Adversary
Figure 39: Trust Value Distribution upon On-Off Attack for Liberal Trust Modification
Coefficients
We notice in Figure 39 that the phenomenon observed in the conservative case is
reversed in the liberal case. In both the sample cases for adversary minority (Fig-
ure 39a) and adversary majority (Figure 39b), we see that all users obtain a trust
value of 1.0 by the end of 10 rounds. This attributes to the higher value for the mali-
cious threshold malValue, as a consequence of the higher value for τinc. Subsequently,
a larger number of aberrations need to occur before the corresponding users are
assumed to be adversaries. This, together with the fact that the adversaries do not
infiltrate the entire environment, leads to the rapid increase of the trust values of all
users in the liberal case. Effectively, it is of paramount importance to choose the right
trust modification coefficients for a given application.
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a.3 list of acronyms
5G Fifth Generation
ABAC Attribute-Based Access Control
API Application Programming Interface
AR Active Replication
CBPS Content-Based Publish/Subscribe
CEP Complex Event Processing
D2D Device-to-Device
DoS Denial-of-Service
DSMS Data Stream Management System
DTN Delay-Tolerant Network
ECA Event-Condition-Action
GPS Global Positioning System
iAR Improved Active Replication
IFP Information Flow Processing
IM Instant Messaging
IoT Internet of Things
JVM Java Virtual Machine
MANET Mobile Ad-hoc Network
MCEP Mobile Complex Event Processing
MOM Message-Oriented Middleware
MSA Mobile Situation Awareness
NB Näive Bayes
NB-IoT Narrowband Internet of Things
NDN Named-Data Networking
NFC Near Field Communication
NLP Natural Language Processing
OS Operating System
OSN Online Social Network
P2P Peer-to-Peer
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP-CEP Privacy-Preserving Complex Event Processing
RBAC Roll-Based Access Control
RF Random Forest
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
RR Rollback Recovery
SGX Software Guard eXtensions
SMS Short Message Service
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SPS Stream Processing System
SVM Support Vector Machine
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TTP Trusted Third Party
UDP User Datagram Protocol
V2V Vehicle-to-Vehicle
VANET Vehicular Ad-hoc Network
VM Virtual Machine
WiFi Wireless Fidelity
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
A.4 supervised student theses 161
a.4 supervised student theses
a.4.1 Bachelor and Master Theses
[1] Yashas Bharadwaj. “A Smartphone-Based Distributed System for Privacy-Preserving
Complex Event Processing in Dynamic User Environments.” Master Thesis.
TU Darmstadt, 2016.
[2] Jérôme Charrier. “Design of a Familiarity Function to Preserve User Privacy
in Context Data Exchange.” Bachelor Thesis. TU Darmstadt, 2015.
[3] Christof Pauer. “Vertraulicher Informationsaustausch in mobilen kontextbe-
wussten Anwendungen mittels des Publish/Subscribe Paradigmas.” Engl.:
"Confidential Information Exchange for Mobile Context-aware Applications
using the Publish/Subscribe Paradigm". Master Thesis. TU Darmstadt, 2016.
[4] Johannes Thomas. “Entwurf einer hybriden Architektur zum Austausch von
sensiblen Daten in mobilen kontextsensitiven Anwendungen durch geeignetes
Caching.” Engl.: "Design of a Hybrid Architecture for Privacy-Preserving
Data Exchange in Mobile Context-aware Applications through Suitable Caching".
Master Thesis. TU Darmstadt, 2016.
[5] Thulasiram Valleru. “Efficient Migration of Operator Graphs for Distributed
Complex Event Processing in Dynamic User Environments.” Master Thesis.
TU Darmstadt, 2017.
a.4.2 Labs and Seminars
[6] Abhishek Ballal and Bharath Honnappa. “Information Confidentiality in Event
Processing Systems.” Seminar on Advanced Topics in Future Internet Re-
search. TU Darmstadt, 2017.
[7] Fares Beji. “Adaptive Video Streaming in Wireless Named Data Networking.”
Lab Project. TU Darmstadt, 2016.
[8] Jérôme Charrier, Shule Liu, and Shahnewaz Suman. “Analyzing Familarity
based on User Interactions.” Lab Project. TU Darmstadt, 2016.
[9] Muhammad Talha Khan. “Privacy Preservation during Information Exchange
over the Internet.” Seminar on Advanced Topics in Future Internet Research.
TU Darmstadt, 2015.
[10] Seema Kumar and R. K. Dileep. “Secure Range Queries in Wireless Sensor
Networks.” Seminar on Advanced Topics in Future Internet Research. TU
Darmstadt, 2015.
[11] Artur Michel. “Survey über Lokalisierungs- und Kontextuierungsverfahren
von Nutzern.” Engl.: "Survey on Approaches for Localization and Contextu-
alization of Users". Proseminar. TU Darmstadt, 2015.
162 appendix
[12] Artur Michel and Long Zhao. “On-the-Fly Decentralized Mechanisms to Iden-
tify Co-located Peers.” Lab Project. TU Darmstadt, 2015.
[13] Nivedita Paul and Nikhil Kalathil. “An Analysis of Privacy-Preserving Mech-
anisms in Distributed Systems.” Seminar on Advanced Topics in Future Inter-
net Research. TU Darmstadt, 2015.
[14] Daniel Specht, Benjamin Schiller, and Marius Rettberg-Päplow. “Activity Recog-
nition Based on User Interaction Patterns on Smartphones.” Lab Project. TU
Darmstadt, 2017.
[15] Navdeep Uniyal and Vamsi Krishna Sripathi. “Secure Range Queries in Sen-
sor Networks.” Seminar on Advanced Topics in Future Internet Research. TU
Darmstadt, 2015.
B
A U T H O R ’ S P U B L I C AT I O N S
main publications
[1] Rahul Dwarakanath, Jérôme Charrier, Frank Englert, Ronny Hans, Dominik
Stingl, and Ralf Steinmetz. “Analyzing the Influence of Instant Messaging on
User Relationship Estimation.” In: 2016 IEEE International Conference on Mobile
Services (MS). San Francisco, CA, USA: IEEE, 2016, pp. 49–56.
[2] Rahul Dwarakanath, Boris Koldehofe, Yashas Bharadwaj, The An Binh Nguyen,
David Eyers, and Ralf Steinmetz. “TrustCEP: Adopting a Trust-Based Ap-
proach for Distributed Complex Event Processing.” In: 2017 IEEE International
Conference on Mobile Data Management (MDM). Daejeon, South Korea: IEEE,
2017, pp. 30–39.
[3] Rahul Dwarakanath, Boris Koldehofe, and Ralf Steinmetz. “Operator Migra-
tion for Distributed Complex Event Processing in Device-to-Device Based
Networks.” In: Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Middleware for Context-Aware
Applications in the IoT. Trento, Italy: ACM, 2016, pp. 13–18.
[4] Rahul Dwarakanath, Dominik Stingl, and Ralf Steinmetz. “Improving Inter-
user Communication: A Technical Survey on Context-aware Communication.”
In: PIK-Praxis der Informationsverarbeitung und Kommunikation 38.1-2 (2015).
co-authored publications
[5] Svenja Neitzel, Frank Englert, Rahul Dwarakanath, Katharina Schneider, Kathrin
Reinke, Gisela Gerlach, Christoph Rensing, Doreen Boehnstedt, and Ruth
Stock-Homburg. “Towards Using Situational Information to Detect an Indi-
vidual’s Perceived Stress Level.” In: 2017 IEEE International Conference on Per-
vasive Computing and Communications Workshops (PerCom Workshops). Kona, HI,
USA: IEEE, 2017, pp. 333–338.
[6] The An Binh Nguyen, Pratyush Agnihotri, Christian Meurisch, Manisha Luthra,
Rahul Dwarakanath, Jeremias Blendin, Doreen Boehnstedt, Michael Zink, and
Ralf Steinmetz. “Efficient Crowd Sensing Task Distribution Through Context-
aware NDN-based Geocast.” In: 42nd IEEE International Conference on Local
Computer Networks (LCN). Singapore, Singapore: IEEE, 2017, pp. 52–60.
[7] Katharina Schneider, Frank Englert, Doreen Böhnstedt, Gisela Bieling, Rahul
Dwarakanath, Ralf Steinmetz, and Ruth Stock-Homburg. “Why are You so
Stressed? Analyzing Methods for Mobile Stress Measurement.” In: Digital
Working Life. Dubrovnik, Croatia, 2016.
163
164 author’s publications
[8] Katharina Schneider, Kathrin Reinke, Gisela Gerlach, Christoph Anderson,
Sebastian Wojtek, Svenja Neitzel, Rahul Dwarakanath, Doreen Boehnstedt,
and Ruth Stock. “Aligning ICT-enabled Availability and Individual Availabil-
ity Preferences: Design and Evaluation of Availability Management Applica-
tions.” In: Proceedings of International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS).
Seoul, South Korea: AIS Electronic Library, 2017.
demo/phd forum papers
[9] Rahul Dwarakanath and Ralf Steinmetz. “A Decentralized System for Privacy-
Preserving Context Exchange: Facilitating a Better Work-Life Balance.” In:
2014 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP): PhD Fo-
rum. 2014, pp. 489–491.
[10] Denny Stohr, Fares Beji, Rahul Dwarakanath, Ralf Steinmetz, and Wolfgang
Effelsberg. “Mobile NDN-Based Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP.”
In: 41st IEEE International Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN): Demo
Track. Dubai, UAE: IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–4.
C
C U R R I C U L U M V I TÆ
personal
Name Rahul Wermund, ne Chini Dwarakanath
Date of Birth September 05, 1987
Place of Birth Raichur, Karnataka, India
Nationality Indian
education
Since 01/2014 Technische Universität Darmstadt,
Doctoral candidate at the Department of
Electrical Engineering and
Information Technology
10/2010-07/2013 Technische Universität Darmstadt,
Master studies in Electrical Engineering,
Degree: Master of Science
09/2005-06/2009 Visweswaraya Technological University, India
Bachelor studies in Telecommunications,
Degree: Bachelor of Engineering
academic experience
01/2014-12/2017 Researcher funded by the Social Link Project
within the Loewe Program of Excellence in Research,
Hesse, Germany
work experience
01/2014-12/2017 Technische Universität Darmstadt,
Research assistant in the research group
Adaptive Overlay Communications (AOC) at the
Multimedia Communcations Lab (KOM)
06/2013-07/2013 Nomor Research GmbH,
Student trainee (DE: Werkstudent)
in the System Level Simulation group
166 curriculum vitæ
04/2012-09/2012 Nomor Research GmbH,
Intern in the System Level Simulation group
teaching activity
2014 - 2017 Lecture “Communication Networks II”,
Organizer and teaching assistant.
2014 - 2017 Lab “Multimedia Communications Lab/Project”,
Supervisor.
2014 - 2017 Seminar “Advanced Topics in Future Internet Research”,
Supervisor.
2014 Seminar “Mobile Phone-based Participatory Sensing and its
Analysis in Mobile Communities”,
Teaching assistant
scientific activities
2017 Reviewer for ACM International Conference on Distributed
and Event-Based Systems (DEBS), 2017
2017 Reviewer for International Conference on Cloud Computing
and Services Science (CLOSER), 2017 (on behalf of Prof. Dr.-
Ing. Ralf Steinmetz)
2016 Reviewer for ACM/IEEE International Conference on Internet-
of-Things Design and Implementation (IoTDI), 2016 (on be-
half of Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ralf Steinmetz)
2016 Reviewer for ACM International Conference on Distributed
and Event-Based Systems (DEBS), 2016 (on behalf of Dr. Boris
Koldehofe)
2014 Reviewer for IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer
Computing (P2P), 2014 (on behalf of Prof. Dr.-Ing. Ralf Stein-
metz)
supervised theses
01/2017 Thulasiram Valleru, “Efficient Migration of Operator Graphs
for Distributed Complex Event Processing in Dynamic User
Environments”, Master thesis
08/2016 Yashas Bharadwaj, “A Smartphone-Based Distributed Sys-
tem for Dynamic Privacy-Preserving Complex Event Pro-
cessing”, Master thesis
curriculum vitæ 167
07/2016 Johannes Thomas, “Entwurf einer hybriden Architektur zum
Austausch von sensiblen Daten in mobilen kontextsensitiven
Anwendungen durch geeignetes Caching”, Master thesis
03/2016 Christof Pauer, “Vertraulicher Informationsaustausch in mo-
bilen kontextbewussten Anwendungen mittels des Publish/-
Subscribe Paradigmas”, Master thesis
09/2015 Jérôme Charrier, “Design of a Familiarity Function to Pre-
serve User Privacy in Context Data Exchange”, Bachelor the-
sis
honors
2005-2009 ‘Distinction award’ by Visweswaraya Technological Univer-
sity for securing First Class with Distinction (FCD) through
all 8 semesters of the Bachelor studies
Darmstadt, January 23, 2018
Rahul Wermund

D
E R K L Ä R U N G L A U T § 9 D E R P R O M O T I O N S O R D N U N G
Ich versichere hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation allein und nur unter
Verwendung der angegebenen Literatur verfasst habe. Die Arbeit hat bisher noch
nicht zu Prüfungszwecken gedient.
Darmstadt, 30. Oktober 2017
Rahul Wermund, geb. Chini
Dwarakanath
